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INTRODUCTION l
"Why is my pain perpetual,
and my wound incurable,
which refuseth to be healed?"
-Jeremiah

"Existentialism" today refers to faddism, decadentism, morbidity,
the "philosophy of the graveyard"; to words like fear, dread, anxiety,
anguish, suffering, aloneness, death; to novelists such as Jean-Paul
Sartre, Dostoievski, Camus, Kafka; to philosophers like Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, Marcel, Jaspers, and Sartre-and because it refers to, and is
concerned with, all of these ideas and persons, existentialism has lost
any clearer meaning it may have originally possessed. Because it has
so many definitions, it can no longer be defined. As Sartre writes:
"Most people who use the word existentialism would be embarraa.ed if they had to explain it, since, now that the word is all
the rage, even the work of a musician or painter is being called
existentialist. A gossip columnist ... signs himself The Existentialist, so that by this time the word has been so stretched
and has taken on so broad a meaning, that it no longer means
anything at all." 2
This state of definitional confusion is not an accidental or negligible
matter. An attempt will be made in this introduction to account for
the confustion and to show why any definition of existentialism involves us in a tangle. First, however, it is necessary to state in a tentative and very general manner what points of view are here intended
when reference is made to existentialism.
Sartre means by existentialism the doctrine "that existence precedes essence, or, if you prefer, that subjectivity must be the starting
point." 3 We must begin with subjectivity, not simply because it is
1 With miilOr changes this introduction appeared in the Winter, 1950, issue of
The University of Kansas City Review.
• Sartre. J-P., Existentialism, 14-15.
"Ibid., 15.
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some sort of convenient starting point but because man has become
problematic to himself, and self-consciously so_ His problem is his own
existence_ The traditional categories of cognition are not only insufficient for a solution but are utterly inapplicable, for the problem
is not one of cognition, certainly not one of cognition in the ordinary
sense of the term_
Nietzsche exclaimed: "God is dead," and men are faced with the
profound responsibility of deciding for themselves, choosing for themselves, acting for themselves, and being themselves; i.e., choosing
authentic existence rather than "losing" themselves in the crowd, becoming a "non-entity," escaping reality_ In this transvaluation of all
values more is at stake than traditional Christianity. According to
tradition a man could not only be saved but he could depend upon
the state, count on his family, and similar institutions. The crisis of our
age, however, of which the existentialist writers speak is the loss of faith
in the absoluteness of Reason, of Science, and of Logic. Ours is the
time of a-logicality. Man is burning between chance and despair, between hope and nothingness, between salvation and guilt.
Existentialism emerges as deeply felt concern with and for the concrete reality of the individual: it is his existence that is vital, and it is
he who must define himself. It is no longer possible to lose oneself in
the System or hope to reveal existence by analytic procedures used in
the investigation of "life" or the "cosmos." The individual as such, in
his unique subjectivity, in his personal existence, is at stake; and existentialism holds that the essence of a person may not be revealed by
reference to an a priori theory of man or any religious interpretation
that speaks of man prior to and apart from his actual existence.
In view of this tentative definition of our subject matter, it is
reasonable to ask about the history of this idea or complex of ideas
referred to as existentialism; whether it represents a movement which
has deep roots in the history of philosophy, or whether it began as a
literary interest. It is possible to speak, if we wish, of an existential
"attitude" and trace the origins of this attitude in past cultures. However, since the purpose of this work is not historical, the "tracings"
that will be done will be rather casual and incomplete. We shall
review the history and background of existentialism merely in an attempt to find a more adequate definition and to assign to it more
properly its place in the general history of ideas.
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However, we are faced at once with a specific difficulty; for it is
obvious that in some sense every philosopher, every man who has ever
"philosophized," has been concerned with the problem of man's existence. It soon becomes meaningless, therefore, to search for historical
antecedents of existentialism unless we restrict the meaning of the term
"existentialist" to those philosophers or thinkers whose specific concern is the concrete subjectivity of man as it defines his actual and
concrete existence. And even with this restriction of the term some
names will have to be considered whose bearers are at best but doubtful
"existentialists." 4
The reaction of Socrates against the Sophists was more than a rejection of rhetoric and fee-taking; it was the turning to a deeper
respect for the problems of men. These problems concerning the Good
Life, Justice, and so on were not simply artificial debates in which
the victor was the "cleverer" who might take the opposite side the next
day to exhibit his verbal dexterity. For Socrates, philosophy was a
communion with persons, in the act of conversation recognizing their
right to bring forth their ideas-to give birth to their potential ideachildren. These ideas, again, are not the issues of mathematics or
physics, but rather the great ethical and social problems. There is an
ambiguous attitude toward reason and its products: an acceptance of
the validity of the rational process and a denial of purely rational
problems. It is thus possible through dialectic to reason our way to an
understanding of the human situation, but it is at the same time more
vital to discuss that human situation than work out equations or puzzles in geometry. Socrates, the life of Socrates, is an affirmation of the
untechnical and human in philosophy, and we shall see a little later
that it is largely for this reason that Kierkegaard is so "taken" by
Socrates. He is the antithesis of the "professor" that Kierkegaard railed
against. But to summarize: Socrates asks, what would you rather have,
a geometer's argument or a myth? He gives us myths that have as
their orientation-point man's place in the market-square, the language
of "shoemakers" and "shepherds," the specificity of the human condition.
We face in subsequent philosophy the fluctuations in valuation of
the worth, importance, and primacy of the individual. From Descartes

• For a historical study of existentialism see Kurt Holfman, Existential Philoso·
phy: A Study of its Past and Present Forms.
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to Hegel we witness the decline of the centrality of the individuaL If
modern philosophy is roughly dated with the Cartesian philosophy, we
may assert that until the period of the reactions against Descartes and
Hegel which came with Pascal and Kierkegaard, the story of modern
philosophy is the story of the loss of individuality, the languishing of
existential subjectivity_
Descartes in his search for "clear and distinct" ideas ignored the
immediate fact of human existence. The dualism of res extensa and
res cogitens is founded essentially on a separation of man's essence
from his existence, and Descartes never succeeded in welding the two
together again, or in synthesizing them. The reaction of Pascal was to
expose man as a feeling creature, a finite creature caught in the paradox of his search for the infinite, a creature that must believe his heart
because his reason is inadequate. Consider some of Pascal's Pensees:
"Let us then take our compass; we are something, and we are
not everything. The nature of our existence hides from us the
knowledge of first beginnings which are born of the Nothing;
and the littleness of our being conceals from us the sight of the
Infinite." 5
"This is our true state; this is what makes us incapable of
certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail within
a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end to
end. When we think to attach ourselves to any point and to
fasten to it, it wavers and leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes
our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever. Nothing stays for
us. This is our natural condition, and yet most contrary to our
inclination; we burn with desire to find solid ground and an
ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to
the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth
opens to abysses." 6
And, of course:
"The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know." 7
The brief protest of Pascal is swept up in the Hegelian Surge. The
Hegelian System which promises everything, the All-inclusive System,
• Pascal, B., Pensees, 24-25.

• Ibid., 25.
• Ibid., 95.
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makes of the Pascalian heart a determined point in the process. A
dialectical mechanism is constructed by Hegel. The unfolding of the
Absolute promises to reveal the slightest incident, but in revealing a
particle, a tiny happening, a single heart, it collapses the blown uniqueness of the person. Inwardness of the personality, the felt life is ruptured by a plan that engulfs the past, present, and future of man.
Kierkegaard is Hegel's punishment.
The positing of "the self against the System" 8 rests on the belief
that speculation (by which Kierkegaard meant the Hegelian philosophy) never reaches the Self but falls short of it. The exploration of
the Self is the burden of Kierkegaardian existentialism. By the Self
Kierkegaard means the "inwardness" of the individual, that unique
aspect of each of us which seeks to synthesize infinity and finitude,
temporality and eternity, freedom and necessity. The Self faces the
problem of salvation, of its "fear and trembling" and its despair. As a
theistic existentialist, Kierkegaard is concerned "to find out where
the misunderstanding lies between speculation and Christianity." 9
The traditional and orthodox Christianity of his time is unacceptable
to him. The ritual and pomp of the church have led away from the
essential Christian problem: the individual Self. But the issue is clear
for Kierkegaard: how is the Self to discover itself, to define itself, to
found itself? Kierkegaard speaks of stages in life's way which lead
from the undiscovered to the founded Self.
The first stage he calls the Aesthetic. At this level the individual
leads the life of the crowd. He loses himself in a bundle of activities.
He investigates the sensuous and sensual life. He faces everyone but
himself. The road from outwardness to inwardness crosses next the
Ethical Stage. Shocked from the aesthetic life, the individual finds
himself suddenly without props, and he reels from the knowledge that
what he has hitherto experienced is vain and illusory. He feels his
loneliness and recognizes his life as "sickness unto death." The third
or Religious Stage involves man directly with the issue of his relation
to God. He recognizes in his fear and trembling that it is only a blind
"leap to faith" through which he can reach God. There is no rational
guidance in this dialectic toward God. An incomprehensible divine
grace is active in its operation.
• Grene, M., Dreadful Freedom. "The Self Against the System" is the partial
title of Ch. 2.
• Ibid., 15.
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The dualisms of Kierkegaard are those of finite man seeking an infinite God, yielding the strange paradox of the God-man; the attempt of
a finite and imperfect reason striving to comprehend the infinite and
incomprehensible, giving rise to the paradox of thought trying to
think the unthinkable; and man seeking to synthesize the incompatible
elements of his own ethic and God's law, which is the paradox of faith_
The Bible story of Abraham and Isaac is to Kierkegaard the desperate
essence of man's condition. The story is described in Kierkegaard's
Fear and Trembling. Abraham is desirous of following the law of the
community, the law of his people. He loves his son, yet he is requested
by God to sacrifice his son. He must transcend man's law and obey
God's. Also, in Isaac alone exists Abraham's promise of the future_
If he kills Isaac, he slays as well the possibility of new generations_
Isaac is his delight and he must yet choose God. Kierkegaard asks:
"Who gave strength to Abraham's arm? Who held his right
hand up so that it did not fall limp at his side? He who gazes
at this becomes paralyzed. Who gave strength to Abraham's
soul, so that his eyes did not grow dim, so that he saw neither
Isaac nor the ram? He who gazes at this becomes blind.-And
yet rare enough perhaps is the man who becomes paralyzed and
blind, still more one who worthily recounts what happened. We
all know it-it was only a trial." 10
The necessity of God is the reflection of man's guilt, of his finitude.
Marjorie Grene writes:
"Subjectivity can be truly subjective only in the confrontation
of the individual with God, since only the absolute is completely
indescribable beyond the inroads of abstraction and objectivity.
Only before God is a man really himself, because it is only before
God that he is finally and irretrievably alone. But before God
the finite individual is as nothing; and it is the bitter realization
of that nothingness that marks the religious stage of existence."ll
The dialectic of Kierkegaard is integral to his philosophy. Here is
the Self, but the Self in its contradictions and in its confusions and
humors. Paradox is the booby-trap into which we plunge immediately
upon reading Kierkegaard, just as Alice went down the rabbit hole. In

10
11

Kierkegaard, S., Fear and Trembling, 28-29.
Grene, M., op. cit., 37-38.
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Either/Or Kierkegaard contrasts the aesthetic with the ethical standpoint. In developing the description of the aesthetic life, he writes of
the Seducer. The latter keeps an amazing diary recording the total
history of a seduction: the most subtle shadings of emotion and interest and the torturous psychologies involved. The ethicist in the
second part of Either/Or writes edifying letters to the aesthetician.
The fantastic irony and humor of Kierkegaard lies in the very composition of such works. They are published under pseudonyms which are
not seriously meant to fool anyone; they contain odd inner ironies,
such as aestheticist-ethicist, but it is never certain that the letters are
being written to whom it appears they are intended. One does not
know for sure at any point whose side the laugh is on.
It is easily seen that in Kierkegaard we find the first authentic
existentialist. His philosophy is directed toward a comprehension of
individuality. It faces the human condition but is religiously founded
and seeks to locate authentic existence for the Self by facing God and
attempting to reach him. The dialectical quality, the irony of Kierkegaard are the strong irrationalism of the thinker. His writing is the
testimony to the exhausted categories of Hegelian rationalism; and so it
is to be expected that Kierkegaard understands man as a creature who
cannot "prove" the existence of God via ontological arguments but
leaps to him in an act of ultimate faith.
The strange combination of irrationalism, poetry, irony, and faith
constitutes Kierkegaard's passionate paradox. It is a new kind of
philosophizing, and yet it is as old as Socrates. We have thus come
back to our starting point. It is now possible to determine what
Kierkegaard found sympathetic in Socrates. The Socratic dialogue is
really astounding: persons talk to persons, they don't rattle categories
at each other; there is a simplification of attitude: the dialogue hopes
to establish the meaning of Truth, Justice, and the Good. Imagine
that these values could derive from a conversation! The astrologer
Hegel would have to consult the Absolute!
Swenson once remarked that Kierkegaard never found his poet;
but, surely, Kierkegaard found his novelist in Kafka. The piercing
works of Kafka are a stubborn testimony to the effort of a writer to deal
with the problem of man's guilt. The basic situation Kafka writes
about may be seen in his novel, The Trial. The story begins:
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"Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine
morning." 12
K. has been accused. That morning two representatives of the law
presented him formally with the accusation. The next step is to learn
the details of the charge: of what exactly has he been accused? But to
this question the reader finds no answer in the novel.
K. must of necessity find a lawyer to represent him in the courts,
yet again the startling fact is that he is making preparations to defend
himself against unrevealed charges. And this state of accusation is
man's guilt: he must prepare his case before God, take it to the courts,
appeal his case to higher authorities, make "deals" with advocates,
appeal to hangers-on who pick up bits of information around the courts
regarding his case; and he can never penetrate to the highest court,
he can never know God, and he is to be condemned and destroyed I
Before his case began, K. was an ordinary citizen, a bank worker, a
person who rented quarters, a person who said "hello" to acquaintances, who went about his business. With the accusation K., in being
summoned to defend himself in court, is stunned into awareness of
himself and the pressing anxiety that accompanies his situation. Quickly he becomes the defendant. He realizes soon that his acquaintances
are aware of his "case"-aware that he has been accused. Soon K. is
isolated. He shuttles to and from his advocate's home_ He engages in
conversations only with those connected with his case. Another
defendant with whom he speaks recalls the large number of people
waiting perpetually in the anterooms and outer chambers of the courts.
" 'I sawall the people in the lobby,' remarked K., 'and thought
how pointless it was for them to be hanging about.' 'It's not
pointless at all,' said the traveller, 'the only pointless thing is to
try taking independent action.' " 13
There is no "way" for the accused man. He must spend his existence in momentary conversations, blind alleys, fragments of dreams,
desperate arguments with advocates and clerks, notes from the lower
courts, summonses, and trivial adjudications; there is no withdrawal
from one's case-it cannot be dropped. But if independent action is
12
13

Kafka, F., The Trial, 3.
Ibid., 220-221.
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impossible, then K. faces the paradox and the absurdity of being forced
to await an unforseeable decision while defending himself on an unknowable charge.
The conclusion of K.'s case is his assassination. There is no other
possibility. If a man should stand face to face with an omnipotent
diety, is it possible that he should observe anything but his finitude
and, therefore, his guilt? The description of K.'s death is the magnificent synthesis of the issues of The Trial. At the death-place and
moment K.'s
"glance fell on the top story of the house adjoining the quarry.
With a flicker as of a light going up, the casements of a window
there suddenly flew open; a human figure, faint and insubstantial at that distance and that height, leaned abruptly far
forward and stretched both arms still farther. Who was it?
A friend? A good man? Someone who sympathized? Someone
who wanted to help? Was it one person only? Or were they all
there? Was help at hand? Were there some arguments in his
favour that had been overlooked? Of course there must be.
Logic is doubtless unshakable, but it cannot withstand a man
who wants to go on living. Where was the Judge whom he had
never seen? Where was the High Court, to which he had never
penetrated? He raised his hands and spread out all his fingers.
"But the hands of one of the partners were already at K.'s
throat, while the other thrust the knife into his heart and turned it there twice. With failing eyes K. could still see the two of
them, cheek leaning against cheek, immediately before his face,
watching the final act. 'Like a dogl' he said; it was as if he
meant the shame of it to outlive him." 14
Kafka's work is one expression of the existentialism of the literary
genius; Dostoievski's writings are another. For in them we find equally
powerful expression of the issues of salvation and human existence.
In the novels of Sartre, however, we have the clearest case of a philosophic existentialist writing existentialist novels. In the literary work of
all three writers the chain of thought started by Socrates, emphasized
by Pascal, and stated with agonizing force by Kierkegaard, comes to
artistic fruition. But at this point we shall turn to the more theoretical
formulations of existentialism as they may be found in Sartre's popular
lectures and articles .

.. Ibid., 287-288.
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Sartre writes:
"When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that
everyone of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in
making this choice he also chooses all men." 15
But if in each of our actions we choose an image of man, we are faced
with the profound responsibility of accounting for that image; and
anguish is the accompaniment of this responsibility.
"Every man ought to say to himself, 'Am I really the kind of
man who has the right to act in such a way that humanity might
guide itself by my actions?' And if he does not say that to himself, he is masking his anguish." 16
If there is no a priori essence of man, then all human values are
created in the acts of choice. It is no longer meaningful to speak of
what we might have done in our lifetime if our dreams had come true.
Our potentiality was precisely defined in the acts we performed.

"For the existentialist there is really no love other than one
which manifests itself in a person's being in love. There is no
genius other than one which is expressed in works of art; the
genius of Proust is the sum of Proust's works; the genuis of
Racine is his series of tragedies. Outside of that, there is nothing. Why say that Racine could have written another tragedy,
when he didn't write it. A man is involved in life, leaves his
impress on it, and outside of that there is nothing." 17
By the same criterion we cannot speak of a living person as a
"coward" or a "failure" or a "hero" in the sense that this person has
some inner quality that determines his cowardice or heroism. Cowards
and heroes are cowardly or heroic simply in so far as they commit acts
of cowardice or heroism. A man who has acted as a beast may definie
himself as a human being of dignity if he acts with dignity. We are not
condemned to being a failure, but also our past success is continually
in the balance, for we must redefine that success as we go along.

,. Sartre, J-P., Existentialism, 20.
1. Ibid., 24.
17 Ibid., 38-39.
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Existential choice is self-conscious choice. In any case, a choice
occurs. If we actively determine it, so much the better; but if we remain passive, then we have chosen passivity-so much the worse I
There is no escape from the responsibility of our choice: no one can
choose for us.
But one might ask at this point why this philosophy has been
termed decadent and morbid.
"The picture of the world drawn from Existentialist literature is not a rosy one. Some themes recur with a revealing
insistence in their novels: nausea (physical and metaphysical),
inordinate absorption of hard drinks ';\ l'americaine: homosexuality, abortion, even occasional scatology." 18
The themes dealt with are the themes of the crisis of our age. Men are
bitterly aware of death-an horrific war has been fought. The sudden
crises and challenges and betrayals of life during the occupation, the
fantastic existence of the underground resistance movement; torture,
capture, escape, starvation, the death of love-these were all as immediate as the daily newspaper and the cinema. Moreover, there is
on the part of authors like Celine and Henry Miller an awareness
which Sartre and the existentialists share-the awareness of a vast
ennui, the stifling mud of pretense and bureaucracy that stuffs the
streets, the crafty doings of the merchants, the disordered, running
social cancer of lives that are groping toward a litle freedom. Within
this struggle Sartre, in his novels, addresses the actors and points to a
kind of freedom which carries with it the awfulness and trembling of
uncertainity when everything is at stake. The actors cannot turn to
God and they cannot turn to the psychologists; they must choose themselves and construct from the tissue of their own actions the structure
of their existence.
It seems that we have reached the logical point for a reconsideration
of the tentative definition of existentialism given at the outset of this
study. That early definition was derived from Sartre; and it is now
clear, I believe, in what sense Sartre intended it. We must now ask: Is
this what existentialism is? Have we cut to the heart of the doctrine?
. Let us proceed cautiously in the investigation at this point.

18 Peyre, H., "Existentialism-A Literature of Despair?", Yale French Studies,
Spring: Summer (1948),23.
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It is not difficult to observe that there are definite levels of interest
and attitude in the literary and philosophic works we have thus far
considered. At the literary level we have existentialism discussed or
used to explicate the condition of man, to examine his suffering and
aloneness and guilt. Writers such as Kafka, Dostoievski, to some extent
even Sartre, are shrewd and revealing psychologists as well as literary
masters. If we are concerned with descriptions of people, of characters, in specific situations, then few descriptions surpass those of
Dostoievski. But such descriptions are literature and not philosophy.
They do not concern us here. We turn instead to the philosophical
level of existentialism.
Let us leave Kierkegaard in a class by himself. Kierkegaard's problems are those of man's guilt, of his position before God, and of his
"fear and trembling" in his finitude. The definition of existentialism
as the doctrine of "existence being prior to essence" seems hardly adequate for such a position. To speak of existence and essence in such a
stilted style is almost anti-Kierkegaardian in spirit. It smacks of the
systematizers, the professors and Privatdozenten. If we omit further
consideration of Kierkegaard, we are left at the philosophical level
with thinkers such as Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, and Sartre. Of these
men we select Sartre for further study.
It is imperative to recognize several levels of existentialist thought
even in Sartre. His novels and popular lectures comprise one level;
his technical ontology occupies a different one. The basic confusions
and misinterpretations of Sartre's thought are largely due to the confounding of these levels. The novels and lectures are concerned with
employing and expositing certain highly technical theories of man's
Being: of his human situation and his problems of choice. But the
philosophic meaning of such concepts as "situation," "choice," "responsibility," and "anguish" cannot be understood unless they are examined
in their proper technical context-as they are developed in Sartre's
L'j};tre et le Neant. To comprehend fully the meaning and import of
Sartrean existentialism, therefore, we must turn to the background,
development, and structure of his ontology, his philosophy of man's
Being.
Sartre's philosophy is indebted to the projected ontology of Martin Heidegger. Sartre is Heidegger's best-known follower, and much
may be learned about Sartre's existential philosophy by turning briefly
to Heidegger's problem.
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Heidegger returned in philosophy to the old Aristotelian problem
of Being. He is concerned with knowing the nature of Being as Being.
The point is clearly stated by Wahl:
"Heidegger has declared that he is not a philosopher of existence, but a philosopher of Being, and that his eventual aim is
ontological. Heidegger considers the problem of existence solely
to introduce us to ontology, because the only form of Being
with which we are truly in contact (according to Heidegger) is
the being of man." 19
Sartre, too, commences with the problem of Being. His main
philosophic work, Being and Nothingness, is subtitled "Essay in
Phenomenological Ontology." However, the problem of Being for
Sartre is not simply a continuation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, but the
attempt to develop an original ontology. For Sartre, the approach to
Being turns as much for help to the phenomenology of Husserl and
Hegel as to Heidegger. These thinkers have had a profound influence
upon Sartre. As Wahl points out, the influence of Husserl in particular
leads Sartre "into a kind of idealism which may not be completely
consonant with the elements he may have derived from Heidegger." 20
Sartre's interpretation of Being as en-soi (in-itself) and as the pour-soi
(for-itself) betrays the dual tendencies in his thinking; for the en-soi
corresponds to the realistic element whereas the pour-soi corresponds
to the idealistic aspect. 21
For Husserl phenomenology had as its prime purpose the attempt
to describe and clarify the content of experience by way of the acts
of experiencing. In Heidegger the totality of the acts of the individual
determine the individual, and by knowing the former we may know
reality. It may be seen, then, that Sartre is in this tradition and is
attempting to cut across the traditional positions of idealism and
realism in founding a radically new ontology. He is attempting to
determine if phenomenology is competent to resolve the problems of
ontology.
,. Wahl, J., A Short History of Existentialism, 11; also see W. H. Werkmeister,
"An Introduction to Heidegger's Existential Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, II (1941-2).
20 Wahl, J., op. cit., 28.
21 Throughout this work the terms "pour·soi" and "en-so;" will be used, rather
than their English equivalents "for·itself" and "in-itself."
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Historically, the Kantian philosophy is the starting point in investigating the phenomenological-existential problem_ Varet writes:
"The failure of the Kantian critique begins with the idea that
the theory of the understanding can be developed independently, without an ontology." 22
For Sartre the question is: Does phenomenology have the inner capacity to expand into an ontology? Sartre's task, therefore, is to determine
whether phenomenology can be developed into what HusserI never
made of it, namely, a general philosophy. Sartre may then be placed
in the Kantian tradition in this sense:
"In the critical idea, every question about being calls forth
the examination of the conditions for knowing it.... Thus in
Heidegger and in Sartre every philosophic question has the
property-it is the very essence of a philosophic question- of
going back to the possibles of that question. In this precise
sense every conscious existentialist, phenomenologist or not,
Sartre in particular, is largely a tributary of the Kantian 'revolution,' which is indeed one of the fundamental acquisitions of
modern philosophy. This must be henceforth the distinctive
character of every philosophy, to include in its own problem the
philosophic enterprise in its totality, and therefore the philosopher himself." 23
But Sartre faces an even deeper problem in respect to Kant: the
issue, namely, of the phenomenon-noumenon dualism. Sartre's two
aspects of Being are not parallels to the Kantian dualism, but they
nevertheless have been derived only by facing the same issues. Phenomenology goes beyond the Kantian dualism, but it is still possible to
ask whether phenomenology is a generalized Kantianism.
If one were now to ask, What is existentialism for Sartre?, the
answer would have to be: An ontology which seeks to determine the
nature of Being via an investigation of man's Being, thus indebting itself to Heidegger, and which also seeks to determine the complete
expression of phenomenology, thus indebting itself to Husserl and
Hegel. Ultimately questions of man's choice-situation and his anguish, etc., will come into the picture-but only as derivatives of an
•• Varet, G., L'Ontologie de Sartre, 17_
Ibid., 15.
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ontology, involving only peripheral issues. Varet, therefore, is right
when he says that "for Sartre the point of departure is not human
reality, or existence, or bad faith, or atheism." 24
Sartre's problem is one of technical philosophy and not of literature or quasi-philosophy. One may talk or write as much as one
pleases about Sartre's plays and novels and popular lectures-about
human responsibility and the choosing of oneself-and not even come
close to the real core of his existentialism. This, of course, is disappointing news for those who considered themselves experts on "existentialism." But did not Sartre himself warn us when he wrote of
existentialism:
"Actually, it is the least scandalous, the most austere of doctrines. It is intended strictly for specialists and philosophers." 25
In the preceding pages several levels of "existentialism" have been
indicated, and only one of these, existentialism as ontology, is the
genuine philosophical meaning of the term. A sustained, comprehensive, and critical investigation of Sartre's ontology is the raison d'etre
of this work, which is intended to unquote "existentialism" by considering it as technical ontology.

•• Varet, op. cit., 2.
•• Sartre, op.cit., 15.

PART I
Exposition

Chapter I

THE SEARCH FOR BEING
"The concept of 'Bein{j is the'most universal one, as was also
realized by Aristotle, Thomas and Hegel; and its universality
goes beyond that of any 'genus.' At the same time it is obscure
and indefinable; 'Being' cannot be comprehended as anything
that is . ... It cannot be deduced from any higher concepts and
it cannot be represented by any lower ones; 'Bein{j is not something like a being, a stone, a plant, a table, a man. Yet 'Bein{(
seems somehow an evident concept. We make use of it in all
knowledge, in all our statements, in all our behavior towards
anything that 'is,' in our attitude towards ourselves. We are used
to living in an 'understanding of Bein{j ... but hand in hand
with it goes the incomprehensibility of what is meant by 'Being.' "
-Werner Brock
Before beginning our exposition of Sartre's L'£tre et Ie Neant, it
is necessary to forewarn the reader that both the style and the content
of Sartre's main work offer a serious problem in any attempt to
present lucidly his ideas and intentions or to translate his language
into intelligible English. It is impossible to convey to anyone who has
not read L'£tre et Ie Neant the involved and often tangled line of
Sartre's argument and the, horrifying quality of the prose which is intended to convey the author's ideas. In addition to seemingly endless
sentences and ambiguous repetitions, the author uses words that do not
appear in any dictionary. Sartre invents a new terminology to meet
the requirements of the radical ontology he presents. Thus, nouns
are used as verbs, and new grammatical constructions are invented to
meet the author's needs. What emerges from this strange new
language is an ontological structure of Gargantuan length and complexity. We must beg the reader's indulgence in the following pages
and hope that he will realize that much of the difficulty of the exposi19
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tion is necessitated by the nature of the material presented. In many
cases it is simply impossible to render the argument in simpler language
without danger of doing violence to the meaning Sartre intends to
convey to his reader. There has not been a single critic who has written on Sartre's ontology, to our knowledge, who has not commented
on the obscurity and complexity of L'P-tre et le Neant. 1 The reader of
this work, therefore, who may be only slightly acquainted with Sartre's
philosophy, should realize that he is not alone in despairing over
these involved arguments and this sometimes fantastic terminology.
We hope that our pains in attempting to make this exposition as clear
as possible will result in confining the reader's despair to an unavoidable minimum.
To commence our exposition, we may say that "The Search for
Being" is a clue to the essential problem with which Sartre is concerned in his attempt to formulate a new ontology. In some sense, the
problem of Being has engaged every philosopher and philosophic system under various titles: phenomenon-noumenon, permanence-change,
appearance-reality are a few examples. The "Search for Being" may
be characterized by a series of questions which Sartre raises throughout L'P-tre et Ie Neant-such questions as these:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is Being?
What is the relation of consciousness to Being?
What is the relation of temporality to Being?
What is the relation of Nothingness to Being?

The answers to these questions involve, in turn, still further questions which we shall ask as we go along. We are here concerned with
a clarification of the questions stated.

1 For example: "It is practically certain that one could count on the fingers of
one hand those who have had the patience to read every line of L'P.tre et Ie Neant,
and fewer still is the number of those who can in all honesty claim that they have
always understood it,"-Foulquie, P., Existentialism, 41. Also, L'P.tre et Ie Neant is
described as "exceedingly long, over 700 large and closely printed pages, always
difficult and often obscure."-Ayer, A. J., "Novelist-Philosophers: V-Jean-Paul
Sartre," Horizon, Vol. XII, No. 67 (1945), 12.
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WHAT IS BEING?

In the attempt to penetrate to the "heart" of Being, Sartre first
considers the answers modern thought has given to the problem of
Being. He examines and discards a series of historical dualisms.
Sartre throws out as inadequate the dualisms of interior-exterior, appearance-being, potency-act, appearance-essence, and, finally, phenomenon-noumenon.
For Sartre, a preliminary definition of Being is, in a sense, impossible; at least, its possibility would involve us either in paradoxes or in
an infinite regress. If we mean by 'definition,' in part, a listing of
predicates which describe the object, then such a listing cannot be attempted so far as Being is concerned; for, as we shall show later, the
ascription of any predicate involves us in the problem of the being
of the predicate ascribed. We should thus have to define the being of
the being of the predicate, and the being of the being of that being,
ad infinitum. For Sartre, the phenomenological method provides an
approach to the nature of Being.
Taken in its most fundamental sense, phenomenology is a direct
"looking upon" or inspection of the givens of sensory experience.
Such inspection confronts us, first of all, with "appearances." These
appearances are-in the sense, namely, that we are presented with them.
They would not be appearances unless they appeared. But if these
appearances are, then, according to Sartre, we have located Being; for
appearance is Being. Thus, if appearance is, "Being is." The object in
appearance is; and "that is the sole manner of defining its way of
Being." 2

2.

WHAT IS THE RELATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO BEING?

It is essential to the understanding of Sartre's doctrine of Being
that we distinguish between two realms of Being, the en-soi and the
pour·soi. In the introduction we said that the pour-soi corresponds to
the idealistic element in Being, and the en-soi to the realistic element.
This statement requires clarification.
The pour-soi, in its most simple sense, is consciousness. For Sartre,
speculation begins in subjectivity; more specifically, it begins with the
Cartesian cogito, which is taken to be the root of all judgments and
all cognition. It is "an absolute truth founded upon the immediate
• Sartre, L'£tre et le Ntfant, 15. (Hereafter the abbreviation "EN" will be used).
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grasp which consciousness has of itself, and as such is the basis for all
other certain truths."3 Sartre recognizes, however, that there is a prereflective as well as a reflective cogito, and that through the examination of the pre-reflective cogito, we may come to a general understanding of the other pole of Being, the en-soi.
Moreover, the pre-reflective cogito is the basis for the reality of
consciousness; for there can be no consciousness where there is no
reference to an object. 4 Consciousness cannot exist apart from its
active unfolding in the acts of consciousness.1i Consciousness is thus
the cause of its own manner of Being and is the identity of appearance
and existence. Consciousness exists to the extent to which it "appears";
and the absoluteness of consciousness consists in the identity of its appearance and existence. Sartre's recourse to the pre-reflective cogito,
therefore, enables him to escape from the infinite regress of "knowingknown"; for the "coincidence of existence and appearance indicates
that the pre-reflective cogito is an absolute in the order of existence
and a condition of all knowledge." 6
Consciousness is more than self-reflection; all consciousness is
consciousness of something. Consciousness intends some object in the
world. What is intended, Sartre asserts, is some "trans-phenomenal"
Being beyond consciousness. The realm of trans phenomenal Being is
the realm of the en-soi. For Sartre, the en-soi is the rough is-ness of
Being, the brute confrontation of Being; the "stuff" of the world.
Thus, the Being of consciousness faces the Being of the phenomenon:
the pour-soi faces the en-soi, and although both may be identified by an
analysis of subjectivity, they remain alien and severed realms. If we
tentatively defined the pour-soi as consciousness, we may tentatively
define the en-soi as the transphenomenal Being of the object. Whether
contact between these realms is possible is one of the profound problems Sartre faces in his analysis.
By constructing an "ontological argument in reverse," Sartre tries
to demonstrate the existence of the trans phenomenal Being of the object from the pre-reflective cogito; for consciousness, he argues, implies
in its very Being a non-conscious, transphenomen<!-l Being. Conscious3 Collins, J., "The Existentialism of J-P. Sartre," Thought, Vol. XXIII, No. 88,
(March, 1948), 69.
• EN, 19.
"Ibid., 19-21.
• Collins, op. cit., 69.
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ness, Sartre holds, is a Being which, because it is in question in its own
Being, implies a Being other than itself.7 The definition of consciousness which Sartre ultimately establishes is the following: the pour-soi
(consciousness) is that which it is not, and is not that which it is. We
intend to explicate fully the nature and meaning of this paradoxical
conception of consciousness.

3.

WHAT IS THE RELATION OF TEMPORALITY TO BEING?

The consciousness with which we are concerned, the pour-soi, is
not static; it is "passionately involved in temporality." In fact, the
pour-soi exists only because it has a future. Sartre's discussion of
temporality reveals the deeper relation between consciousness and Being. He says that the Being of the pour-soi will be elucidated only
when we have defined and described the signification of the temporal.
"It is only then that we shall be able to arrive at the study of the
problem which occupies us: that of the original relation of consciousness with Being." 8
What, then, is the relation of temporality to Being? For Sartre,
temporality is an original synthesis containing structured moments. 9
To understand temporality it is necessary to pursue a phenomenological analysis of the dimensions of temporality: past, present, and
future.
Let us consider a few sentences: I am the person you now see; I am
the person you saw last Monday; I was the man who owned that white
bulldog. The difficulty is: in what sense is it possible to speak of one's
present self as the self that was at place P at time T? Is it the sall¥! self?
Was it the same self? This tie between the present self and the past self
must be explained. In what sense do I remain the same self, able to be
both "was" and "is"?
Sartre holds that temporality cannot be artificially split up into
past and present. There must be an ontological connection between
them. "The term 'was' designates ... the ontological leap from the
present into the past and represents an original synthesis of these two
modes of temporality." 10 "Was" is the ontological liaison of the pour-

• EN, 29.
Ibid., 149.
• Ibid., 150.
10 Ibid., 158.
8
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soi; what Sartre terms the "facticity" of the pour-soi is it pastness.u
The facticity of the pour-soi is threatened and encroached upon by the
en-soi; the latter attempts to "swallow" it up. The "was" characterizes
the type of Being of the pour-soi: "The relation of the pour-soi to its
Being. The past is the en-soi which I am, considered as passed beyond." 12
In the present-past relationship a dialectic is involved: "I was the
man who owned that white bulldog." This means that I am the man
who "was the man." But in the same sense in which I am the man who
was, I certainly am not the man who was; for I am the man I am. The
internal connection in this dialectic of "am," "was," and "am not" is
the relation "not to be." It follows, then, that if "I am not my own past,
it cannot be in the original mode of becoming, but in so far as I have
to be it in order not to be it and I have not to be it in order to be it." 13
Sartre concludes that, in regard to my Being, "I am in the mode of
internal liaison with the not to be." 14
The dialectic of present-past reveals the relation between the two
realms of Being: the pour-soi, when it becomes pastness, is seized by
the en-soi and rendered pastness or "facticity," as Sartre puts it. But
since the present is pour-soi, a paradox is involved: although we must
define the present in terms of Being, whenever we attempt to specify
the present, we are left with only an infinitesimal instant, a Nothingness. Here is the fundamental contradiction of existence: we always
find the indissoluble pair, Being and Nothingness.
The problem of the present forces us to expand our understanding
of the pour-soi. The pour-soi, as present, cannot be seized as such;
it is in a state of flight. Sartre says that the present is a perpetual flight
in the face of Being and that whenever we experience the present it is
under the form of flight. We cannot truly seize the present in any of
its instants, for these instants themselves are in flight. 15
The present, however, is as yet imperfectly understood, for we have
considered only one half of its dialectical relation. In addition to
flight from, there must be flight to. The pour-soi has a facticity, but

11

EN, 162.

Ibid.
Ibid., 161.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 168.
12
13
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it also has a future. 16 Sartre's theory of the nature of futurity is com·
plex. The Sartrean future is the pour-soi's unavoidable though indeterminate Being-to-be. This future is not some chronologically
ordered or homogeneous succession of instants to comeP Futurity is
the paradoxical mixture of what I shall be and yet what that shall-be
is not. Just as the dialectic of past-present entails an ontological liaison
of "was-ness," so the dialectic of present-future depends upon the
ontological connective of "flight." Flight from present Being toward
future Being outlines the skeleton of the shall-be, although it does not
cause or mold that shall-be.
Since "the future is that which I have to be in so far as I am able
not to be it," 18 and since "the future is myself in so far as I await myself as presence at a being beyond being," 19 Sartre asserts that the
pour-soi of the present reveals the pour-soi yet to be. The latter is
held before the pour-soi as its image-to-be. In this sense the not-yet has
Being, and its Being is that of futurity. The future world "has meaning as future only in so far as I am present in it as an oth~r which I
shall be, in another physical, affective, social, and so on, position." 20
Sartre concludes that "I must ... 'become what I was', but it is in a
world itself become that I must become it, and in a world become
from what it is." 21
From the total unity of past, present, and future, with the ontological liaisons of "was-ness" and "flight" which bind them together
dialectically, arises the Self. The Self holds within it the problem of
its freedom, for the flight of the pour-soi toward its future is its measure
of freedom to become what it will be. But this freedom is unique: the
pour-soi does not accept or reject its freedom in a purely conceptual
fashion. The pour-soi faces its own "problematicity." 22 "The future
constitutes the meaning of my present pour-soi, as the project of its
possibility, but it does not predetermine in any way my pour-soi to
come, since the pour-soi is always abandoned in this 'nihilating'
(neantisante) obligation to be the foundation of its nothingness." 23
EN, 168.
Ibid., 174.
18 Ibid., 170.
19 Ibid., 172.
20 Ibid., 171.
01 Ibid., 172 .
•• Ibid., 174.
'3 Ibid., 173.
16
17
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Sartre concludes that the pour-soi cannot avoid its "problematicity," since the pour-soi itself is problematic in the sense of continually
being faced by an uncertain future. This is what Sartre means when
he asserts that Man is a Being whose meaning is always problematic.
Thus, "the pour-soi can never be anything but problematically its
future, for it is separated from that future by a nothingness which it
itself is: in a word, the pour-soi is free and its freedom is to itself its
own limit." 24 To be free, Sartre says, is to be condemned to be free. 25
4.

WHAT IS THE RELATION OF NOTHINGNESS TO BEING?

We have thus far attempted to answer the question, "What is Being?" If we now ask, "What is non-Being?", we have hinted at the
nature of Nothingness; for to each question we ask there exists the
possibility of a negative answer. 26 Sartre considers several varieties of
non-Being.
The non-Being of knowing is of a conceptual order. If I say "the
dog is not the cat," I am, according to Sartre, formulating a purely
conceptual negation. However, if I say "Pierre is not here" after I
have expected to find him here and have looked for him here, then I
am uttering a negation which is not purely conceptual. The difference
between these two types of non-Being is that the "non-Being" of Pierre
has a Being, it is a Nothingness.
Sartre explains the Being of Nothingness in the following example:
Let us say that Pierre has not waited for me at an appointment. I
came to the place where we were supposed to have met, and "I immediately saw that he was not there." Was there, then, an intuition of
Pierre's absence? When I looked at the scene where I was supposed to
meet Pierre, everything I saw underwent a "nihilation" (neantisation).
I am at this moment looking for Pierre; as I look about me at the
scene where he is supposed to be, there is, for me, a successive disappearance of objects, Sartre says,-of those objects which are not Pierre.
The "nihilated" form of Pierre rises between my look and the objects
upon which my look is directed. The Nothingness of Pierre is in opposition to the Nothingness of the crumbled objects, because the
Nothingness of Pierre "haunts" the scene. 27
"'EN,173-174.
2. Cf. ibid.
2. Ibid., 39.
"'[bid., 45.
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This non-conceptual Nothingness has a certain structure which the
purely conceptual Nothingness does not have. If, after I have determined that Pierre is absent, I say to myself, "Well, George Washington isn't here either," there arises no constitution of the Nothingness
of George Washington. Such a negation is simply a thought and does
not produce non-Being. 28
Being has priority over Nothingness in the sense that there can be
Being without Nothingness, but there can be no Nothingness unless
there has been Being. Whereas Hegel says that Being and Nothingness
are equally empty abstractions, Sartre holds that although Being is
empty of every determination other than identity with itself, non-Being is empty of Being. "In a word, what is necessary here to recall
against Hegel is that being is and that nothingness is not." 29
We may now ask, "Where does Nothingness come from?" Sartre
also raises the associated question, "What must man be in his being
in order that through him Nothingness comes to Being?" Sartre reveals the "secret" of Nothingness. He says that "it is necessary to find
the foundation of all negation in a 'nihilation' which would be exercised at the very core of immanence; it is in absolute immanence, in
the pure subjectivity of the instantaneous cogito, that we must discover the original act by which man is to himself his own nothingness." 30
In what sense is the instantaneous or pre-reflective cogito the basis
of all negation? We said earlier that the pre-reflective cogito is the
basis for the reality of consciousness and that the reality of consciousness depends on its being presented with a known object. Original
negation or Nothingness arises from the pre-reflective cogito because
the cogito is not before it meets its known object. To put it in another
way: when Sartre says31 that, in rising from the heart of Being, consciousness creates and sustains its essence-the synthetic arrangement of
its possibilities-he implies that the pre-reflective consciousness is only
in so far as it does realize its possibilities. But if the possibilities are
"possibles," (i.e., if they lie in the future) , then the possibility of their
not being realized exists; this is negation in its root form .

• 8 EN, 46-47 .
•• Ibid., 51.
.0 Ibid., 83.
81 Ibid., 21.
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Sartre distinguishes between two types of nihilation. There is the
nihilating structure of the pre-reflective cogito. Consciousness "is not
its own motive in so far as it is empty of all content." 32 This emptiness
of content is what has been described above as the root-negation of as
yet unrealized "possibles."
Although the original negation which arises from the pre-reflective
cogito is the basis of all negation, there is a second type of nihilation
which is the nihilating structure of temporality. Of this second type
Sartre says that "the consciousness is confronted with its past and its
future as confronted with a self which it is in the mode of not-being."33
This is the area of negation which circumscribes the core of the poursoi. It is the Nothingness of that which separates the pour-soi from its
past and from its future. The Nothingness of the pour-soi is, for
Sartre, the possibility of freedom. Freedom is the "possibility for the
human reality to secrete a nothingness which isolates it" 34 and "freedom is the human being putting its past outside of the game in secreting its own nothingness." 35
Nothingness reveals freedom and also reveals our anguish. "It is in
anguish that man becomes conscious of his freedom or, if one prefers,
anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it
is in anguish that freedom is in its being in question for itself." 36
Anguish must be distinguished from fear. The latter is of things
of the world, but anguish is anguish before oneself, fear of having fear,
consciousness of freedom. Sartre gives the example of a person walking
along a narrow, dangerous path, who considers the various possibilities of catastrophe: the earth giving way, a landslide, slipping on a
rock, and so on. These imagined catastrophies are general; they might
happen to anyone walking along such a path. But as soon as our
protagonist on the path considers these possibilities as his possibilities
-that he might slip and fall to his death-then he experiences fear.
The distinction between fear and anguish is that fear has a specific
object, but anguish is anguish before one's "possibles"-no specific one
having been selected. Fear of having fear is anguish because it is fear

32 EN, 72 .
•• Ibid .
•• Ibid., 61.
•• Ibid., 65 .
•• Ibid., 66.
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of the non-specific. Anxiety has no ascertained object, and that is the
piercing hurt of the anguish.
When Sartre says that anguish is the self-awareness of "possibles"
as my "possibles," he does not mean that the awareness of these "possibles" is a conceptual act which occurs prior to some involvement with
those situations of which the "possibles" are a part. Rather, we act in
situations which reveal "possibles" in the process of being realized.
We are referred back to the meaning of the "possibles," but we do not
experience the awareness of "possibles" in a purely beforehand, or
abstract sense. Man is a creature involved in his reality. He does not
gaze upon it as a Martian might coolly consider earthman's works-he
is inextricably a part of reality. We are engaged in our reality, hurled
into the world and involved in it. "This means that we act before
positing our 'possibles'" 37 We discover ourselves, then, in a world
peopled with exigencies, and we are at the core of projects in the course
of realization. Thus, man turns up in the world-he appears on the
scene.3S
Sartre, in concerning himself with the profound problem of Being
qua Being, has found it necessary to investigate man's being in order to
penetrate to the heart of Being. He has considered temporality, consciousness, and Nothingness as dimensions of the dialectic of Being.
The problem has been to resolve the basic dualism of the two realms of
Being, the pour-soi and the en-soi.
It may be seen that the pour-soi is in flight both toward the future
and from the past, and, further, that it is separated from both by the
Nothingness which establishes its freedom and, at the same time, its
anguish. The pour-soi, as consciousness, is man's possibility of freedom, for in self-reflection and self-awareness lie the roads of freedom.
But the en-soi is quite the opposite of the pour-soi; it is unreflective,
stolid, and gross-brute packed-togetherness.39
In Sartre's novel Nausea, the protagonist, Roquentin, suddenly
grasps the reality of existence in its brute en-soi as he is seated on a park

EN, 75.
Existentialism, op. cit., 18 .
•• Collins, op. cit., 77-78. Sartre "describes the en-soi as a massive, crammed-down
bulk of being which quite brutally is. It allows for no self-acquaintance with its own
reality because of its opacity and thickness. Only in a loose sense can the In-self be
called a self, for it supports no relations with others and allows for no presence to
itself and self-development of its own solid plenitude."
37
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bench one day. In an almost perverse Husserlian fashion the normal
world is bracketed off, and he perceives the park and its objects as a
swollen blob of jelly-like consistency, which presses in on him like
quicksand about a sinking man. 40 The experience of the en-soi in its
unexpurgated immediacy is "nausea." The flight of the pour-soi} then,
is the flight from this nauseous en-soi toward futurity. But futurity itself has en-soi as part of its Being. Thus, man is in flight from en-soi
toward en-soi; this is the tragedy of his condition. Man in his flight is
haunted by Being, yet he cannot absorb that Being under pain of the
engulfment of his pour-soi. "The human reality in its being is suffering because it arises to being as perpetually haunted by a totality
which it is without power to be, since precisely it could not reach the
en-soi without losing itself as pour-soi." 41
The pour-soi is in a vicious paradox: since it is lack} it is hurled
toward the future; yet if it fills itself with en-soi, it nauseates itself. In
like fashion, we can retreat into the past only at the risk of absorbing
the en-soi of facticity: we slip away into the en-soi and so yield our
freedom, our authenticity. The dilemma of the pour-soi is the urgent
condition of human existence. 1£ freedom of the pour-soi is freedom
only within the confines of this condition, and if man is condemned
to this strange and awful freedom, then Sartre's great burden in the
remainder of his research on Being and Nothingness must be the
explanation of how man operates in his Being and how he may both
choose and realize his "possibles."

.0 Sartre, J-P., "The Root of the Chestnut Tree," Partisan Review, (Winter, 1946),
32-33. "Was it a dream, that enormous presence? It was there, poised over the park,
tumbling from the trees, all soft, gluing up everything, a thick gelatinous mass.
And was I in it, I, and the entire park? I was afraid, but above all I was furious,
it seemed so stupid, so inappropriate. I despised that ignoble jelly. It was everywhere! It reached to the sky, it spread out in all directions, it filled everything
with its sprawling mass, and I could see layer upon layer of it, extending much
farther than the limits of the park and the houses and Bouville. I was no longer in
Bouville, nor anywhere, I was floating. I was not surprised; I was very well aware
that it was the World, the naked World which had suddenly shown itself, and I
was choking with rage against this huge absurd being. . . . I cried out: 'What a
filthy mess, what a mess!' and I shook myself to throw off the sticky slime but it
clung to me and there was so much of it, tons and tons of existence, endless tons:
I was suffocating under the weight of a tremendous ennui."
"EN,134.

Chapter II

THE OTHER

In the first part of L'P.tre et le Neant Sartre described mainly the
Being of the pour-soi and its relation to the en-soi. This study, however, has left him with the necessity of rescuing his ontology from the
charge of solipsism, for he has explicated only the Being of one's consciousness with no bridge established to the consciousness of Others.
The danger is that "Sartre has followed so closely the idealistic conception of Self-consciousness (cogito) as the transcendental origin and
'creator' of all Being that he constantly faces the danger of transcendental solipsism." 1 In facing the problem of solipsism in EN,
Sartre analyzes the existence of the Other and the relations between
my Being and the Being of the Other. 2
1.

THREE THEORIES OF THE OTHER

In his analysis of the "Reef of Solipsism" Sartre takes into consideration the theories of the Other held by Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger
before presenting his own views.

a) Husserl.-"Husserl's main argument-as Sartre sees it-consists in
the thesis that the reference to the Other is a necessary condition for
the existence of the world." 3 Husserl, according to Sartre, has defined
the Other as an "absence." How, Sartre asks, is it possible to have an
intuition of an absence? Unless I arbitrarily presuppose that the Other
is identical with me, true knowledge of the Other escapes me. 4

1 Marcuse,
H., "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'£tre et Ie
Neant," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII (1947-1948), 316.
"EN,277.
3 Schuetz, A., "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. IX, No.2, (1948), 183.
• Ibid., 184.
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The inadequacy of the Husserlian theory of the Other is that
phenomenological method operates only through reducing the object
via the self's analysis and through intending the object via the self's
acts of intending- But since we cannot penetrate beyond the core of
the self, the Other escapes us. "The only liaison which Husserl has
been able to establish between my being and that of the other is that
of the understanding; he could not then ... escape from solipsism." 5
b) Hegel.-For Hegel the problem of the Other is the problem of consciousness of self. Sartre quotes Hegel: "The consciousness of self is
real only in so far as it knows its echo (and its reflection) in another." 6
For Hegel, Sartre claims, the existence of my consciousness as consciousness of self depends on the appearance of the Other. Selfconsciousness appears with the excluding of the Other. 7 "Such exclusion takes a double form: By the very fact of being myself, I exclude
the Other; by the very fact of being himself, the Other, whom I exclude, excludes me." 8
Sartre accuses Hegel on two counts: first, of "epistemological
optimism" and, second, of "ontological optimism." According to Sartre, it appears to Hegel "that the truth of the consciousness of self can
appear, that is, that an objective accord can be realized between the
consciousness under the name of recognition of me by the Other and
of the Other by me." 9 The "ontological optimism" is an even more
fundamental element in Hegelian philosophy. The essence of this
optimism, according to Sartre, is the Hegelian assertion that the truth
of the All already exists, permitting, therefore, the claim that the truth
regarding the Other is possible to obtain.lO

"EN,291.
Ibid., 293.
• Ibid., 291.
• Schuetz, op. cit., 185.
• EN, 296.
10 Ibid., 299. "Truth is truth of the All. And he places himself at the point of the
truth, that is, of the All, in order to envisage the problem of the other. Thus, when
the Hegelian monism considers the relation of the consciousnesses, it is not to be
placed in any particular consciousness. Although the All is to be realized, it is already
there as the truth of all that is true; also, when Hegel writes that every consciousness
being identical with itself is other than the other, he has established himself in
the All, outside of consciousness and considers consciousnesses from the point of view
of the Absolute."
6
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The failure of Hegel's optimism is the failure to produce the basis
of intersubjective knowledge (knowledge of the Other). Hegel is
left with a mere plurality of consciousnesses which cannot be properly
connected. Hegel's optimism is the illusion that such a connection has
been established in his arguments concerning the Other,u

c) Heidegger.-It is also necessary to point out that the question of
the Other arises for a person, according to Sartre's exposition of Heidegger's thought, only when that person has achieved authentic existence. Authenticity is achieved in the resolute decision the individual
makes regarding his possibility of death. At the moment that the individual chooses his authenticity, he is disclosed to himself in authenticity, and the Others around him are at the same moment elevated
toward the authentic. 12
Sartre charges that Heidegger's description of the Other is an ontic
and psycho logistic description and not a true ontological explanation,
since he claims there is no warranty for passing from the idea of beingwith to the ontological structure of being-in-the-world. 13 Sartre holds
that Heidegger, like HusserI and Hegel, has failed to produce an acceptable theory of the Other and that Heidegger's philosophy leaves
the problem unsolved: it leaves the self isolated in the dungeon of
solipsism-in "solitary."
In general, Sartre is dissatisfied with the positions of both realism
and idealism in so far as they have taken stands on the problem of
intersubjectivity. Through a dialectical examination of the problem
in both idealist and realist camps,14 he concludes that both positions
lead to paradox and internal contradiction; for the realist position,
when followed through, leads necesarily to idealism, whereas idealism,
when it abandons the solipsist hypothesis, leads to a dogmatic and

11 EN, 299, "The optimism of Hegel results in a defeat: between the object-other
and me-subject, there is no common measure, no more than between the consciousness (of) self and the consciousness of the other. I cannot know myself in the other
if the other is first object for me and I can no more seize the other in its true being,
that is, in its subjectivity. No universal consciousness can be derived from the relation of the consciousnesses. It is what we shall call their ontological separation."

12

13
H

Ibid., 303.
Ibid., 304.
Ibid., 277-288.
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totally unjustified realism_ I '5 The problem of the Other, according to
Sartre, can, therefore, be solved by neither idealism nor realism_

2_

THE LOOK

Any attempt to explore intersubjectivity, Sartre asserts, must commence with the cogito_ We cannot prove the existence of the Other
in the sense of logical proof. The Other is immediately known, or, as
Sartre puts it, "encountered_" "The existence of the Other has the
nature of a contingent and irreductible fact." 16 We, therefore, cannot ontologically derive the existence of the Other.17 Such is the
general outline of Sartre's theory of the Other's existence. Is
If the cogito is to be the starting point, then Sartre commits himself
to the position that any consideration of the Other must begin wih
the Being of the self.19 Also, he holds that the rapport with the Other
will be a relationship of Being to Being and not one of understanding
to understanding. 20 Husserl failed by measuring Being by the understanding, Hegel failed in identifying understanding with Being.21
Sartre, to the contrary, proposes to give an explanation of the relationship between my Being and the Being of the Other. 22
In the affirmation of the existence and presence of the Other, taken
now as a relation of Being to Being, the question which initiates the
Sartrean inquiry into the specific problem of the Other arises: "Is
there in the everyday reality an original relation to the Other which

EN, 285.
Ibid., 307.
17 Marcuse, op. cit., 316.
18 Schuetz, op. cit., 187. "Sartre formulates the following criteria for a valid theory
of the Other's existence. 1. Such a theory need not prove the Other's existence, the
affirmation of which is rooted in a 'pre-ontological' understanding. 2. The Cartesian
cogito is the only possible point of departure in order to find (not reasons for m)'
belief in the Other's existence, but) the Other himself as being-not-me. 3. The Other
does not have to be grasped as an object of our cogitations, but in his existence 'for
us' as affecting our actual concrete being. 4. The Other has to be conceived as being
'not me,' but this negation is not an external spatial one; it is an internal negation,
defined by Sartre as a synthetic and active connection between two terms, either of
which constitutes itself by negating the other."
19 EN, 300 .
• 0 Ibid., 300-301.
·'Ibid.
"Ibid., 311.
15
16
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can be constantly sought and which, consequently, can be disclosed to
me, outside of all reference to a religious or mystical unknowable?" 23
The basis of the original relation to the Other is the very appearance of the Other in my world: he appears to me. A shock accompanies the presentation of the Other to my world. "The appearance
among the objects of my universe of an element of disintegration of
this universe is what I call the appearance of a man in my universe."24
The Other shocks my world in an original, unique, and irreducible
manner: he looks at me. 25 "At each instant the Other looks at me." 26
The basis of the solution to the problem of the Other will be the Look.
But "what does it mean for me: to be seen?" 27
Sartre asserts that shame reveals to the self the Look of the Other. 28
The Other looks at me and, in the Look, shocks or "haemorrhages" my
inner unity, my inner world, my subjectivity. The recovery of this
inner world of the self is possible by a retaliation against the Other;
i.e., by making the Other the object of my Look and destroying his
inner unity. By the Look of the Other I have been made an object
for his subjectivity, and he knows me only as object, never as subject.
In the same manner, I know the Other as object, never as subject. 29
Consciousness of being object exists when the Other looks at me,
but does it also exist when the Other is absent? Absence is defined by
Sartre as a mode of Being of the human-reality that was originally
determined by presence. 30 That is, I look for somebody because he is
generally there. But what is important in consciousness of being object,
or of being the one who looks for the Other in his absence, is that in
these cases we are being-for-other. Thus, "the look has placed us on
the track of our being-for-other and it has revealed to us the indubitable existence of this others elf for which we are." 31
I "cannot be object for an object";32 I must be object for a subject.
But if my being-for-other has revealed the necessity for the Other, the
EN, 311.
Ibid., 312.
25 Ibid., 315.
26 Ibid .
•• Ibid., 316 .
• 8 Ibid., 319.
Ibid., 327-328.
30 Ibid., 337 .
• , Ibid., 342 .
• 2 Ibid., 349.
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question remains: What is the Being of the being-for-other?33 Sartre
asserts that the being-for-other is not an ontological structure of the
pour-soi_ 34 "We cannot even think of deriving, as a consequence of
a principle, the being-for-other from the being-for-self, nor, reciprocally,
the being-for-self from the being-for-other_" 35 Sartre's answer to our
question will be given later, when the ground for such an answer has
been prepared_
We may return now to the concept of shame and its relation to the
problem of the Other. Pure shame, Sartre tells us, is the feeling of
being an object, not some particular object. Shame exists when I
recognize myself as degraded by and dependent upon the Other.
"Shame is the feeling of original fall, not from the fact that I would
have committed such and such a fault, but simply from the fact that
I am 'fallen' into the world, in the midst of things, and that I need
the mediation of the other in order to be what I am." 36
Partly, then, through the experience of shame, I seek the overthrow
of the Other by appropriating him as object for my subjectivity. But in
this appropriation I hope to achieve more than simply the objectification of the Other. What I seek is no less than the discovery in the
Other of an aspect of myself: my objectivity.
But the explication of the being-for-Other has been carried as far
as possible within the limits of the structures of Being examined. A
dilemma has resulted: the Other "seizes" me in my facticity as object,
and I can never "seize" the Other in his subjectivity. If I attempt to
prove the latter, my proof founders on the reefs of the limits of my
knowledge; and if I accept the facticity of the Other as object, I fail
to penetrate to his core.
3.

THE BODY

Sartre's argument regarding the Other can be carried no further in
its present framework; it is necessary to investigate a series of new
levels of the structure of Being.
If we return to the very first knowledge of the Other, it will be recalled that the Other appears to us. The appearance of the Other is
possible only in so far as he originally appears manifested as a body .
•• EN, 342.
"Ibid.
'"Ibid .
• 6 Ibid., 349.
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If "this object that the Other is for me and this object that I am for
the Other are manifested as bodies,"37 then Sartre asks, What is my
body? and What is the body of the Other? 38
My body has a dualistic aspect: it is "either a thing among things,
or else it is that by which the things are disclosed to me." 39 My body
cannot be both of these two aspects at the same time. 40 Because of this
double relation, I may be present to a part of my body without its being
me or my being it. This double relation derives from the fact that I
cannot sense one of my organs sensing. I cannot see my eye seeing.
When I do "seize" my eye, it is as an aspect of the world-an object for
me-or else "it is that by which ... things are disclosed to me." 41 There
are, then, two aspects of the investigation of the body that can be
delineated: the body as being-for-self and the body as being-for-Other.
Sartre asserts that the understanding itself is a self-contradictory
element if it is unrelated to positional experience. The understanding
must be involved; i.e., it must be understanding of something somewhere. 42
"To be for the human reality is to-be-there; that is, 'there, on that
chair; 'there, at that table: 'there, at the top of that mountain, with
those dimensions, that orientation, etc.' "43 The necessity of the positional element in experience (being-there) involves, however, an
ambiguity: "On the one hand ... if it is necessary that I may be under
the form of being-there, it is completely contingent that I am, for I am
not the foundation of my being; on the other hand, if it is necessary
that I may be engaged in such and such a point of view, it is contingent that it is precisely this one, to the exclusion of every other." 44
Sartre terms this double contingency the "facticity" of the pour-soi.
We used the term "facticity" earlier in the exposition of Sartre's
definition of the pour-soi as not being what it is and being what it is
not. The pour-soi can never know itself in itself, for at the foundation
of itself is its Nothingness. 45
•• EN, 364.
•• Ibid .
• 9 Ibid., 366 .
• 0 Ibid.
" Ibid.
"Ibid.
,. Ibid., 371.
"Ibid.
'·Ibid.
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The individuation of the pour-soi is realized through its body.
"The body is a necessary characteristic of the pour-soi; it ... proceeds
necessarily from the nature of the pour-soi that it is body." 46 The body
appears to Others. The world in which it appears is given to the
pour-soi as positional to it, not simply as an experential "possible," or
a cognitive expectation. In so far as I am given to the world, I am
given through my body. "To say that I am entered into the world,
'come to the world,' or that there is a world or that I have a body, is
one sole and selfsame thing." 47
The world, for Sartre, is given to me through its utensil quality
and its resistance to my actions toward it. This means that the desk in
front of me is desk-to-be-written-upon, not simply "desk," and the
Others, in the same fashion, are Others-for-me. The objectivity of the
world resides in the synthetic unity of the utensils which comprise it
and not in creative power of a subjectivity. "Thus, the world appears
to me as objectively articulated: it never refers back to a creative subjectivity but to the infinity of utensil complexes." 48
An example which Sartre gives clarifies the utensil-quality of the
world. 49 The statement "Carthage is to be destroyed" has the indifferentness of an un oriented, referenceless proposition. The meaning of the destruction of Carthage is one thing for the Romans, but
quite another for the Carthagenians. For the Romans, Carthage is to
be destroyed, but for the Carthagenians, Carthage is to be enslaved.
Thus, meanings are always meanings in situo, related to persons ...
involved. In their totality these utensils reveal more than objectivity:
they are objects which resist us. "What I perceive when I wish to draw
this glass to my mouth is not my effort, it is its heaviness, that is, its
resistance toward entering into a utensil complex, which I have made
appear in the world." M
The resistance of utensils to the pour-soi reveals the nature of the
position of the pour-soi in the world. There is a dialectic of interaction between the objects, the Others, and the Self. This dialectic can-

4. EN, 372.
<7 Ibid., 381.
48 Ibid., 387 .
•• Ibid.
50 Ibid., 389.
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not posit a body apart from the objects which are utensils for and
resistants to that body.51
The body involves infinitely more than simply the flesh I inhabit.
My body in its being-for-Others is the synthetic resultant of my
"seizing" of the totality of utensils given to me and, in addition, my
seizing of Others as they condition my experience with their attitudes,
interests, and passions. The way in which objects are disclosed to me
will then depend on my birth, my race, my class, my nationality, my
physiological structure, etc., in so far as these elements themselves are
constituted by my relationships to Others. This also is a dialectical
relation, for I am not simply conditioned into class, nationality, etc.,
but pass beyond such conditioning and, in the passing beyond, establish the synthetic unity of my being-in-the-world.
Sartre is now able to relate the conception of body to choice and
both to freedom.
Sartre holds that we choose the manner in which we "exist" 52 ourselves. The pour-soi "exists" its body and thereby chooses its meaning
to the Self. If I have an infirmity, for example, I choose in which way
I shall "exist" that infirmity. I may "exist" it as "'intolerable,'
'humiliating,' 'to be hidden,' 'to be revealed to all,' 'object of pride,'
'justification of my failures,' etc." 53 The concept of the pour-soi's
"existing" itself, as we shall see later, is the key to Sartre's theory of the
Self and of human freedom. In later sections we shall discuss this concept in great detail. At the present time it is not possible to define the
concept any further, since we have not yet exposited those correlated
ideas necessary to its comprehension .

• , EN, 389-390. "We have surrendered all claims to endowing ourselves first with
a body in order then to study the way in which we seize or modify the world through
it. But, on the contrary, we have given as foundation to the disclosure of the body as
such, our original relation to the world, that is, our very arising in the midst of being. Far from the body's being first for us and revealing the things to us, it is the
things.utensils which, in their original appearance, indicate our body to us."
.2 Sartre uses the verb "to exist" as a transitive verb with a direct object. In
other words, he may speak of "I exist myself" (when "I" bring into existence "myself") as distinguished from "I myself exist" (when the statement simply means that
I myself do exist). It seems impossible to get away from Sartre's use of "to exist."
For example, Sartre writes (EN, 418): "J'existe man corps," which can only be translated: "I exist my body."
'3 EN, 393.
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The seizing of the Self as Self, as pure facticity, as consciousness
which does not "exist" itself via pain or other such phenomena-such
seizure is the taste of nausea. "A discrete and insurmountable nausea
perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness." 54 Sartre's novel
Nausea makes clear that what is grasped in nausea by the pour-soi is
its stuffness, its en-soi. Physical nausea is only one of the manifestations
of existential nausea. "Far from our having to understand this term
of nausea as a metaphor derived from our physiological loathings, it is,
on the contrary, on its foundation that are produced all the concrete
and empirical nauseas (nausea before rotten food, fresh blood, excrements, etc.) which lead us to vomiting." 55
The appearance of my body to the Other or vice versa is not the way
in which the Other is truly manifested to me or the way in which I am
manifested to the Other. This would be a relation of pure exteriority,
whereas the real relationship is one of interiority. "My liaison to the
Other is inconceivable if it is not an internal relation." 56 The internal
relation needed, then, is the "signification" of the body. The signification of the body is defined through the relations which the body
has to the chairs it sits on, the sidewalks it walks on, etc. "The body
is totality of the significant relations to the world ... The body could
not appear, in fact, without sustaining, with the totality of that which
it is, significant relations." 57
The Other appears to me as related to the totality of "significations"
he expresses. Thus, the body of the Other is a certain distance from
that glass, in a specific relation to the chair he sits on, etc. I can understand the Being of the body of the Other only by comprehending the
Other as he exists within a total situation. 58 The totality referred to
here may be explained as follows: an organ or part of another person
appears to me in relation to his total situation. If the Other holds his
fist directly before my eyes, I do not, therefore, infer that his fist is
larger than his body. Here the traditional notion of perspective is
translated into the signification-perspective of life. Fists are not simply

.£ EN, 404 .
• 5 Ibid.
··Ibid., 405.
57 Ibid., 411.
·"Ibid., 412.
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objects; they are parts of beings who themselves are parts of situations
in which their fists are related to what they are engaged in.59
Just as we cannot truly seize the organ of the body apart from the
totality, we cannot speak of the emotion, or passion, or expression of a
man apart from the activity through which that emotion, passion, or
expression is evidenced. The form of evidencing the emotion is the
emotion:
"These knittings of the brows, this redness ... which seem ...
threatening do not express the anger, they are the anger. But
it is very necessary to understand: in itself a clenched fist is
nothing and means nothing. But also we never perceive a
clenched fist: we perceive a man who, in a certain situation,
clenches his fist. This significant act considered in liaison with
the past and the "possibles," understood from the synthetic
totality 'body-in-situation: is the anger." 60
Within a specific situation-for example, the relation of the glass
to Pierre, who happens to be sitting in that armchair-the Other has
the freedom to change his situation (Pierre can move to the couch).
Because the body of the Other is "seized" only in so far as we must admit the referential quality of the situation of the Other (all references of
utensils are to the Other, since they are his utensils), we are compelled to admit the freedom of the Other.
Because of the freedom of the Other, we can never consider his body
as mere body; it is always greater than the facticity of the body, since
the Other passes beyond, transcends, that facticity in his engagement.
There is an objectivity, a mere facticity of the body, but in so far as I
grasp the Other in his surroundings, in his engagement, i~ synthetic
totality, I do not observe that facticity.61
Three ontological dimensions of the body have been defined in the
relations between the Being of the Self and the Being of the Other:
"I exist my body; such is its first dimension. My body is
utilized and known by the Other: such is its second dimension.
EN, 413.
Ibid.
a'Ibid., 418. "The body for the Other is the magical object par excellence. Thus
the body of the Other is always 'body-more-than-body,' because the Other is given
to me without intermediary and totally in the perpetual passing beyond of its
factidty."
59

60

A CRITIQUE OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

42

But in so far as I am for the Other, the Other is disclosed to me
as the subject for which I am object_ It is a question even here,
as we have seen, of my fundamental relation with the Other.
I exist then for myself as known by the Other by virtue of body_
Such is the third ontological dimension of my body_" 62
In the third ontological dimension I know my body as it is for the
Other, yet I have a new knowledge of it myself_ This new knowledge
is gained during certain states of my body: when I perspire in fear of
the Other, when I blush, etc_ In such instances, I have a consciousness
of my body not as it is for me, but as it is for the Other_ 63
The Being which we are escapes us, and we, paradoxically, get to
know that Being in tangential fashion through the manner in which
we experience that Being as it is for the Other_ Thus, for example, we
can never know our body as it is; only another sees us in totality so
that he sees our body as it is; but in being aware of the fact that I am
object for another who sees my body as it is, I feel timidity or shame,
and in the experience of that timidity or shame my body becomes
known to me as body-known-by-the-Other_ "It appears to us then that
the Other accomplishes for us a function of which we are incapable,
which however is incumbent on us: to see us as we are." 64

4_

AlTITUDES TOWARD THE OTHER

The introduction of the relations of timidity and shame leads
Sartre to a consideration of the concrete relations the pour-soi has with
the Other. The attitudes of the pour-soi toward the Other which Sartre
describes are Love, Language, Masochism, Indifference, Desire, Sadism,
and Hate_
a) Love_-Love presents an ambiguous and paradoxical relationship_
In loving the Other, we are faced with the problem of whether such
love is love of the Other as object or as subject. Do we necessarily
appropriate the Other as object in the love relation? If so, then in
what sense is the freedom of the Other maintained? Or is love by
necessity a severing and destruction of the freedom of the loved one?
Again, what effect do these possibilities have on the lover?

62

EN, 418-419_

•• Ibid., 420 .
.. Ibid., 421.
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Since, for Sartre, the freedom of the Other is the foundation of my
Being, I am in danger of losing my freedom if the freedom of the Other
is lost. 65 If I shatter the subjectivity of the Other whom I love by
rendering him an object in my world, I am at the same time endangering my own status, my own freedom; for it is always through the Other
that my freedom is determined.
Thus, there is a general paradox of love: the lover makes of his
loved one an object, and, in so doing, negates the freedom of the loved
one. But the freedom of the loved one was what the lover sought in his
love. In loving he has destroyed the love he sought. The lover wishes
for an impossible thing: "He wishes to possess a freedom as freedom."66
Since this is in principle impossible, love is a paradoxical relation which
results in frustration.

b) Language.-The problem of language is exactly parallel to the
problem of the body, and the descriptions which were valid in one case
are valid in the other.67 It is through the Other that we learn the trlie
nature of our body. The Other sees us as we are. Thus, we must turn
to the Other to learn what we are, and this is necessarily accomplished
through language. Since it is only through the Other that we can see
ourselves, we depend upon the description the Other gives us concerning ourselves. These descriptions which we receive through language,
then, are the sole way in which we may hope to comprehend ourselves
as we exist for the Other. 68
c) Masochism.-In masochism the desire of the masochist is to
be completely and purely an object for the Other. The flight of the
masochist is toward en-soi. It is the masochist who refuses to be anything more than an object for the Other. In feeling himself an object
for the Other, the masochist experiences the feeling of shame, and it is
this feeling that he seeks in his abnormality. The masochist wants and
loves his shame.69
But masochism is also the assumption of guilt. The masochist is
guilty from the sole fact that he is an object. He is also guilty in so far

6. EN, 433.
Ibid., 434.
6. Ibid., 442.
6. Ibid., 421.
6. Ibid., 446.
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as he willingly allows himself to be made an object for the Other. 70 But
the guilt of the masochist is just part of his paradoxical condition,
which makes of masochism a necessary failure.
Masochism carries the germ of its destruction within itself, for
while the goal of the masochist is to reduce himself to an utter object
for some Other's subjectivity, he must, in his masochism, treat that
other person, who beats him, whips him, etc., as an object for his subjectivity_ It is, then, in vain that the masochist permits himself to be
mistreated or tortured, since he is mistreated or tortured by the Other,
who ultimately is object for him. Thus, the more the masochist attempts to "taste his objectivity, the more he will be submerged by the
consciousness of his subjectivity." 71

d) Indifference.-The attitude of indifference is induced by a
"blindness" toward Others. In being indifferent, the pour-soi retreats
from Others, chooses to ignore reality. The pour-soi practices, then,
a sort of solipsism of attitude: the Others walking by me in the street
are hardly noticed, they are simply "coefficients of adversity," like walls
or buildings .... "I do not even imagine that they can look at me." 72
Thus, "there are men who die without having suspected-except
during brief and terrifying illuminations-what the-Other was_" 73
e) Desire.-"Desire" is always sexual desire, which is "my original
attempt to possess the free subjectivity of the Other through its objectivity-for-me." 74 The questions which now arise are: What is desire? Of what is there desire? and What is it that desires? 75
Sartre's answer to the first question is that "desire is nothing other
than one of the grand forms which the disclosure of the body of the
Other can take." 76 He also says that "desire is an attempt to undress
the body of its movements as of its clothes and to make it exist as pure
flesh; it is an attempt at incarnation of the body of the Other." 77 This
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"incarnation" of the body of the Other is accomplished through the
"caress," which Sartre describes as a "shaping" through which I make
the flesh of the Other "be born." 78
Desire, however, also leads to a paradox-an "impossible ideal":
"to possess the transcendance of the Other as pure transcendance and
yet as body; to reduce the Other to his simple facticity, because he is
then in the midst of my world, but to make this facticity be a perpetual
presentation of its 'nihilating' transcendance." 79
f) Sadism.-Sadism is the correlated reverse of masochism. Like
masochism it is destined to failure. "The object of sadism is immediate
appropriation. . .. Sadism is, at one and the same time, refusal to be
incarnated and flight from all facticity, and effort to become master
of the facticity of the Other." 80
"What the sadist seeks ... with so much tenacity, what he wants
to knead with his hands and break under his fist is the freedom of the
Other." 81 To accomplish this the sadist seeks the moment of decision
when his victim gives in under the torture. At that moment what the
sadist sought for is momentarily gained. The body of his victim "is
entirely flesh, panting and obscene, it keeps the position that the torturers have given to it, not that which it would have taken by itself,
the cords which bind it sustain it as an inert thing and, by that, it has
ceased to be the object which moves spontaneously." 82 This tortured
body is the symbol of enslaved freedom.
But there is a necessary cycle of defeat in sadism, and for several
reasons. Although the sadist tries to appropriate the transcendent freedom of the Other, "this freedom remains, in principle, out of reach,
and the more the sadist is intent on treating the Other as instrument,
the more this freedom escapes him." 83 The sadist discovers the failm:e
of his efforts when his victim looks at him. In the Look the sadist
realizes "that he could not act on the freedom of the Other, even by
compelling the Other to humiliate himself and to beg for mercy, for it
is precisely in and by the absolute freedom of the Other that a world
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happens to exist in which there are a sadist and instruments of torture
and a hundred pretexts for being humiliated and disowned_" 84 The
Look is for the sadist more unbearable than crucifixion or death, for
it haunts his Being as pure guilt. "The look of the Other in the world
of the sadist makes the meaning and the goal of the sadism collapse_" 85
All the conducts of men toward each other are only variations, increased complexes, of the original attitudes of sadism and masochism
(and a third-hate). Thus, conducts such as collaboration, obedience,
maternal love, pity, and good will are fundamentally founded on
masochism and sadism. In the description of such complex attitudes,
it is necessary to take into consideration historical situation, concrete
particulars, etc.; "but they all enclose within them as their skeleton the
sexual relations." 86
g) Hate.-Hatred is the attempt of the Self to avoid being an object
for another by wishing the extinction or destruction of the Other. But
in order to hate an Other, I must first admit the existence and the
subjectivity of the Other. Thus, hate carries with it necessarily a recognition of the freedom of the Other.
"The occasion which provokes hate is simply the act of the Other
by which I have been placed in a state of submitting to his freedom." 87
But in hating the Other, who has appropriated me, and in recognizing
his freedom, I am hating all Others as well. My hatred for the Other
is symbolic, then, of my hatred for all Others. 88
But this hatred is necessarily involved in a failure, for even if I succeed in overcoming the Other, the very attempt I make to triumph over
him is admittance of the fact that he existed. I am unable to prevent
myself from recognizing the existence of the Other, even though that
existence may be part of my past. Thus, once I have been made an
object for the Other, I am "contaminated" in my Being for the rest of
my days, "even if the Other has been entirely overcome." 89

EN, 476.
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86 Ibid.
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88 Ibid., 483.
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BEING WITH (MIT-SEIN)

The investigation of the Other leads to the concept of Being·With:
the 'we.' The problem of Being-With is one of the communal relations
of the Self with the Other and with Others. The experience of the 'we'
is a true experience, according to Sartre, for "the very existence and
use of this grammatical form (we) refers back necessarily to a real
experience of the 'Mit-sein'." 90 However, this experience of the 'Mitsein' is a psychological, not an ontological structure.
The rejection of the Mit-sein as an ontological structure is a fundamental concept of EN. For Sartre, human reality is not originally
communal but, rather, is in conflict-in necessary and perpetual conflict. Thus, "the essence of the rapports between consciousnesses is not
the 'mit-sein,' it is conflict."91
The concept of action is implicit in the philosophy of Sartre. In
its dialectical flight, in its relation toward Others, the pour-soi acts.
It is now necessary, Sartre says, to raise such questions as: What does it
mean to act? Why does the pour-soi act? How can the pour-soi act?
The foundation for the answers to these questions has been constructed
already in Sartre's considerations of nihilation, facticity, the body, the
Other, and, of course, the pour-soi and the en-soi.92 Through a new
interrogation of these concepts, Sartre proposes to reveal the ontological nature of action and to show the relation of action to man's
freedom.

9. EN, 484.
I bid., 502.
9. Ibid., 503.
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Chapter III

THE SELF
1.

FREEDOM

According to Sartre, every action is, in principle, intentional; and
true action implies a consciousness of acting on the part of the actor.
Thus, if someone throws away a lighted cigarette which happens to set
off a fuse, which in turn produces an explosion, he has not acted. On
the other hand, true action has been taken by the worker whose job it
is to follow out the steps required to set off a dynamite charge. 1 Since
action is necessarily intentional, no political or economic fact can cause
action in the individual. Motivation is inner.2
The "indispensible and fundamental condition of all action is the
freedom of the acting Being." 3 Freedom is evidenced in the pour-soi
in so far as the pour-soi exists as "lack." The "lack" of the pour-soi
is its Nothingness. Because the pour-soi "exists" itself through flight,
it is nothing, for its existence is always non-static: the pour-soi is not
that which it is and is that which it is not.4
Choice, freedom, and action are inextricably bound together in the
existence of the pour-soi. There can be no freedom if there is no
choice; there can be no choice if there is no freedom; there can be no
action where there is no freedom. "Freedom, choice, nihilation,
temporalization are but one sole and selfsame thing." 5
Sartre means something quite different by 'freedom' than is intended in common usage or in general philosophical usage. Freedom, as it
is generally understood, might be defined as "the ability to satisfy
needs plus the ability to develop new needs, with the understanding,

'EN,508.
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of course, that abilities do not evolve unless objective conditions are
favorable." 6 Sartre cannot accept such a definition.
Sartre's ontological conception of freedom is not a description of
those conditions external to man which allow him to choose among
alternatives but, rather, freedom is the state of Being of the pour-soi
to which the pour-soi is condemned. "Weare a freedom which chooses,
but we do not choose to be free: we are condemned to freedom." 7
Since the pour-soi is in question in its Being, freedom is its condition:
"I am ... an existant which learns of its freedom by its acts ... My
freedom is perpetually in question in my being; it is not a super-added
quality or a property of my nature; it is the very stuff of my being." 8
To comprehend freedom is to understand that the human reality
is its own Nothingness. 9 The pour-soi, in order to be, must choose
itself. There is no a priori essence or God-given human nature that the
pour-soi can depend upon or cling to. The pour-soi is "entirely
abandoned, without aid of any sort, to the unbearable necessity of
making itself be down to the slightest detail." 10
Man's freedom cannot be relative to any particular situation or
occurrence; for his freedom is his Nothingness, and his Nothingness
is an absolute in the sense that it is the condition of the pour-soi. Thus,
"man could not be sometimes free and sometimes slave: he is entirely
and always free, or he is not." 11

2.

SITUATION

Thus far freedom has been described in terms of the "lack" of the
pour-soi. However, it is necessary to understand the pour-soi not as an
• McGill, V. J., "Sartre's Doctrine of Freedom," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, (15 Juillet 1949),341.
'EN,565.
"Ibid., 514.
"Ibid., 515. "To be, for the pour-soi, is to nihilate the en-soi which it is. In these
conditions, freedom could be nothing other than this nihilation. It is through it that
the pour-soi escapes its being as its essence; it is through it that the pour-soi is always something other than what one can say of it, for . . . the pour-soi is that
which is already beyond the name one gives to it, the property one recognizes in it.
To say that the pour-soi has to be what it is; to say that it is what it is not in notbeing what it is; to say that in it existence precedes and conditions essence or ...
that for it 'Wesen ist was gewesen ist: is to say one sole and selfsame thing, namely,
that man is free."

,. Ibid., 516.
11 Ibid.
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abstraction but as engaged, as in situation. In fact, the pour-soi is only
in so far as it is engaged and in situation. We must, therefore, turn to
the concept of situation in order to describe the more profound implications of Sartre's theory of human freedom.
The situation of man is the totality of the limits with which the
pour-soi is faced in its relation to the world. This world consists of
other pour-sois and of things. Although the objective world of "brute
things" "may, from the start, limit our freedom of action, it is our freedom itself which must previously constitute the framework, the technique, and the ends in regard to which they will manifest themselves
as limits." 12
The situation, then, is the resultant or synthesis of two aspects of
reality: the facticity of things as revealed in their coefficient of adversity, and the meanings which the pour-soi legislates for them. The
relation of the pour-soi to a situation is described through what Sartre
terms "being-there." "Being-there for a colonial is to be twenty days
from France-better still: if he is a functionary and awaits his paid
voyage, it is to be six months and seven days from Bordeaux." 13 It is
through being-there that the object of desire or of cognition takes on
meaning for the pour-soi; and its meaning identifies the situation and
defines it. The mountain I now look at has a certain "coefficient of
adversity." It is difficult to climb, it is high, it is craggy, etc.; but the
meaning of "difficult to climb" and of "high" and of "craggy" is determined by the pour-soi who is confronted by that mountain in a
particular situation. 14
The relationship between situation and freedom is one of paradox.
Freedom exists only in a situation and a situation exists only if the
pour-soi is free. "The human reality encounters everywhere resistances
and obstacles which it has not created; but these resistances and these

"EN,562.
13 Ibid., 574 .
.. Ibid., 569. "To an equal desire to climb, the rock will be easy to ascend for such
an athletic climber, difficult for such another, a novice badly trained and with a puny
body. But the body reveals itself in its turn all well or badly trained only in regard
to a free choice. It is because I am there and have made of myself what I am that
the rock develops in regard to my body a cOf'fficient of adversity. For the lawyer
living in town who pleads, for the body hidden under his legal robe, the rock is
neither difficult nor easy to ascend: it is melted into the totality 'world' without
emerging in any way from it."
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obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice which is
the human reality." 15
But situation is itself partially a function of the pour-soi which is
understood under the dimensions of temporality: past, present, and
future. Hence, a situation will be constituted, in part, by what I was
as well as by what I am. If "Wesen ist was gewesen ist," then the past
can be understod only in paradox. "I could not conceive of myself
without a past; better, I could no longer think anything about myself
since I think about what I am, and I am in the past; but on the other
hand, I am the being through which the past comes to itself and to
the world." 16
Sartre's conception of situation and freedom as intimately associated and correlative aspects of the pour-soi defines the nature of
human reality. "If the pour-soi is nothing other than its situation, it
follows that the being-in-situation defines the human reality." 17 However, it must be stressed that while the pour-soi expresses its existence in
situation, the situation is not solely constituted by the pour-soi. The
pour-soi is thrown into a world which consists of other pour-sois and
their situations. The other pour-sois have established meanings in the
world which then function as part of the reality which surrounds the
individual pour-soi. 18
Thus, to be free is "not to choose the historical world in which
one arises-which would have no sense-but to choose oneself in the
world, whatever it may be." 19 The realistic element in Sartre is apparent: the pour-soi does not create the world in any Fichtean sense.
There is, rather, a given which the pour-soi grasps and, in grasping,
renders uniquely meaningful to itself. "Freedom ... recognizes and
foresees implicitly in its original project the independent existence of
the given on which it exercises itself." 20

EN, 569.
,. Ibid., 577-578. "Let us examine this paradox more closely: freedom being choice
is change. It defines itself by the end which it projects, that is, by the future which
it has to be. But precisely because the future is the-state-which-is-not-yet of that
which is, it can be conceived only in a direct liaison to that which is. And it could
not be that which is what clarifies that which is not yet: for that which is is lack
and, consequently, cannot be known as such except from that which it lacks."
17 Ibid., 634.
18 Ibid., 603.
,. Ibid., 604.
20 Ibid., 588.
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The complexus of choice-freedom-Iack-nothingness-situation, which
is the pour-soi as it "exists" itself, is ultimately reducible to two basic
aspects: the given and the ends which the pour-soi imposes upon the
given_ "The arising of freedom is a crystallization of an end through
a given, and discovery of a given in the light of an end: these two
structures are simultaneous and inseparable_" 21

3_

DEATH

Sartre asserts that it is not possible for the pour-soi to be aware of
its own possibility of dying_ My death must in principle remain outside the orbit of my comprehension_ "Death is not my possibility of no
longer realizing a presence in the world, but an always possible nihilation of my possibles, which is outside of my possibility." 22
Sartre is quite willing to admit that the pour-soi can imagine a
death, but not its death_ 23 My death is a comprehensible notion only
for the Other. "The fact of death ___ gives final victory to the point
of view of the Other." 24 Sartre maintains that since, in principle,
death, in so far as it is my death, is comprehended by the Other, my
death can never be for me an ontological structure_ It is unanalyzable
and beyond me_ 25
It is now possible to see that there are two basic existential characteristics which qualify the pour-soi: "nothing is in the consciousness
which is not consciousness of Being," and, secondly, "my Being is in
question in my Being-which means that nothing comes to me which
is not chosen." 26 These characteristics determine a pour-soi which,
through the aspects of "lack," choice, Nothingness, etc_, "exists" itself
as freedom_ This freedom is a strictly ontological concept. It is not
to be confused with what is ordinarily meant by freedom_ Sartre thus
has given us a radically new concept of freedom: the pour-soi's situation or status as it "exists" itself ontologically_ Freedom is the necessary
condition of the pour-soi, and is evidenced in the pour-soi in so far as
the pour-soi exists as "lack_" Such is the freedom to which the pour-soi
is condemned.
EN, 590.
Ibid., 621.
.a Ibid., 624.
·'Ibid., 628.
26 Ibid., 630.
28 Ibid., 578.
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Chapter IV

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
1.

EXISTENTIAL VERSUS FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Sartre defines existential psychoanalysis as a "special phenomenological method," 1 a "method designed to bring to light, under a
rigorously objective form, the subjective choice by which each person
makes himself a person, that is, makes himself announce to himself
what he is." 2 The existential psychoanalyst rejects the Freudian
psychoanalysis in so far as the latter describes certain general 'states'
(complexes, attitudes, etc.) rather than individually determined projects and choices. The goal of existential psychoanalysis is to reveal the
symbolization and rapports contained in the projects of the pour-soi
and to find "through these empirical and concrete projects the original
manner which each one has of choosing his being." 3
How does existential psychoanalysis differ from phenomenological
ontology? The answer to this question will clarify the differences between orthodox and existential psychoanalyses. For Sartre, ontology
has as its aim the analysis of the structure of Being in general. It cannot attempt a study of the detailed history of an individual pour-soi;
it cannot make predictions concerning the outcome of any specific
situation. These particularized questions are the concern of existential
psychoanalysis.
The existential psychoanalysis interrogates particular human conducts, tendencies, inclinations, etc., and attempts to "decipher" their
existential meaning. The principle of this kind of psychoanalysis is
that man is comprehended as a totality, not as a collection of separate
facts. Every act of man, however insignificant it may seem, reveals
something of his nature. The goal of this psychoanalysis is to "decipher" the empirical behavior of man. It is primarily through a deIEN,559.
• Ibid., 662.
• Ibid., 689.
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tailed and complete analysis of the acts of choice which a man makes
that the existential psychoanalyst may hope to formulate a picture of
the relationship between specific choices of an individual and the
symbolic meanings which those choices represent.
The essential difference between the existential and the Freudian
psychoanalyses is that the latter stresses the general complexes and
attitudes determined unconsciously in the individual, while the former
holds that all mental conditions are consciously disclosed and are to
be comprehended through an analysis of the situation of the person.
The two psychoanalyses are in closest agreement in regard to fundamental method and the desirability of reconstructing the total picture
of the individual mind through an exhaustive investigation of the
individual's personal history and behavior.4

2.

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ONTOLOGY

Ontology lays the groundwork for general and abstract significations which analyze the nature of Being. Existential psychoanalysis is
a method of applying the basic ontological principles to highly individualized projects, i.e., of analyzing the specific attitudes and actions
of the individual in relation to his life-history. In this respect, ontology
is basic to existential psychoanalysis: "The information which ontology
may acquire about conducts and desire must serve as principles of
existential psychoanalysis." 5 Thus, "What ontology may teach psychoanalysis is, in effect, first of all the true origin of the significations of
things and their true relation to the human reality." 6

3.

VISCOSITY

Sartre investigates the structure and basis of the existential psychoanalysis but is interested in describing the method rather than in
using it. However, he does give us some illustrative examples of how
he intends to apply the method. While Sartre's Baudelaire is a full
length study in existential psychoanalysis, its consideration would involve us in too great a digression from the issues with which we have
been dealing. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the analysis of
"visco city," which is the most extended illustration of existential psychoanalysis in EN.
• EN, 656-658.
"Ibid., 663.
"Ibid., 694.
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The analysis of viscosity is indebted to Bachelard's attempted
psychoanalysis of things. 7 Bachelard holds that one may psychoanalyze
things, such as water, stones, fire, etc. Sartre is sympathetic toward
this notion but holds that Bachelard's work lacked the method necessary to carry out a successful analysis of things. s
Sartre's analysis of viscosity is an application of the principles of
existential psychoanalysis to things; but in the case of viscosity the
things are of prime importance, since viscosity is symbolic of the ensoi, and to penetrate its nature is to know the nature of the en-soi.
The "viscous" is the sticky, glue-like, tar-like, soft quicksand-like
stuff that was best described earlier in Sartre's novel Nausea. 9 But the
viscous is not simply matter: "a handshake is viscous, a smile is viscous,
a thought, a sentiment is capable of being viscous." 10 We know the
nature of the viscous when we consider it in its relation to the pour-soi.
This relationship is dual: on the one hand, the viscous is molded by us,
shaped by us; on the other hand, it "seizes" us and possesses usP
The possibility of losing mastership over the viscous "haunts" the
pour-soi, for "the viscous is the revenge of the en-soi." 12 The fear of
the pour-soi that it will be absorbed by the en-soi is the essence of the
"flight" of the pour-soi previously described by Sartre. 13
"EN,694.
8 Ibid., "We would consider the study of Bachelard on water, which teems with
ingenious and profound insights, as an ensemble of suggestions, as a precious collection of materials which would have to be utilized at present by a psycholoanalysis
conscious of its principles."
• Vide supra 29-30.
10 EN, 695.
11 Ibid., 700. "The viscous is docile. Only, at the very moment when I believe to
possess it, by a curious reversal, it is it which possesses me. It is there that appears its
essential character: its softness makes a suction. If the object that I hold in my hand is
solid, I am able to let it slip when it pleases me; its inertia symbolizes for me my
entire power: I found it, but it never founds me ... here it is that the viscous reverses the terms: the pour-soi is suddenly compromised. I remove my hands, I wish
to let go of the viscous but it adheres to me, it sucks me, it clings to me; its mode of
being is neither the reassuring inertia of a solid, nor a dynamism as that of water
which wears itself out sliding away from me: it is a soft activity, frothy and feminine
of suction, it lives obscurely under my fingers and I sense it as a dizziness, it attracts
me ... as the bottom of an abyss would be able to attract me. It is like a tactile
fascination of the viscous. I am no longer the master of stopping the process of
appropriation."
12 Ibid., 701.
18 Ibid., 702.
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The existential psychoanalysis of the viscous, Sartre claims, has revealed a sector of Being. We know en-soi through our experience of
the viscous in nausea, and this experience suggests "a crowd of obscure
significations and of sendings-back which pass beyond it." 14 In its
most profound sense, the viscous "is a possible meaning of Being." 15

HEN,703.
15 Ibid.

Chapter V

GENERAL SUMMARY
"For us, man is defined first of all as a being 'in a situation.'
That means that he forms a synthetic whole with his situation
-biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his
possibilities; but, inversely, it is he who gives it meaning by
making his choices within it and by it. To be in a situation, as
we see it, is to choose oneself in a situation, and men differ from
one another in their situations and also in the choices they themselves make of themselves. What men have in common is not a
"nature" but a condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions: The inevitablity of death, the necessity of working for
a living, of living in a world already inhabited by other men.
Fundamentally this condition is nothing more than the basic
human situation, or, if you prefer, the ensemble of abstract characteristics common to all situations."
-Sartre
The topics to be discussed as general conclusions are Sartre's ideas
regarding "situation," his explanation of how the dualism of Being
(en-soi and pour-soi) is bridged, his statements regarding metaphysical
questions, and, finally, his views on moral matters.
1.

APPROPRIATION

Human reality for Sartre is understood only through situation.
The pour-soi is not isolated in its existence; rather, it is engaged with
the totality of things, Others, etc., which establishes the pour-soi as a
being-in-the-midst-of-things. While I am "absolutely free and responsible for my situation ... I am never free except in a situation." 1

'EN,590.
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Since without the pour-soi there cannot be a situation, it is the
pour-soi which constitutes its reality. By being-in-the-world the poursoi is responsible for legislating significance to the world in which it is.
It is here, then, that the relationship between the situation and man's
freedom is made clear:
"Man, being condemned to be free, carries the weight of the
w<?rld on his shoulders: he is responsibile for the world and for
himself considered as manner of being. __ . The responsibility
of the pour-soi is overwhelming, since it is that through which
there is a world; and, since it is also that which makes itself be,
whatever may be the situation in which it finds itself, the poursoi must assume this situation entirely. __ with the proud consciousness of being the author of it- ... The situation is mine
.. _ because it is the image of my free choice of myself and all
that it presents to me is mine in that it represents me and
symbolizes me." 2
However, the realistic element in Sartre's conception of situation
must be stressed_ The pour-soi does not of itself create its world; rather,
in reacting to objective givens (objects, Others, significations created
by Others, etc), it makes of these givens the world of meanings it both
"exists" and exists in_ The brute given is nothing without the testimonies of Others and their significations.3
In the same manner, my past actions are never wholly completed
and accomplished facts alone. In addition to the brute fact of their
pastness, the meaning which they have is continually dependent on the
significance which I continue to give them.4
EN, 639_
Ibid., 579.
'Ibid., 579. "The signification of the past is narrowly dependent on my present
project. That signifies by no means that I am able to vary at the mercy of my
caprices the meaning of my anterior acts; but, much to the contrary, that the fundamental project that I am decides absolutely the signification which the past that I
have to be can have for me and for others. I alone in fact am able to decide at each
moment the burden of the past: not in discussing, in deliberating, and in appreciating in each case the importance of such and such an anterior event, but in
projecting myself toward my goals, I save the past with me and I decide by action
its signification. Who shall decide if that mystic crisis of my fifteenth year 'was'
pure accident of puberty or, on the contrary, first sign of a future conversion. I,
according as I shall decide- at twenty, at thirty-to convert myself. The project of
conversion confers at one sole stroke upon a crisis of adolescence the value of a
premonition that I had not taken seriously."
2

B

GENERAL SUMMARY

59

In regard to the facticity of pastness, the conclusion is that although
"all my past is there, pressing, urgent, imperious," still "I choose its
meaning." 1) The past is never 'settled' once and for all, but the meaning of the past is perpetually in "suspension." 6 The meaning of the
past is clarified only in the context of my present situation, and so
Sartre terms this active, unstable past the "is-was" (est ete).7
Despite the realistic element of the world (as expressed in the
coefficient of adversity of things, the significations due to Others, the
historical past, etc.), situation is primarily an expression of the active
role of the pour-soi in fashioning the world which it "exists." The
world is revealed to me, and, in this sense, I am its creator and
possessor. 8
The key concept which explains how situation is an expression of
the pour-soi is what Sartre terms "appropriation." In appropriation
the pour-soi gives meaning to its reality; it molds the significations for
which it is responsible; the pour-soi "exists" its significations.
The concept of appropriation leads beyond constitution of meanings to an understanding of the special status of the pour-soi, for the
pour-soi is the human reality. Its priority over facticity engenders the
necessary interpretation that the existence of reality is a function of the
pour-soi, and that it can be grasped only in the situation which the
pour-soi "exists";
"To the degree to which I appear to myself as creating the objects through the sole rapport of appropriation, these objects
are I. The pen and the pipe, the article of clothing, the desk,
the house it is I. The totality of my possessions reflects the
totality ofmy being. I am what I have. It is I that I touch on this
cup, on this trinket. This mountain which I climb, it is I to the
degree to which I conquer it; and when I am at its summit,
which I have 'acquired' at the price of some efforts, this large
view over the valley and the surrounding mountains, it is I; the
panorama, it is I expanded to the horizon, for it exists only
through me, only for me." 9

5 EN, 580.
• Ibid., 582.
• "is-was" is another of Sartre's ungrammatical constructions. There seems to be
no other way of successfully rendering the meaning of this term in English.
"Ibid,666.
• Ibid., 680-681.
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Through the appropriation I "egotize" my reality. The mountain
which is I is not "within" me in any sense; rather, it is I externalized.
"Possession is a magic rapport; I am these objects which I possess, but
outside of all subjectivity as an en-soi which escapes me at each instant
and whose creation I perpetuate at each instant." 10
Appropriation is thus a paradoxical concept, for it seeks to explain
both the realistic (objective) factor in experience and the idealistic
(subjective) aspect which is the pour-soi. It amounts, in analytic
reduction, to the problem of the en-soi-pour-soi-an ideal and unrealizable concept.H
In so far as appropriation leads ultimately to the problem of the
en-soi-pour-soi, we are returned to the very question of EN: the problem of the nature of Being; for the en-soi-pour-soi is absolute Being.
However, since the en-soi-pour-soi is an ideal and unrealizable structure, the question arises, How can appropriation be the project of the
en-soi-pour-soi? The answer is that appropriation symbolizes the
essential nature of the existant who, as pour-soi, can never be his own
proper foundation, who, as Nothingness, is in flight toward an en-soi
which he can never attain.12

2.

THE DUALISM OF EN-SOl AND POUR-SOl

Since appropriation is symbolic of the ideal but impossible en-soipour-soi, the basic dualism of en-soi and pour-soi is still unresolved.
In yearning to be its own foundation, the pour-soi seeks the status of
en-soi-pour-soi: the Absolute. Another name for this Absolute is God.
The ideal of en-soi-pour-soi is the ideal of "a consciousness which
would be foundation of its own being-en-soi by the pure consciousness
that it would take of itself. 13 The pour-soi, if it could achieve this
ideal status, would be God. "Thus," Sartre writes, "one can say that
what renders the fundamental project of the human reality most conceivable is the fact that man is that being who projects himself to be
God." 14

EN, 681.
Ibid., 682.
12 Ibid., 682.
13 I bid., 653.
"Ibid.
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Sartre concludes that "to be man is to stret~h toward being God;
or, if one prefers, man is fundamentally desire to be God." 15 That
man is condemned to the desire to be God is his tragic condition. The
dialectic of relationships between pour-soi and en-soi is the profound
description of this failure to achieve the Absolute. Sartre states the
conclusion of the en-soi-pour-soi dialectic: each human reality seeks to
metamorphose its own pour-soi into en-soi-pour-soi, but in striving for
this status, the pour-soi must lose itself if it makes itself en-soi. The
projection of the pour-soi to lose itself in order to found its own Being
Sartre terms a "passion." But since the status of en-soi-pour-soi is impossible for the pour-soi to attain-since man cannot be God-the
pour-soi loses itself in vain: "man is a useless passion." 16
Having spent the main part of EN in describing the nature of the
two polarities of Being and in analyzing the flight of the pour-soi as
well as the ideal but unrealizable en-soi-pour-soi, Sartre concludes
his work by returning to the original question of whether the polarities of Being constitute an irrevocably separate and distinct dualism
whose members can never be unified. He seeks to establish an ultimate
resolution of the dualism: "the pour-soi and the en-soi are reunited by
a synthetic liaison which is not other than the pour-soi itself." 17
The pour-soi, then, is considered as "synthetic liaison" which unites
the en-soi and the pour-soi. This union, however, is to be understood
in regard to the genesis of the dualism. We mean simply that Sartre's
answer to the dualism is really an answer to the question: How did
the dualities arise? It is not an answer to the question: In what manner
may the pour-soi unite itself with the en-soi? Sartre says that ontology
cannot answer this latter question, for "we do not have grounds to
interrogate ourselves about the manner in which the pour-soi may
unite itself to the en-soi since the pour-soi is in no wayan autonomous
substance." 18 The only substance which the pour-soi has is its Nothingness.
3. METAPHYSICAL QUESTIONS
Further investigation of the problem of the dualism of Being leads
to metaphysical considerations. Sartre says that the metaphysical

15

EN, 653--654.

Ibid., 708.
Ibid., 711.
18 Ibid., 712.
16

17
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problem might be formulated in this way: Why does the pour-soi
arise from Being? 19 Since, for Sartre, the ontological investigation is
by definition a phenomenological study, we can analyze only givens;
we cannot turn to questions of the ultimate origin of givens. It is the
task of metaphysics to take up where, because of its method, ontology
must leave off.
4. ETHICAL QUESTIONS
A final area of philosophic inquiry is taken up in the conclusion of
EN: the question of ethical values. Sartre asserts that ontology is not
concerned directly with formulating moral prescriptions. Ontology
"concerns itself uniquely with that which is, and it is not possible to
derive imperatives from indicatives." 20 It is possible to indicate, however, the general lines along which an existential ethic might be
formulated. The existential ethic will begin its analysis by studying
the human being as a pour-soi in a situation. Since, for Sartre, all
values are determined through the choices that the pour-soi makes, it
follows that the pour-soi will be understood as creating its moral
values through its acts. The moral agent is "the being through whom
values exist." 21 The existential analysis of values will be based upon
the categories of Being, Nothingness, freedom, anguish, and so on, as
these categories have been clarified through phenomenological ontology. The existential ethic will be founded upon a freedom which
will "take consciousness of itself and will discover itself in anguish as
the unique source of value." 22
The multiple questions and difficulties which face such an ethic are
problems to be met in a special and separate work which Sartre
promises in the closing line of EN. This work on existential ethics has
not yet appeared.

,. EN, 713.
2. I bid., 720.
n Ibid., 722.
"Ibid_

PART II
Evaluation

Chapter VI

SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD
In any analysis of L'P,tre et le Neant, it is imperative that Sartre's
use of phenomenological method be considered and evaluated. It is
not a coincidence that phenomenology appears in Sartre's ontology,
for we have been advised in the subtitle of EN, "Essay in Phenomenological Ontology," of his intention to make use of the phenomenological method. Since Sartre appears to mean by phenomenology the
special discipline formulated by Husserl, it will be well to begin our
discussion with a brief resume of Husserl's position.
Husserl's early interests were in mathematics-more specifically, in
so-called "foundations of mathematics." His first basic problem was
one of "reconciling the objective validity of logic and mathematics
with the subjective processes of experiencing."! Prior to HusserI's
work on this problem there was a strong tradition which held that
logic is intimately related to psychology, that logic is really a subbranch of psychology. Various writers argued that meaning and truth
are dependent upon psychological processes, and that logical validity
is possible only in so far as it is grounded in the thought-processes of
individuals. According to Lipps, for example, "the rules of correct
thought are identical with the natural laws of thought itself; and logic
is either the physics of thought or nothing at all." 2 This "psychologism" Husserl examined; and to its refutation he devoted his first
philosophical efforts.
The essence of Husserl's refutation of psychologism consists in his
demonstration of the a priori validity of logical laws; i.e., it consists in
demonstrating that the laws of logic are "established through apodictic
evidence and not inductively." 3 As Husserl sees it, psychology, "because of its inability to yield more than empirical generalities, . . .
1

Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 561.

"Ibid., HO.
B Ibid., H2.
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cannot account for the apodictically evident, 'superempirical,' ab .
solutely exact laws which make up the core of logic." 4 By pointing
out the "ideal" nature of logical necessity, HusserI undermined the
foundation of that psychologism according to which logical necessity
is derived from "matters of fact." I)
The refutation of psychologism leads HusserIlater in his career to
the formulation of the distinctive philosophic method which is known
as phenomenology. Husserl was able to "break through" to phenomenology largely because in his work on psychologism he had raised
certain key questions for which, at that time, no method of philosophizing could provide an answer. These key questions were concerned with the attempt to relate subjectivity (not psychologistically
understood) to those meanings, logical unities, and "ideal" elements
in experience which Husserl had described in his attempt to rescue
logic from psychology; they were questions concerning the possibility
of exploring subjectivity in a non-psychologistic manner. In his prephenomenlogical period Husserl faced the problem of the" 'clarification' of the fundamental concepts of logic and mathematics, and of
their relationship to thought processes." 6 In his phenomenological
period, HusserI expanded this problem into a larger one: the search
for a transcendental phenomenology which would provide a "universal ... method for philosophy and a final foundation for science." 7
"The aim of phenomenological analysis," Farber writes, "is to
bring the logical concepts and laws to epistemological clarity
and distinctness. The logical concepts as valid thought-unities
must originate in intuition, and must arise through 'ideating
abstraction' on the basis of certain experiences. In repeated
performances of this abstraction the logical concepts must be
always confirmed anew, and must be grasped in their self-

• Farber, M., op. cit., 112.
5 Ibid., 114: "An analysis of the real meaning of logical laws shows that they are
not laws of actual mental life. The psychologistic interpretation therefore does
violence to the meaning of logical laws, which do not presuppose the facts of mental
life, either in their content or in their establishment, any more than is the case in
pure mathematics. The valid forms of inference refer generally to any terms or
propositions, and do not involve the existence of any actual judgments or psychical
phenomena."
6 Farber, M., "Phenomenology," Twentieth Century Philosophy, 350.
• Ibid.
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identity. Expressed otherwise: Husserl is not content with 'mere
words; or with a merely symbolic understanding of words, such
as we have to begin with in our reflections about the meaning
of the laws set up in pure logic regarding 'concepts; 'judgments,'
'truths,' etc. Meanings which are only animated by remote,
confused, figurative intuitions-if by any at all-cannot satisfy
him. He proposes to return to the 'things themselves.' By means
of fully developed intuitions we are to see with evidence that
what is given here in actually performed abstraction is really and
truly that which word-meanings of the law mean." 8
The cry of "back to the things themselves" is the attempt to devise
a philosophy which will take a new attitude toward the examination
of the content of experience. This new attitude is at once the attempt
to construct a "presuppositionless" method and a philosophy which
will begin with that "root" experience or givenness which neither reflection nor dialectic nor scientific disciplines of any order can meaningfully deny.
"The 'phenomenology' represented by the Logical Investigations
makes use of immanent intuition alone, and does not pass beyond the sphere of the intuitively given. That is the meaning
of the precept 'Back to the things themselves'; it meant the appeal to intuitive givenness." 9
The question now is: What sort of attitude are we leaving when
we turn to phenomenology, and what sort of attitude may we expect
from phenomenology? The answers Husserl gives to these questions
are clear. The phenomenological attitude is a radical departure from
what Husserl termed the "natural" attitude-a term denoting the
common-sense, uncritical view of the world which accepts as "obvious"
the existence of things, of other persons, and of a structure of meanings which relate ourselves to the world we live in: In the phenomenological attitude nothing can be taken for granted. The presuppositions
of the natural attitude are among the very elements to be explained
by phenomenological philosophy.
HusserI's method is essentially a return in principle to the Cartesian
point of view. Phenomenological knowledge must begin in subjectivity via the reflections of the meditating ego. Thus:

8 Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 213.
• Ibid., 218.
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"The choice of a subjective method is due to the aim for complete and r~dical understa~ding, which is. of deciding importance for phIlosophy. Nothmg may be naIvely assumed; there
must be no pre-judgments. In the natural view of the world,
the ~ommo~-sense :view, and in all t~e special sciences, a general
theSIS of eXIstence IS taken to be ObVIOUS. Its unconscious acceptance is well justified for purposes of natural existence, but not
for theoretical understanding_ A world existing continuously
and independently of our experiencing is the natural basis for
non-philosophic thinking_ But because philosophy is guided by
the ideal of completeness of understanding, it cannot allow even
so obvious a belief to remain unquestioned. The 'natural' view
of the world after all contains elements of theoretical interpretation to which we have become accustomed_ In short, everything
must be questioned, including the phenomenological procedure
itself. Hence only a subjectivistic method which begins with the
experiencing knower and his evidence will answer." 10
The first step in phenomenological investigation is a "reduction"
of our common or "natural" experience into those special aspects of
experience which are the objects of phenomenological investigation. As
Farber points out, this "reduction"
"is really twofold, and consists of (1) eidetic reduction, which
means that only essences, or essential structures, are of interest,
and not particular facts; and (2) transcendental reduction, with
its technique of 'elimination' and 'bracketing,' which leads one
back to the 'pure' consciousness of an individual knower as the
starting-point for philosophy." 11
In the transcendental reduction (termed "epoche") all judgments
about existence, including material things, are suspended, placed in
abeyance. The objects to which these judgments refer are bracketed,
or put in quotation marks. What is left after this reduction are the
perceiving, remembrances, and imaginings of the experiencing being_
The bracketed world becomes a phenomenon for a transcendentally
reduced consciousness_ 12 The reduction, which is the essence of the
phenomenological attitude, thus enables the phenomenologist to go
back to the "originary given_"

Farber, M., "Phenomenology," op. cit., 350-351.
Ibid., 353_
12 Ibid., 353.
10
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The nature of the starting point of phenomenology, the nature of
the objects with which phenomenology is concerned-these indicate
that Husserl's transcendental procedure is an attempt to examine the
lowest categorial level of experience; and at this level the primary
structure of subjectivity is, in Husserl's terminology, "intentionality."
Consciousness, for Husserl, would not be consciousness were it not consciousness of something. Consciousness intends. Via its acts of intention it "endows" objects with meaning. Husserl's investigations of
intentionality aim at a clarification of the complex relationships
which prevail between the cogito and the meaning-intentions of the
cogito, and open up a vast nexus of problems which, since they are
basic to subjectivity, are basic to practically every area of human experience-basic to every discipline and to the structure of science.
Phenomenology, therefore, as practiced by Husserl is but a prolegomenon to all branches of science and philosophy.
"The aim of phenomenology is said to be the achievement of an
'absolute knowledge of the world,' which it attempts to accomplish
by going beyond all 'worldly' forms of explanation."13 Phenomenology
"seeks to point out all presuppositions" and views everything factual
as an exemplification of essential structures." It "is not concerned with
matters of fact as such,"14 but with the "originarily given" in the
"stream of pure experience." 15
Now Sartre, despite the fact that he speaks of his inquiry as
"phenomenological," nowhere asserts that he is a "phenomenologist"
following Husserl's method in detail. On the contrary, we shall show
that Sartre departs radically from Husserl's method and that the term
"phenomenological," when applied to Sartre's method, is ambiguous
and, in certain respects, a misnomer.
The "phenomenological" basis of EN is contained in the first 37
pages of the book. It is in these pages that Sartre discusses the idea
of phenomena, the phenomena of Being and the Being of phenomena,
the pre-reflective cogito, and other relevant matters. He is attempting
to do two things: (1) to concretize, locate, and, in general, indicate the
problem of Being; (2) to show the initial differentiation of Being into
two regions which are ultimately defined as the en-soi and the pour-soi.

Farber, M., The Foundation CIt Phenomenology, 547.
Ibid., 568.
,. Ibid., 353.
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In attempting to develop the fundamental dualism which permeates
the whole of his ontology, Sartre, early in EN, discusses the seemingly
dualistic terms of the phenomena of Being and the Being of phenomena. 16 Again, the primary consideration of the cogito and of consciousness as later contrasted with the treatment of being en-soi is
another aspect of Sartre's technique of setting up the dualism of his
ontology, since consciousness resides in the pour-soi. What is the
phenomenological basis for the derivation and analysis of these structures?
.
Sartre tells us that "being is neither a quality of the object seizable
among others, nor a sense of the object. The object does not reflect
back to being as to a signification." 17 We learn, further, that "the
object does not possess being, and its existence is not a participation
in being, nor any other kind of relation. It is, that is the sole manner
of defining its way of being." 18 The object can neither conceal nor
reveal Being, since there is no hidden Being behind the appearance
of the object. The object, rather than revealing itself to us, is there
to-be-revealed. Sartre says: "Being is simply the condition of all revealing; it is being-in-order-to-reveal and not being revealed." 19 The
Being of the phenomenon constitutes the transphenomenality of Being. We are able to have knowledge of this transphenomenality of
Being since it is coextensive with the phenomenon of Being and makes
itself known to us by an "overflowing." 20
Our basic criticism of this analysis of Being is that, whatever its
merits or insights, it is not a phenomenological analysis. Quite to the
contrary, the Husserlian method is put aside as inadequate. To begin
with, no epoche or reduction has been performed. Sartre holds that
the Husserlian reduction is not the proper method to begin the analysis
of Being, since it is based. on the concept of passing beyond particularity to the essence of that particularity. This, according to Sartre,21
is not a possible method for the analysis of Being, since Being has no
meaning or essence 'beyond' its own particularity. Being is to-be-re-

1. Later he will show that the former leads to the region of the pour-soi and the
latter to the region of the en-soi.
,. EN 15.
18 Ibid.
,. Ibid .
• 0 Ibid., 16 .
•, Ibid., 15-16.
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vealed, but this revelation is not via any Husserlian phenomenological
discipline. Instead, we have what might be termed a quasi-phenomenological sort of method, which may be further described through Sartre's analysis of the cogito.
Sartre commences his analysis of consciousness by asserting with
Husserl that "all consciousness ... is consciousness of something." 22
In being conscious of something, consciousness directs itself outward
toward the object of which it is conscious. Thus, the intentional
quality is the basic characteristic of the cogito. In order for there to
be true intention, however, the cogito must be self-conscious: "the
necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be
knowledge of its object is that it be consciousness of itself as being
this knowledge."23 Reflective consciousness in the cogito necessitates
the precondition of a non-reflective consciousness; this is termed the
pre-reflective cogito. "It is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflections possible: there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the
condition of the Cartesian cogito." 24
There is no essence of consciousness prior to the intentions of consciousness: "Consciousness is not produced as singular exemplar of an
abstract possibility, but. _ . in rising from the heart of being it creates
and sustains its essence, that is, the synthetic arrangement of its possibilities." 25
Sartre has argued26 that Husserl's theory, according to which consciousness is consciousness of something, allows of two interpretations:
"Either we understand by this that consciousness is constitutive of the
being of its object, or else it signifies that consciousness in its most
profound nature is in rapport with a transcendent being." 27 Sartre
rejects the first interpretation and accepts the second. This is a key
point of disagreement with Husserl, since Sartre holds that Husserl's
theory of intentionality leads ultimately to a transcendental idealism
which makes reality subjectively created and unreal.

·'EN,17.

'3 Ibid., 18 .
.. Ibid., 20.
,. Ibid., 21.
•• Ibid., 27-29.
21 Ibid., 27.
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"It is in vain that one will attempt a hocus pocus, in basing the
reality of the object on the subjective impressional plenitude
and its objectivity on non-being: never will the objective come
out of the subjective, nor the transcendent from the immanent,
or being fro~ non-being_ But, one will say, Husserl precisely
defines conSCIousness as a transcendence_ In fact, it is this which
he posits, and it is his essential discovery. But ___ he is totally
unfaithful to his principle" 28
In place of Husserlian phenomenology, Sartre uses a kind of ontological argument. Taking as his point of orientation HusserI's statement that consciousness implies consciousness of something, Sartre
writes:
"Consciousness is consciousness of something: This signifies that
transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; i.e.,
consciousness originates carried in a being which is not it. It is
this which we call the ontological proof." 29
Sartre's ontological argument is based on HusserI's theory of intentionality and constitutes an expansion of it:
"To say that consciousness is consciousness of something signifies
that for consciousness there is no being outside of this precise
obligation to be a revealing intuition of something, i.e., of a
transcendent being; ... for a revealing intuition implies a revealed. Absolute subjectivity can only be constituted in the face
of a revealed; immanence can be defined only in the seizure of a
transcendent." 30
Whatever the validity of such ontological arguments, it is necessary
to point out that such a form of argumentation is not phenomenological in HusserI's sense of the term. No reduction has been performed; the examined content of subjectivity is thus an unpurified
content which bears the marks of the natural attitude. Sartre begins
with HusserI's concept of intentionality and divorces it from HusserI's
method, losing its methodological precision.
The discussion in the introduction of EN reviewed in the last pages
forms Sartre's phenomenological framework for his ontological inquiry.
• SEN,28.

··Ibid.
•• Ibid., 28-29.
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With minor exceptions, it is only in the first 37 pages of his 720 page
work that he specifically considers any aspects of phenomenology as
method for philosophizing, and, more specifically, as method for ontological philosophizing; and it is only in these first 37 pages that
Sartre makes use of anything resembling Husserlian phenomenology.
We are advised of Sartre's departure from phenomenological techniques in his description of the Other. Since the existence of the Other
cannot be determined ontologically, "Sartre ... renounces all efforts
to derive ontologically the existence of the Other."3l The Other is encountered but not constituted by the ego. We know that the Other
exists because he looks at us. The importance of noting this inability
to give an ontological proof for the existence of the Other is that
non-ontological and, in HusserI's sense, non-phenomenological methods
of analysis must be used. Thus, those extensive sections in EN dealing
with the Other and with the relations to the Other all rest on nonontological grounds. "Ever since his Ego, in the Third Part of his
book, had to acknowledge the existence of the Other as a plain
'necessite de fait/ his philosophy had left the realm of pure ontology
and moved within the onticempirical world." 32
The nature of Sartre's method may be characterized as quasiphenomenological and intuitive. The last term needs clarification.
Sartre does not use the term "intuition" in the Kantian sense of Anschauung but rather in the sense of a felt necessity which accompanies
an inspection of such experiences as "reveal" themselves as true ontological structures. It is this concept of "revealed" ontological truth
which is the heart of Sartre's method. In contrast to hypotheticodeductive types of philosophies, revealed ontology is an exploration
of the subject-pole of experience; in contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, ontological revelation does not begin with a formal epoche
and does not have a precise methodology. If Sartre's ontology is to be
characterized as phenomenological, this cannot be done in the sense
of HusserI's usage of the term. However, another alternative is open
to Sartre to justify his use of the term.
Sartre's only possible justification for describing his procedures as
phenomenological is that his is that variety of phenomenology found
in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. In this sense, we ally Sartre's onto-

a1

Marcuse,

op. cit., 316; also Cf. EN, 307.

a'Ibid., 319.
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logical investigation to the historical genesis of the field of ontology itself and are enabled to refer the problem of Being back to Hegel and to
Aristotle before him. Another alliance which has been quite obvious to
students of Sartre is his indebtedness to Heidegger, in whose philosophy
the concept of "revelation" is used as the guide to phenomenological
method. ss According to Heidegger, revelation will come through certain modes of experiencing-through certain moods; and Sartre takes
over much of this concept of "revealing." We can now understand the
statement that EN "is in large parts a restatement of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit."34
Our basic criticism of Sartre's method, then, is that it deserves the
name "phenomenological" only in so far as Hegel's phenomenology is
intended, and th~t it is quasi-phenomenological if we are referring to
HusserI's variety of phenomenology. Thus, the greatest part of EN
is non-phenomenological (in HusserI's sense) and makes use of the
intuitive method of "revelation." The specific forms of investigation
which characterize the non-phenomenological parts of EN are closest
to products of existential psychoanalysis which are on on tic-empirical
rather than pure ontological grounds, and are marked by intuitions,
projective guesses, literary insights, and psychological analyses. But
such existential psychoanalysis is not an inquiry into Being and
Nothingness via a phenomenological ontology.
What effect does departure from Husserlian method have on the
validity of Sartre's ontology? The answer to this crucial question is
reserved for a later time. Meanwhile, it is important to note that Sartre's failure to state clearly his methodological principles and to use
Husserlian method, in addition to his failure to give an ontological
proof for the existence of the Other and to remain on the grounds of
pure ontology for the greater part of EN, results in internal confusions,
basic ambiguities, and ultimate contradictions, and, as we hope to
show, philosophic failure to resolve his initial problem. The following pages will have as their purpose the criticism of fundamental
aspects of Sartre's ontology. We shall attempt to show in detail how
the original failure to clarify phenomenological method and to remain within the scope of pure ontology invalidatt;s Sartre's work.
SS It may be well to remember that Husserl condemned Heidegger's use of
phenomenology as a distortion of Husserlian method.
s, Marcuse, op. cit., 311.

Chapter VII

THREE THESES OF L'ETHE ET LE NEANT CRITICIZED

1.

FREEDOM

Sartre's concept of freedom is unique: freedom is the condition of
the pour-soi; and since the pour-soi exists as "lack," its freedom is the
expression of its Nothingness. The pour-soi is what it is not, and is not
what it is. This instability defines its freedom. Again, since this is
the condition of the pour-soi, man is condemned to his freedom. Man
is condemned to be free because man is freedom.
We consider first certain criticisms of Sartre's position.
Emmanuel Mounier argues that since freedom is confined to the
circle of subjectivity-to the condition of the pour-soi-it never goes
beyond its own subjectivity to meet any real objective obstacles, and
that it is objectivity which truly defines· freedom.
"Sartre's type of freedom ultimately eschews dramatic appeal,
since, in the end, it never actually comes up against any restrictions. Actually, as far as outward observation which objectivates the path taken by freedom is concerned, there is restriction only to the extent to which it is observed. But freedom
which is given expression never really comes up against the obstacle, because it creates the obstacle itself, and it never comes up
against ultimate limits, not even death, because it has within itself no means of overstepping them. Its limitations are not
placed upon it from outside, but by a sort of inherent flabbiness." 1
Mounier's second point is that Sartre's concept of freedom leads to
a form of idealism which excludes any meaning from the pour-soi:
"It is impossible to avoid drawing attention to a subtle movement from Realism to ultimate Idealism. Such a drift seems to

1
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be the result of a form of freedom which, like the whole of
human being, does not ultimately represent superabundance of
being but poverty of being. It is, in fact, not even being; like
the 'for-oneself' with which it is identified, it represents lack of
being; it is nothingness. 'It is because human reality is insufficient that it is free.' It is my constant overflow into the
nothingness that I am which gives me this nimbleness amongst
things; it is my ontological scantiness which makes me so active;
it is my aspiration to this gulf of being in me which puts the
opportunity and the achievement before me. Freedom does not
bring a state of perfection or any meaning into the world; it is
nothing but a perpetual inwardization of contingency, nothing
but a return to the primitive outburst of absurdity." 2
His final criticism is that Sartre's concept of freedom leads to a
paradoxical theory of responsibility:
"There is . . . a fatal temptation to reduce subjectivity to a
form of non-being which is isolated and which gushes forth
into the world, which is paradoxically situated in the world and
given shape by this fact, but which never actually comes up
against the world; it is, in fact, the supreme paradox of a theory
of absolute responsibility, a theory by which I am not responsible
in the sight of anything." S
The essence of Mounier's three criticisms is that Sartre is espousing
a form of idealism which, in isolating the pour-soi from the world and
making of it a Nothingness, results in the failure of the pour-soi to
attain those meanings which come only from real contact with the
world. Freedom, meaning, and responsibility are categories applicable
to the pour-soi only to the degree to which they face objective existence.
These criticisms fail because they rest upon a partial and inadequate interpretation of Sartre's concept of situation. The pour-soi is
an empty and abstract term without ontological significance unless it
is understood, as Sartre intends it to be, in situation. Situation is the
reality of the pour-soi; it is the intense and profound complex of the
objective significations, meanings, coefficients of adversity, facticities,
etc., determined strictly by Others or by history or by the socio-economic structure of society, and also the activity of the pour-soi which
legislates its unique meaning and interpretation to these objective
2
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structures and relations. Thus, human reality is a combination of objectively existent givens which the pour-soi "exists" in the light of the
ends and goals by which it defines itself.
In defining itself through choice, the pour-soi has a dual role: It
meets certain coefficients of adversity ( the chains of the slave, for
example, and the prison bars which hold him) which it must recognize
and admit, but it legislates the meaning of those coefficients of adversity by considering them under certain goals or ideals which it freely
chooses (the slave may interpret his chains as elements which limit his
liberty or as things to be accepted as his 'just due'; he may interpret
his chains as symbols to be revolted against or as symbols to be submitted to, etc.). In choosing the meaning of its coefficient of adversity,
the pour-soi incorporates the meaning of the obstacle into its situation.
In this sense, therefore, the pour-soi does meet the obstacles of reality.
The mistake Mounier makes is in asserting that the pour-soi does
not face reality because it is bound in its subjectivity. But one cannot
speak of 'reality' apart from the pour-soi, since reality is the pour-soi
in the sense of being the situation of the pour-soi. To go beyond the
pour-soi would be to do one of two things: either to penetrate to some
noumenal realm of 'objectivity' or else to realize the status of en-soipour-soi. Both are impossible for Sartre; the first, because he has
shown that there is no ding-an-sich 'behind' the phenomenon of Being
(appearance is Being) , and the second, because the whole meaning of
the pour-soi is that it is what it is not, and is not what it is. Were the
pour-soi to achieve the status of en-soi-pour-soi, the pour-soi would
be what it is-would become substantialized-and the human reality, as
Sartre has described it, would be shattered, for men would not be men
but Gods.
The criticism developed by V. J. McGill is colored by the author's
naturalist position and presents in clear language those understandable
misinterpretations which result from a failure to comprehend the
specifically ontological nature of Sartre's inquiry.
We can outline McGill's charges against Sartre's doctrine of freedom as follows:
1. Sartre's assertion that existence precedes essence results in his
ignoring the psycho-biological essence of man. 4
• McGill, V. J.,
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2. The concept of the pour-soi as Nothingness is false, since it
ignores the basic elements of continuity and stability in man's nature. 5
3. McGill denies that "for the human-reality, to be is to choose"
on the grounds that choice is not the only determinant in being
human. 6
4. In Sartre's assertion "to choose is to be free," choice is a necessary
condition of freedom but not a sufficient condition.7
5. McGill denies that one becomes intuitively certain of his freedom in his experience of anguish. He analyzes two of Sartre's illustrations: the fear one has in high places that one might hurl himself
down, and the anguish the soldier experiences in relation to his future
behavior in an attack. Both instances, McGill says, offer feelings of
anguish which are not reliable indicators of freedom. He explains the
feelings held in such instances as varieties of psychological reactions
(panic, auto-suggestibility, etc.) rather than true indicators of freedom. 8
6. While Sartre's contention is that the "conscious project" rather
than past or present events determines our actions, McGill favors the
psycho-biological approach to human action and thinks that the work
of such behaviorists as Clark Hull will lead to a surer, experimentallygrounded explanation of the problem.9
7. Arguing that objective obstacles truly limit man's freedom, McGill opposes what he takes to be Sartre's position on the question,
namely, that "obstacles to freedom are only apparent." 10
8. The conclusion is that Sartre's doctrine of freedom is "too abstract and empty to ever win (sic.) general assent," 11 that it does not
permit the setting up of criteria of freedom, and, finally, that since it
"stipulates that freedom is already universal and inescapable," 12 it
cannot give men directives for the extension of their freedom.
McGill's fundamental misinterpretation of Sartre is his failure to
realize that Sartre means by the term "freedom" a radically new and

• McGill, V. J.,
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different doctrine which philosophic analysis has not hitherto revealed.
Since Sartre is concerned purely with the ontological nature of freedom, all criticism of his doctrine, if it is to be meaningful, must be
oriented with respect to this point of view. McGill, however, starts
out with a naturalistic conception of Being and presupposes what
Sartre endeavors to analyze.
There are two levels of human freedom: the first is the freedom of
human Being which Sartre analyzes. This Being is prior to all psychological pronouncements. The second level of freedom is what naturalists such as McGill have in mind when they use the term. Here freedom refers to the existence of alternatives in human situations: the
common sense understanding of freedom. By definition, the slave is
the man who does not have freedom; otherwise, he would not be a
slave. But the inescapable point is that this definition presupposes the
nature of human reality and human consciousness by accepting
psychological descriptions which are ontologically unexamined.
Sartre's task is ontological; and with this fact in mind we shall
examine the specific charges made by McGill.
1. Sartre does not ignore the psycho-biological basis of man. He
describes this basis under the category of "facticity." However, this
facticity is not an "essence" of man, since its meaning is dependent upon
the pour-soi for its interpretation. The pour-soi "exists" its facticity
under the goals and ends it chooses for itself. Sartre does not deny
essences to men: but he insists that all we can mean by essence is the
resultant of the pour-soi's actions rather than any a priori and inescapable "human nature."
2. Continuity and stability are not denied the pour-soi; rather,
the pour-soi is its memories, its past actions and choices, its physical,
social, and cultural heritage in so far as it "exists" these aspects of its
nature. The pour-soi is not an utter chaos but a dialectical continuity.
The past actions, choices, attitudes, etc., of the pour-soi are forever in
suspension in their Being; that is to say, the meaning of all of those
aspects of the pour-soi is continually in question, since the new actions
and choices of the pour-soi will alter or discard their importance and
meaning. Although the pour-soi is what it is not and is not what it is,
it is not an anarchic flux: its flux is dialectical. Its meaning and nature
are continually being defined and redefined.
3. The meaning of choice is that the pour-soi is choice. It "exists"
itself only by virtue of its choices. McGill has taken a typically
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naturalistic definition of choice and, upon the basis of this definition,
attacks Sartre's concept of choice, which is on a different level. For
Sartre, choice is never completed because the pour-soi is in flight and
continually redefines itself. We are therefore human when we choose_
Also, for Sartre, aesthetic enjoyment, love, humor, etc., are aspects of
the human reality and of man's freedom, since the meaning which they
have for the pour-soi is determined only to the degree to which the
pour-soi chooses and appropriates those aspects of its experience.
4_ To be consistent with Sartre's purpose in EN, we would have to
say that the "test" of freedom which McGill mentions is revealed in the
ontological analysis of the pour-soi) because freedom exists only by
virtue of the pour-soi. McGill desires non-ontological criteria of freedom; and with these Sartre is not concerned.
5. We must distinguish between the intuition of anguish and the
psychological states which may associate themselves with the intuition
of anguish. The latter, but not the former, are the proper study of the
psychologists. That the psychological experiences associated with the
intuition of anguish may vary, Sartre can admit without endangering
his position. The feeling of anguish is not the unavoidable accompaniment of the human condition, since we can escape by "bad faith."
Anguish as an intuitable meaning of the human condition is inescapable. But McGill overlooks this difference.
6. Sartre is not attempting to ignore the importance of past and
present events in human experience. He is trying to show only that
such events are not fatalistic constants whose meaning, once stated, is
forever frozen and static. The conscious project which determines our
action is itself the expression of the pour-soi) which is in so far as it is
the dialectical and dynamic unity of past, present, and future.
7. This criticism ignores Sartre's description of the coefficient of
adversity which faces the pour-soi in its existence. The slave's chains
are an obstacle to his freedom, but the latter is meaningful only in so
far as the slave wishes to be free of his manacles. In other words, it is
in the project of the pour-soi that freedom is expressed. The chains
are only an apparent obstacle to the slave's freedom because the latter
is only in so far as the slave has chosen the end of liberty. McGill has
confused the concept of liberty-physical right to go about one's business-with the ontological concept of freedom. Sartre does not argue
that the slave is at liberty to scale a fifty-foot wall or to break the steel
bars of his prison with his fists; he argues, rather, that the meaning
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of the slavery of the individual is comprehensible only through an
analysis of the situation of the pour-soi involved.
8. The popular appeal of a highly technical philosophic concept
is no criterion for the validity of that concept. The criteria McGill
wishes to set up deal with a common sense notion of freedom: one with
which Sartre is not concerned here. Finally, the stipulation that man's
freedom is inescapable, far from limiting the possible directives for
human freedom, is the basis for asserting that such directives are unlimited. Since man is condemned to be free, everything is possible
to his freedom.
Despite the answers given above to the criticisms of Mounier and
McGill, we must admit that these critics of Sartre have hinted, however
inadequately or mistakenly, at a certain core of truth in their analyses
of freedom. This core might best be described through questions
which we think Sartre fails to answer, and sometimes even fails to
raise, in his ontology. These questions are: Although man "exists"
his facticity, is not this facticity a sector of man's Being upon which only
relative limits can be placed? Is it possible for the pour-soi to negate
its own Nothingness via a violent flight from reality?13 In the case of
the tortured man who chooses the instant he will "give into" his
torturers, the question arises: Even if we agree that he chooses his
torture by relenting at a certain point, what can we say of his freedom
after that point? Finally, it is necessary to ask: How will existential
analysis relate ontological freedom to those areas of freedom which
comprise man's social, economic, and moral values? Thus far such
correlation is lacking. Sartre's short work, Existentialism, is but a
rough and, at points, vague attempt in this direction.
2.

NOTHINGNESS AND BAD FAITH

The Nothingness of the pour-soi consists in the fact that the poursoi is what it is not and is not what it is. Consciousness is "nihilation"
because it is in flight in its existence. It is perpetually remaking itself,
redefining itself. The pour-soi is what it "is-was" (est ete) in so far as
its future projects reveal and interpret that "is-was"; the pour-soi is
what it is not, because its situation is in flux. Thus, for Sartre, Wesen
ist was gewesen ist.

13 To illustrate: even if we may say that the catatonic schizophrenic chooses his
disease, is there a true pour-soi extant after that choice?

82

A CRITIQUE OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

The anguish of man is his awareness of his responsibility, and this
responsibility is man's burden because his existence is beset by the
necessity of constant choice. Since the pour-soi is Nothingness, it cannot appeal to any a priori "human nature" for guidance to action in
choice. The pour-soi is in so far as it is choice. For these reasons,
anguish is the stamp of man's Nothingness.
N ow if man is condemned to be free as Sartre says, is there any
manner in which man may choose to yield his freedom or to hide from
it? In his description of "mauvaise foi" (bad faith), Sartre has indicated that there is a mode of Being in which the pour-soi seeks to
"un-free" itself-to take leave of its anguish, its responsibility. Our
problem, then, is to attempt to discover the relationship between
Nothingness and bad faith, and to determine whether it is possible
for the pour-soi to negate its own Nothingness and shun its responsibility.
Bad faith is the attempt of the pour-soi to deny itself by trying to
hide from its own anguish. The pour-soi tries to escape its anguish by
fleeing from one aspect of its nature: its "is-was." Although the poursoi is not what it is, it does "exist" its "is-was" aspect (its past actions,
choices, etc.). Two interpretations of this "is-was" of the pour-soi are
possible: first, the attempt to substantialize the "is-was" into an essence.
This might be illustrated by the description of man as being a coward
because in the past he has committed certain cowardly acts. Such is
the argument of those who hold for a "human nature," an essence of
man which antecedes his acts and determines them. Obviously, this
interpretation is the antithesis of Sartre's own position.
The second interpretation of the "is-was" is the conception of it as
dialectically bound up with the existence of the pour-soi. The meaning of the "is-was" is continually in suspension, for man, by his actions,
redefines and reinterprets his "is-was." Thus, Sartre maintains that the
"is-was" of the pour-soi is that which the pour-soi is not. Now, to act
in bad faith is to attempt to deny both of these interpretations. 14
The individual who acts in bad faith seeks to negate the "is-was"
of his pour-soi. This negation may be accomplished either by stopping
at a certain period in one's life and refusing to take into consideration
or even admit the changes that occur, or by clinging to the fact that
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changes are always taking place in one's situation, and refusing to
be held accountable for what one has done in the past. 15
However, all attempts to negate the "is-was" must result in failure,
because every effort to flee from anguish and responsibility inevitably
takes place under an unintended but unavoidable recognition of
anguish and responsibility. "The flight from anguish is only a mode
of being conscious of anguish .... It cannot be concealed or avoided."16
Here is the paradox of bad faith: to be in bad faith is to attempt to flee
from one's anguish, but such flight is accompanied necessarily by a
recognition of anguish. Sartre states the paradox in the following way:
"The first act of bad faith is to flee from what one cannot flee, to flee
from what one is." 17 The condition of flight from Nothingness is
Nothingness; and "the condition of the possibility of dishonesty is that
the human reality in its most immediate being, in the intrastructure of
the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is." 18
It might seem from this description that, since bad faith is a paradoxical condition, the pour-soi could never truly achieve the status of
bad faith. To reason oneself into bad faith, to select or choose bad
faith,-all such conscious actions could not lead one beyond the
paradox; i.e., bad faith could not be realized, because its realization
would depend on escaping from anguish, and active choice of escape
from anguish means awareness of anguish. How, then, is bad faith possible?
Sartre's answer is that bad faith is not a "question of a reflectedupon and voluntary decision, but a spontaneous determination of our
being." 19
"One is placed in bad faith as one sleeps and one is of bad faith
as one dreams_ Once this mode of being is realized, it is as
difficult to go away from it as to wake up. Bad faith is a type
of Being in the world, like insomnia or dreaming, which attempts by itself to perpetuate itself." 20

,. EN, 97.
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With this "spontaneous determination of our being" goes a weak and
uncritical acceptance of the world of bad faith, an initial decision not
to make decisions, an initial decision to be indecisive_ Bad faith does
not maintain the criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical
thought of good faith_ Bad faith is resigned in advance not to be
transformed into good faith_ 21 Through the intitial determination of
bad faith there will be obstinacy in the face of truth and a willingness
to adhere to uncertain evidence_
The conclusion is that bad faith is a constant threat to consciousness: the unavoidable menace which accompanies the Nothingness of
the pour-soi.
"If bad faith is possible, it is because it is the immediate and
permanent menace of every project of the human being, it is
because consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk
of bad faith. And the origin of this risk is that consciousness,
at the same time and in its being, is what it is not and is not
what it is." 22

With this exposition of bad faith in mind, we may turn to a criticism of the arguments Sartre has set forth regarding bad faith and its
relationship to Nothingness.
Sartre has presented a highly ambiguous theory of bad faith. He
argues, to begin with, that flight from Nothingness is a priori a failure,
since admittance of Nothingness is presupposed in the attempted flight.
Yet later he describes bad faith as a "type of being-in-the-world," and
presumably this "being-in-the-world" is something more than a momen·
tary structure. Sartre compares it to insomnia or dreaming and states
that it is difficult to escape. If bad faith has this stability as a type of
Being in the World, then how is it achieved? The failure to escape
Nothingness would appear to render this stability inconsequential or
illusory.
By holding that bad faith is not a reflective and voluntary decision
"but a spontaneous determination of our being," Sartre presents a
form of argument directly antithetical to what he is attempting to
demonstrate. Sartre's point is that to be in bad faith is to fail to escape
anguish, since choice of bad faith involves choice of anguish. Active
choice is the key to the concept of bad faith. Yet when Sartre argues
21 EN, 109.
"Ibid., 111.
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at the same time that active choice is not involved in the "spontaneous
determination of our being," he has involved himself in a basic contradiction.
Sartre's main purpose in introducing the concept of bad faith was
to show that, although man is condemned to be free, he is able to seek
ways of avoiding that freedom. Bad faith is a meaningful concept only
if it represents an anti-freedom value. Sartre has succeeded, however,
in showing that bad faith is really only a peculiar aspect of freedom.
Again, this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that he states that bad
faith is the "menace" which accompanies every human project. Is
the menace introduced by the pour-soi itself in the acts of choice of
the pour-soi in its projects? Or is the menace of bad faith an a priori
correlative of Nothingness which accompanies every pour-soi? When
Sartre argues that bad faith is chosen, he is more consistent with his
general position, but the meaning and force of the concept of bad
faith are watered down. When Sartre argues that bad faith is some sort
of spontaneous determination, he leaves the general line of his argument and make of bad faith an order of an a priori correlate of the
pour-soi.
While it is clear that his general intention is to describe bad faith
as the flight from anguish, from responsibility, from Nothingness,
Sartre fails to make clear the nature of this flight and the import of its
success or failure in its venture.
Involved in the entire concept of Nothingness and of bad faith is
the problem of the facticity of the "is-was." Bad faith flees from its
"is-was" because it is unwilling to accept the responsibility for the
actions it has performed. But if the meaning of the acts and choices
which comprise the "is-was" is always in transition, then a crucial
problem arises: for what, precisely, is the pour-soi responsible? If I
acted like a coward last year on fifteen occasions, then it would seem
that these instances of cowardice comprise one sector of my "is-was."
But now it is necessary to observe that these acts were acts of cowardice
only in the light of certain criteria of cowardly action. Since these
criteria are themselves in transition and are meaningful only in the
light of my own projects, how can we say that the pour-soi is responsible for these cowardly acts? The meaning of cowardice is in suspension; therefore, the meaning of my past actions is also in suspension.
In what sense are we responsible for them?
The point of the above criticism may be rephrased in the following
way: if we are faithful to Sartre's argument, the actions which comprise
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the "is-was" can never be characterized as being acts of love, hate,
violence, heroism, cowardice, deceit, etc. They may be characterized
only as acts of a certain order and structure; e.g., to use love as an
illustration, my "is-was" acts were acts of making certain vows, of
performing certain actions, and so on, and these acts are called acts of
love by definition and agreement. Thus, to be consistent, we should
reduce the acts of the "is-was" to their basic structures. We cannot go
beyond these basic structures and say that such and such an act was
an act of love, because future experience may demonstrate that it was
the opposite. The ardent filial love I bore my mother at the age of
nine may turn out, ten years later, to have been part of an oedipus
complex, which would then alter the meaning of that original love.
It is highly ambiguous to say that I am responsible for the actions
of my "is-was." To follow the example just given, I am responsible for
acts of kissing and hugging my mother at the age of nine, but does
this mean that I am responsible for loving my mother at the age of
nine? The latter could never be determined until the pour-soi is nonexistent.
The import of the criticism just made is that Sartre's concept of
anguish must be extended. Since my responsibility for the acts of my
"is-was" is a perpetually ambiguous one, my anguish is extended. The
choices I make in the present and in the future not only define my
pour-soi as a whole but redefine the facticity of my "is-was." By extending the concept of anguish we arrive at a more consistent interpretation
of Nothingness, for it is now more clearly apparent that the pour-soi
is that which it is not. The facticity of the pour-soi must be reduced
to the bare structure of its past actions, whereas the Being of those
actions is perpetually in question, because that Being is intimately associated with the meaning of the actions.
There is one final question concerning Sartre's conception of
Nothingness: Is there any point where the human equation which is
the pour-soi cancels out? We raised this question in the previous section by asking whether there is a true pour-soi extant in the catatonic
schizophrenic after the choice of his disease (admitting the choice of
the disease for the sake of the argument). Much of the criticism that
has been raised against Sartre's concept of freedom is that this concept
is false to reality, that it makes no sense, for example, to speak of the
cremated prisoner of the concentration camp as having freely chosen
his imprisonment and destruction. Sartre has said that either man is
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completely free or is not free at all. However, we may still raise the
question of whether human freedom may undergo states of negation,
leaving aside the question of whether those states have been initially
chosen or not.
In our criticism of Sartre's theory of Nothingness and bad faith we
have thus made the following points:
1. It is not clear whether bad faith is chosen by the pour-soi or is
an a priori correlate of Nothingness.
2. It is unclear whether the pour-soi can truly achieve a status of
bad faith.
3. The concept of anguish must be extended to accommodate the
unsubstantiality of the "is-was."
4. It is doubtful whether there is ever a negation of the pour-soi.

3.

BEING

In the introduction and early pages of EN, Sartre tells us that a
fundamental problem he faces in his essay is to show that the two
seemingly incommunicable realms of Being-the en-soi and the pourso i-do, in fact, ultimately achieve unification in his philosophy and
that he is not left with an insurmountable dualism. It will be the
burden of this section of our work to attempt to prove not only that
Sartre fails to resolve the dualism but also that, by his own principles,
any such attempt is destined to be a failure.
Sartre attacks a series of traditional dualisms. (1) He holds that the
dualism of interior-exterior of the existant is fallacious, because there
is no hidden aspect of Being- no Ding-an-sich. He says that "the being
of an existant is precisely that which it appears" to be. 23 (2) There is
no dualism of appearance-essence, for appearance is essence (3) It is
the Being of appearance which must be investigated. But upon inspection the Being of appearance reveals itself to be of two distinct varieties: the en-soi and the pour-soi. Here, then, is Sartre's problem: how
can the two realms of Being be synthesized?
Sartre's first answer is the following:
"The pour-soi and the en-soi are reunited by a synthetic liaison
which is no other than the pour-soi itself. The pour-soi, in effect,
is nothing other than the pure nihilation of the en-soi; it is like
a hole of being at the heart of being. . . . The pour-soi has no
2. EN, 11-14.
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other reality than that of being the nihilation of being. Its only
qualification comes to it from the fact that it is nihilation of
the individual and singular en-soi and not of being in general.
The pour-soi is not nothingness in general but a singular privation; it constitutes itself as privation of this being." 24
While this description answers the question, "How did the dualities
arise?" or, more precisely, "How does the pour-soi arise?," the real question regarding the synthesis of the two polarities of Being is not
answered. The solution to this problem must also be the answer to the
question: How does the pour-soi unite itself with the en-soi? And to
this question Sartre paradoxically states that an answer is not possible:
"We do not have grounds to interrogate ourselves about the
manner in which the pour-soi may unite itself to the en-soi because the pour-soi is in no wayan autonomous substance." 25
Were the pour-soi an autonomous substance, it would be what it
is, but we know already that for Sartre the pour-soi is not what it is
and can never be what it is-this status is reserved for the en-soi alone.
Since the pour-soi is what it is not and is not what it is, it is impossible
to describe the manner in which this "lack," this Nothingness, can
unite itself with that which is what it is: the en-soi. We must conclude,
therefore, that the synthetic liaison established by the pour-soi between
the en-soi and the pour-soi is not the structure which can solve the
original problem of how the two polarities of Being are synthesized.
At best, the synthetic liaison is an explanatory relation which tells
something about the genesis of the realms of Being.
But we cannot yet assert that Sartre has completely failed to solve
his problem, for he makes a second attempt. He points out that prior
analysis has shown that one cannot understand the pour-soi without
immediately taking the en-soi into consideration, and vice versa. Unless the intimate relationship between the two rearms of Being is kept
in view, they are both reduced to empty abstractions:
"The en-soi and the pour-soi are not juxtaposed. Quite to the
contrary, the pour-soi without the en-soi is something like an
abstraction. It could no more exist than a color without form or

2' EN, 711-712.
25

Ibid., 712.
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than a sound without highness and without timbre; a consciousness which would be consciousness of nothing would be an
absolute nothing." 26
Since consciousness is consciousness of the en-soi, the two are in internal
relationship which is the essence of the bond unifying en-soi and
pour-soi.
"If consciousness is linked to the en-soi by an internal relation,
does that not signify that it is articulated with it in order to constitute a totality and is it not to this totality that the name of
being or of reality refers? Undoubtedly, the pour-soi is nihilation, but, by virtue of nihilation, it is; and it is in a priori unity
with the en-soi." 27

But, Sartre argues, even if this internal relationship does give us a
concept of Being which is a synthetic totality, we are left with the
dualism as it appears in the existant, who is still a pour-soi in relation
to an en-soi.
"If we have to consider the total being as constituted by the
synthetic organization of the en-soi and the pour-soi, are we not
going to find again the difficulty which we wished to avoid? Are
we not going to encounter again in the existant itself the hiatus
which we discerned in the concept of being?" 28

Sartre says that in order to be able to consider an existant as a
totality, "it is necessary that the diversity of its structures be retained
in a unitary synthesis, in such a way that each structure, envisaged
apart, is only an abstraction." 29 One part of the equation fulfills this
criterion: the pour-soi envisaged by itself is an abstraction. The other
half of the equation, however, does not fulfill the requirement, because
"the en-soi has no need of the pour-soi in order to be." 30 The Being
of the pure en-soi without consciousness is not an abstraction. Sartre
describes the way out of the difficulty in these words:

EN, 715-716.
Ibid., 716.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid
30 Ibid.
26

27
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"If we should wish to conceive of a synthetic organization such
that the pour-soi is inseparable from the en-soi and that,
reciprocally, the en-soi is indissolubly linked to the pour-soi, it
would be necessary to conceive of it in such a way that the ensoi receives its existence from the nihilation which makes the
en-soi take consciousness of that nihilation. What does this
mean if not that the indissoluble totality of en-soi and pour-soi
is conceivable only under the form of being 'cause of self.' " 31

We may understand the nature of the form of Being which is
"cause of self":
"The real is a miscarried effort to attain to the dignity of causeof-self. Every thing happens as if the world, man, and man-inthe-world succeeded in realizing only a God who is lacking (un
Dieu manque). Everything happens as if the en-soi and the
pour-soi were presented in a state of disintegration in regard to
an ideal synthesis. Not that the integration has ever taken place,
but precisely on the contrary, because it is always indicated and
always impossible. It is the perpetual defeat which explains at
once the indissolubility of the en-soi and the pour-soi, and their
relative independence." 32
The conclusion is that the ideal synthesis of Being is an impossible
and self-contradictory structure, although if it should exist, we should
know also in what manner it existed: we should know its structure.
It is disconcerting to note that if this is a correct interpretation of
what Sartre is arguing, then he contradicts himself basically and has
not solved his original problem. The contradiction is the following:
Sartre is able to posit the possibility of an ideal synthesis of Being by
a "pre-ontological comprehension of the self-caused being."33 The
comprehension is pre-ontological because it is of an ideal and not a
real structure. Ontological analysis can be made of real (i.e., existant)
structures only. Yet Sartre states that ontological analysis includes
analysis of the region of "cause of self." He writes: "For ontology, the
only regions of being which can be elucidated are those of the en-soi,
the pour-soi, and the ideal region of the 'cause of self' ."34 Apart from
the fact that ontology cannot analyze ideal regions, it remains a con81 EN, 716-717 .
•• Ibid., 717.
·'Ibid.
'<Ibid., 719.
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tradiction to hold, in view of what Sartre said earlier, that the ideal
region of "cause of self" can be comprehended both pre-ontologically
and ontologically.
Thus, in his analysis of "cause of self," Sartre has not solved his
original problem of the synthesis of the polarities of Being. If "the
real is a miscarried effort to attain to the dignity of cause-of-self," if
"everything happens . . . as if the en-soi and the pour-soi were presented in a state of disintegration," then it must follow that the ultimate integration of en-soi and pour-soi must remain an incomplete
and unrealizable ideal. The dualism is not resolved, and the two
realms of Being find no true integration. Surprisingly, this is what
Sartre himself points out when he says that the integration of en-soi
and pour-soi is "always impossible." 35
'
Sartre's conclusion to the argument concerning the resolution of
the dualism of Being is this: "If it is impossible to pass from the notion
of being-en-soi to that of being-pour-soi and to reunite them in a common genre, then the passage in fact from one to the other and their
reunion cannot be brought about." 36 But it is not possible to reconcile
this statement with his earlier claim that his analysis of Being will not
end in a dualism of two incommunicable realms of Being.
The only consistent conclusion that may be drawn from Sartre's
ontological analysis of Being is the one which he hints at in certain
places but does not make explicit, and which he later contradicts. The
logical conclusion of his argument is that a self-caused Being "is impossible and that its concept ... contains a contradiction." 37 The contradiction is that man is the creature who aspires to be the en-soi-poursoi. This aspiration must end in failure in principle, for the pour-soi
cannot be its own proper foundation, since it is what it is not-since it
is Nothingness.
A further aspect of the logical conclusion to Sartre's problem is that
if the ideal whole can be imagined or posited, it is only imaginable or
posit able-never realizable. This is the paradox of the en-soi-pour-soi.
The paradox of Being, therefore, is Sartre's proper conclusion. However, if this conclusion is accepted, Sartre must give up the claims made
in his introduction to EN, in which he berated the traditional philosophic positions for their unsolvable dualisms .
•• EN, 717.
··Ibid.
"'Ibid.
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The logical conclusion to Sartre's own ontology is an unbridgeable
dualism_ Only within this dualism can all the structures of Being which
Sartre describes retain their meaning and consistency_ The crucial
relations of freedom, choice, situation, etc., all receive consistent interpretation if we understand Sartre's concept of Being as essentiallly
dualistic. The relation of freedom may serve as an example of what is
intended here.
The pour-soi is free because it exists as "lack"; i.e., it has no stable
or permanent structure which it is. Rather, the pour-soi must continually define and redefine itself. It must make itself as it goes along.
Now, the pour-soi is free because it is not the foundation of its Being.
Were it en-soi-pour-soi, it would be a permanent and substantial structure: it would be God. However, if we assume now that the pour-soi
and the en-soi are united in such a manner that the pour-soi causes the
en-soi to be, then the concept of the freedom of the pour-soi is distorted,
and the pour-soi itself no longer exists in the way Sartre has previously
described. The same applies to the concepts of choice and situation,
because they, too, are profoundly bound up with the structure of the
pour-soi.
If his ontology were revised so that the en-soi and the pour-soi
were made attributes of Being after the fashion of Spinoza, then every
structure of Being Sartre has described would lose its unique meaning
and he would have accomplished no more than a reformulation of traditional ontologies. The validity, consistency, and significance of Sartre's ontology require the unresolvable dualism of en-soi and pour-soi.

Chapter VIII

SARTRE'S "COPERNICAN REVOLUTION":
AN INTERPRETATION
Sartre's "Copernican revolution" is essentially the attempt to
formulate at the ontological level what Kant attempted to show at the
epistemological level: that the phenomenal world we experience is the
resultant of the activity of the forms of cognition upon a primordial
"given." The basic similarity between Sartre and Kant which must be
kept in mind is that for Sartre the 'molding' of phenomenal reality is
at the ontological level derivative of and dependent upon the activity
of the pour-soi, which both "exists" reality and exists in reality. There
are important dissimilarities, however, between the two Copernican
revolutions. Kant describes the action of the forms of sensibility and
of cognition which ultimately constitute the synthetic unity identified
as the phenomenal object. Sartre, on the other hand, is not concerned
with deducing the categories or determining how synthetic a priori
propositions are possible and valid for experience; rather, he wishes
to find out in what way the human reality is a function of two polarities: the en-soi and the pour-soi. By introducing his Copernican revolution and asserting the priority of the pour-soi, Sartre attempts to
demonstrate how the dialectic of relationships which hold between
the en-soi and the pour-soi is ultimately comprehensible. It should be
added, of course, that Sartre nowhere uses the term "Copernican revolution" to describe this approach to Being; it is implicit rather than explicit in his writing. What follows here is, therefore, an interpretation
and not an exposition of what Sartre himself has said.
In our expository section we stressed the fact that there is a strong
realistic element in Sartre. The pour-soi "exists" its reality, but also
it exists in its reality. By this we understand the following: to "exist"
reality is to constitute the reality about us-to appropriate the object.
To exist in reality is to be a pour-soi among other pour-sois in a world
whose significations are not all my significations but contain the signifi93
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cations of Others; it is to admit the objective existence of the object
through the idea of the coefficient of adversity. For Sartre, reality is
the complex: "existed" and existed-in. The polarities of Being are
reality, i.e., that which is "existed" is the function of the pour-soi, and
that which exists in is the function of the en-soi. But at this point a
crucial difficulty arises.
It is one thing to assert that the meaning of experience is dependent
on the meaning-giver: the pour-soi; it is quite another thing to hold
that the object itself is constituted by the pour-soi. The Kantian
Copernican revolution can be interpreted in two ways: either as a
working hypothesis in the attempt to explicate the knowing process,
or as a metaphysical interpretation which holds that the constitution
of the object is directly dependent upon the categories of the understanding in such a manner that, without the synthetic operation of the
categories, the constituted object would be impossible and there would
be no phenomenal reality. It is here that we find the variation in the
interpretation of Kant: the realistic interpretation which considers the
activity of mind in the knowing process as fulfilling a strictly logical
role of synthesis of meaning, and the subjectivistic interpretation
which holds that the phenomenal object is the resultant of the activity
of mind as it molds or shapes what is given to it.
Should Sartre's Copernican revolution be given a realistic or a subjectivistic interpretation? Under the headings of signification by
Others, coefficient of adversity, etc., we have already dealt with the
realistic basis in Sartre's philosophy. We cannot accept the realistic
interpretation completely because of contrary evidence: Sartre's intense stress on the appropriative techniques of the pour-soi. Sartre has
told us that "the known object is my thought as thing" 1 and that "to
have is to create" 2 and that "the original and radical rapport of
creation is a rapport of emanation.... That which I create ... is myself ... To the degree to which I appear to myself as creating the objects by the sole rapport of appropriation, these objects are me." 3
Sartre repeatedly stresses the importance of both subjectivist and objectivist approaches. Phenomenological ontology is to cut across the
positions of both idealism and realism.

'EN,668.
"Ibid., 680.
• Ibid., 680-681.
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Complete appropriation is an ideal and not a realizable structure
of experience. "It is impossible to realize the relation symbolized by
appropriation," 4 since realization would mean an impossible synthesis-the synthesis, namely, of the en-soi-pour-soi. If, as Sartre maintains, appropriation is a symbolic relation, then any true Copernican
revolution in the metaphysical sense is ruled out. Sartre, however, has
not accepted a strictly non-metaphysiacl interpretation.
Whether we accept a subjectivist or realist interpretation of Kant, .
it is still true that for him the sensibility and the understanding are
stable structures. As necessary preconditions of the possibility of experience they are constants. If they did change somehow, the experience we might imagine ourselves to have would not be what we could
understand as human experience. For Sartre, however, such constant
and unchanging categories cannot be introduced into the nature of the
pour-soi, for the latter is that which it is not and is not that which it is.
The pour-soi, then, is in a constant state of unfulfillment-in a state
of "lack." At the ontological level no categorial constants can be
ascribed to it. Hence, if the pour-soi molds experience or legislates
the nature of its situation, that molding or legislation takes place
within a framework of flux and transition of meanings. But if now
the nature of the pour-soi is such thilt a hypothetical interpretation of
the Copernican revolution is ruled out (since appropriation is a
projective but unaccomplished relation), what is left?
Sartre's Copernican revolution at the ontological level places the
pour-soi at the core of existence. The pour-soi has priority because it
is its situation. However, since the pour-soi is in perpetual flux, the
significations which it creates change with it. In short, the constancy
or regularity of the phenomenal world of Kant has been denied, and
in its place is put a dialectical reality. The essence of Sartre's Copernican revolution, therefore, is that the manifestation of the pour-soi
is dialectical reality. Reality exists through situation, and situation is
a function of the pour-soi. To be sure, the en-soi does have a facticity
which is independent of and prior to the individual pour-soi, but the
meaning of the en-soi is determinable only through the pour-soi.
Thus, Sartre's Copernican revolution establishes two points: 1) that
reality is a function of the pour-soi although it is not the phenomenal
world of Kant; it is the dialectical reality which the pour-soi "exists";

'EN,683.
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2) that the facticity of things has realistic status, but that the meaning
of this status depends on the interpretation it receives from the poursoi. In a certain sense, therefore, the Copernican revolution intended
by Sartre has never been and never can be completed. It is a perpetual
and on-going process. Its meaning is continually in suspension.
Is it of value to introduce this interpretation of the Copernican
revolution into Sartre's work? We said earlier that Sartre has performed
his revolution on the ontological rather than the epistemological
plane. His revolution gives an explanation of how Being is determined by human Being, or, to put it in another way, how the en-soi
is determined by the pour-soi. But if our interpretation of Sartre's
Copernican revolution is correct, the resultant of the revolution is a
non-stable reality, is Being in flux. The importance of having introduced the concept of the Copernican revolution into this discussion
lies in the fact that we may now use it as an interpretive category in
furthering our understanding of Sartre's ontology, in particular, the
nature of appropriation.
The appropriative relation is, in principle, incomplete and must,
therefore, remain an ideal. Appropriation for the pour-soi is appropriation only of certain segments of the objects of experience, of those
segments, namely, which the pour-soi holds in its situation. The ensoi of some unchartered peak in the Himalayan Mountains is not "existed" by me. I do not appropriate it; it is not I. However, the mountain I climb with great difficulty is I. I appropriate it in conquering it.
"The totality of my possessions reflects the totality of my being.
I am what I have. It is I that I touch on this cup, on this
trinket. This mountain which I climb, it is I to the degree to
which I conquer it; and when I am at its summit, which I have
'acquired' at the price of some efforts, I am this large view over
the valley and the surrounding mountains; the panorama is I
expanded to the horizon, for its exists only because of me and
for me." 5
And further:
"Possession is a magic rapport. I am these objects which I
possess, but outside of me. That which I posses is me outside of

• EN, 680-681.

SARTRE'S "COPERNICAN REVOLUTION"

97

me, outside of all subjectivity as an en-soi which escapes me at
each instant and whose creation I perpetuate at each instant." 6
The conquered mountain is I as en-soi. But this en-soi is, as it
were, an externalized internality-a projection of my pour-soi which
has momentarily become en-soi. This en-soi is impermanent. It has no
stability of its own, it fades. It necessitates constant renewing for survival and is a "creation I perpetuate at each instant." Such en-soi is
impermanent, because the pour-soi is organically incapable of founding its own Being.
Thus, Sartre has shown that the pour-soi can create a certain type
of en-soi, but that such en-soi is impermanent because its existence is
constantly in suspension; it is like a paralytic who depends upon a
machine to keep him breathing and whose life would be terminated
the moment the machine stopped working. It seems, then, that the
one form of the true metaphysical creation of which the pour-soi is
capable is, in principle, doomed to failure. Upon ascending the mountain, I am the mountain, but the en-soi which is the I that is the mountain is an en-soi that can never be realized in true permanence and
stability.
Making use of the Copernican revolution as an interpretive category, we may attempt one more and final analysis of a certain existential problem: Sartre's idea of situation. The pour-soi, in order to
be pour-soi, must be engaged. It must choose itself in a situation. The
pour-soi "exists" the situation. All of the significations, the meanings
of projects, the interpretation of rapports, the grasping of the facticity
of objects, and so on-all of these, making up the reality of the poursoi, are the pour-soi and define its existence. Now, if we admit that
through the thesis of the Copernican revolution the pour-soi constitutes
its dialectical reality ("exists" its situation) , then it must follow that
the pour-soi is responsible for its situation. Further, since the situation
of the pour-soi includes other pour-sois, it also follows that the poursoi is responsible for Others as well. If, as Sartre says, situation is possible only through choices of the pour-soi, then these choices involve
a grave responsibility, for they affect completely and profoundly the
status of Others. In Existentialism we learn that, when we choose, we
choose all mankind and involve thereby all mankind. Thus we choose
in anguish.
"EN,681.
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Since Sartre has not pursued the value question in EN, it is unnecessary for us to continue further with this analysis. We see, however, that, as an interpretive category, the thesis of Sartre's Copernican
revolution goes far toward explaining many aspects of his philosophy
which otherwise would remain unconnected or obscure. For example,
the frequently recurring statement that Being haunts the pour-soi now
becomes intelligible. The pour-soi is haunted by the en-soi which it
can never absorb or with which it can never become one; it is haunted
by its passion to make itself the Absolute: God. It is haunted also by
the fact that, while it "exists" its reality, it can never stabilize that
reality; it must re-create it at every moment. The responsibility for this
re-creation is the anguish of the pour-soi. It is anguish that haunts the
pour-soi the anguish of Being.
J

Chapter IX

FINAL EVALUATION
"Metaphysics is not a sterile discussion about abstract notions
which have nothing to do with experience. It is a living effort to
embrace from within the human condition in its totality."
-Sartre
In our introduction we described the general area of existential
thought, both literary and philosophic, and we attempted to show in
this connection that Sartre's technical philosophy cannot be understood from his popular novels or plays or public lectures, but that he
is a serious philosopher attempting to investigate the problem of Being
via a phenomenological ontology, and that it is only by an examination of his EN that a real comprehension of his philosophic thought
can be attained. We indicated further that certain fundamental questions face Sartre's projected ontology: Does phenomenology have the
inner capacity to expand into a critical theory of knowledge and into
an ontology? Is phenomenology a generalized Kantianism? And,
finally, in what sense is Sartre's variety of phenomenology indebted to
Husserl and Hegel? We shall return to these questions in order to
indicate our final conclusions regarding Sartre's answers to them.
After an exposition of the structure and content of EN, we turned to
our criticisms of the work. In the discussion of phenomenological method we described Husserl's phenomenology and attempted to show that
Sartre's method is distinctly non·Husserlian and that the only valid
sense in which it can be termed "phenomenological" is in the Hegelian
sense of the term. In this respect EN is in many ways a restatement of
the Phenomenology of Mind. The significance of Sartre's failure to
adopt Husserl's method we shall discuss later.
Next, we examined three central theses of EN: Freedom, Nothingness and Bad Faith, and Being. In the first thesis, we examined the
Sartrean concept of freedom and defended it against the attacks of
several critics who, we claimed, had misinterpreted its meaning. We
99

100

A CRITIQUE OF JEAN·PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

reserved our own criticisms of Sartre's doctrine of freedom for the
second thesis on Nothingness and Bad Faith, because this thesis is
intimately tied to the concept of freedom. Our major point of criticism
of Sartre's concept of Nothingness was that the idea of human responsibility, which is the core of the concept of Nothingness, is presented
in a paradoxical light: it is not clear from the discussions in EN
whether Bad Faith (flight from responsibility ) is a "possible" of the
pour-soi. Associated with this criticism is our discovery of the uncertain
status of the facticity (the "is·was") of the pour-soi and the role it
plays in human freedom.
In the third thesis on Being we investigated the fundamental
dualism of the en-soi and the pour-soi in Sartre's ontology. After showing that the essence of Sartre's contribution to ontology lies in the a
priori incapacity of the pour-soi to become its own foundation: to
become en-soi-pour-soi (the Absolute or God), we demonstrated that
Sartre's attempt to resolve the dualism through some sort of synthetic
liaison or idea of "detotalized totality" must prove a failure for two
main reasons: first, because the structure of the argument in EN requires the dualism, and, second, because the ideal synthesis of the
polarities of Being would transcend the reach of ontological analysis.
The final critical section is concerned with what we have termed
Sartre's Copernican revolution. The criticism raised there is that in
Sartre's description of the dialectic of relationships which holds between the en-soi and the pour-soi, there is contained implicitly an attempt to formulate at the ontological level something analagous to
Kant's revolution in epistemology. Rather than its being introduced as
a working hypothesis, Sartre's revolution, we held, is the outcome of his
kind of phenomenological inspection of what is given in experience.
The importance of raising the question of an ontological revolution
is that, having formulated the idea of a Copernican revolution, we
may then use it as an interpretive category in the analysis of other
areas in Sartre's thought which might otherwise remain obscure.
Thus, via the Copernican revolution, we re·examined such vital Sartrean concepts as "appropriation" and "situation" and were able to
secure a more complete understanding of Sartre. Finally, we showed
that through clarification of the concepts of appropriation and situation, we were able to achieve greater insight into his doctrine of human
responsibility: the profound relationship between the pour-soi, human
freedom, human responsibility, and existential anguish.
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With this summary of our work in mind, we turn now to questions
raised in the introduction.
(1) Does phenomenology have the inner capacity to expand into a
critical theory of knowledge and into an ontology? Despite the fact
that writers such as Farber have attempted to present HusserI's phenomenology as strictly philosophic method, it nevertheless remains true
that HusserI himself, in later years, developed a position in many
respects close to the transcendental idealism of the Kantians. In accepting HusserI's method in the extremely limited and partial sense we
have previously indicated, Sartre cannot be said to be part of the movement of the followers of HusserI, who are attempting to carry his work
forward in various special fields. It is not, therefore, Sartre's intention
to attempt the expansion of HusserI's phenomenology into an ontology.
We shall return later to the question of whether or not such an expansion is possible.
(2) Is phenomenology a generalized Kantianism? This question
remains a general problem confronting Husserlian phenomenology
rather than a specific question for Sartre. We have tried to show in
the section on Sartre's Copernican revolution that on the ontological
level, he faces some questions basically similar to the questions Kant
faced. The answer to the question of whether phenomenology is a
generalized Kantianism should come from HusserI rather than from
Sartre.
Perhaps the basic similarity between Husserl and Kant is that both
are profoundly concerned with a non· psychological exploration of the
categorial structure and content of subjectivity in general and of consciousness in particular. As for Kant the problem of knowledge is
referred back to cognition and is analyzed there transcendentally, so
for HusserI "Phenomenology refers the being of the worId back to the
transcendental subjectivity in whose life the worId is 'valid'." lOne
way of referring to HusserI's concern with subjectivity is to view it in
the light of the Kantian problem of the a priori. Thus, according to
Farber, "Husserl has formulated the method which is implicit in all
attempts, from Kant to Lewis, to determine the a priori aspect of
experience." 2 What is pursued by Husserl is the typically Kantian

1 Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 553.
"Ibid., 562.
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quest for that comprehension obtainable "only by an analysis which
gives an account of the part played by mind (or subjectivity) in its
relationship with that which is 'given' in experience_" 3
Although we can give no final answer to RusserI's own ideas regarding the inner capacity of phenomenology to be expanded into a
generalized Kantianism, we do know that phenomenology deals with
basically Kantian questions, that RusserI, in his later philosophizing,
turned more and more to a sympathetic interpretation of Kant and,
finally, that some of his writings indicate that, had he lived to complete
his projected work, he would have taken up many of the questions we
have considered in the course of this work, and especially the basic
questions we have now raised regarding the relationships between
phenomenology, Kantianism, and ontology. The demonstration of
RusserI's concern with these areas is revealed convincingly when Farber writes:
"It was RusserI's aim through the years to determine the genuine
concept of the analytic, as distinguished from Kant's unclear
concept of it, and to distinguish the genuine analytic ontology
from the essentially different material (synthetic-a priori)
ontology. After the appearance of the Logical Investigations he
planned a systematic theory of categories, or of the possible
regions of being; and he was careful to distinguish the phenomenological a priori from the ontological a priori." 4

We might conclude our answer to the question of the relationship
between RusserI's phenomenology and Kantianism by pointing out
that there was an agreeable and close kinship between the Marburg
school of Neo-Kantianism and RusserI's phenomenology. In the
opinion of RusserI, Natorp was one of the very few critics who understood his work as it appeared in Logical Investigations. This thread
of communal interest and mutual respect which runs through the
relationship of phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism continues to the
present day.5
3 Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 562.
• Ibid., 206.
5 It can be observed in the interest of Cassirer in phenomenology and in the interest of such representatives of the phenomenological school as Fritz Kaufman in
Neo-Kantianism. The intended "dialogue" between Cassirer and Kaufman which
was to take up these very problems was made impossible by the death of Cassirer.
See Kaufman, F .• "Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenlogy."
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(3) In what sense is Sartre's variety of phenomenology indebted to
Husserl and Hegel? We have largely answered this question in our section on phenomenological method by showing in detail what the Husserlian method of phenomenology is and how Sartre departs radically
from it. We concluded in that section that the only true sense in which
Sartre can call his ontology "phenomenological" is the Hegelian sense
of that term. Accordingly we wrote that EN is in large part a restatement of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. But the real question that
arises in this connection is: What is the significance of Sartre's abandonment of Husserlian phenomenological method? What effect does this
abandonment have on his ontological inquiry?
In the final analysis, Sartres "radical' ontology rests upon the claim
to a new method of dealing with the questions of ontology. Unless he
does use a new method, his work can be considered only as a repetition
of the old. If we realize that it has been the burden of much contemporary philosophy-the positivistic movement, in particular-to
rid philosophy of the traditional morasses and forests of empty verbiage
which have resulted from metaphysical systems, it would be only a poor
excuse for Sartre's claim to originality to have merely restated Hegelian
philosophy.
From the very start of EN, Sartre attacks prior ontologies and
philosophic positions as having led to unresolvable dualisms and impasses; phenomenological ontology is created for the very purpose of
overcoming the difficulties of this situation. Thus, Sartre's work, judged
by his own claims and intentions, can be considered a meaningfully
new approach to ancient problems only if his method is new and
distinctive. He leads us to believe that it is Husserl's method he will
employ, but then proceeds to abandon that method and, without overt
statement, returns to Hegelian phenomenology. Because of this
abandonment, he gives up the one hope he offered for precise and clear
methodology. Let us see if we can get to the heart of Sartre's reason
for departing from Husserlian method.
In accepting Husserl's idea that all consciousness is consciousness of
something, Sartre places his ontology on the terrain of Husserl's starting point: subjectivity. With Husserl, Sartre agrees that the Cartesian
point of orientation is the only true starting point in philosophic inquiry. However, where Husserl develops strict methods for the inspection of intentionality, Sartre does not. In giving up the theory of
intentionality, Sartre departs drastically from Husserlian phenomenology. His quarrel with Husserlian intentionality is, fundamentally, that
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it results in that variety of idealism which fails to found transcendent
Being.
"During his whole philosophical career, Husserl was haunted by
the idea of transcendance and passing-beyond. But the philosophic instruments which he used, in particular his idealist conception of existence, deprived him of this transcendance. His
intentionality is only the carricature of it. The Husserlian
consciousness can, in reality, transcend itself neither toward
the world nor toward the future, nor toward the past." 6
The difficulty in understanding Sartre's use of phenomenology
arises because he does not completely give up the Husserlian phenomenology. He retains its starting point in intentionality, but this
retention of the starting point is not a retention of the meaning, nature,
or use of Husserlian intentionality. All of these are given up. What
does Sartre put in their place?
We observed in an earlier section that Sartre makes considerable
use of a kind of "ontological argument." It is his use of the ontological
form of arguing that replaces the distinctive method of intentionality
as developed by Husserl. Sartre's ontological proof of transphenomenal Being begins with the idea of intentionality, with the idea, that is,
that consciousness is consciousness of something. However, he does not
continue the argument as the tradition of Anselm would have it, i.e.,
he does not argue that there must be Being because we have an idea of
it. Rather, Sartre argues that subjectivity itself is possible only on the
condition that what it is conscious of is a real and trans phenomenal
existant. Consciousness of Being, he contends, is a revealing intuition
which implies a revealed. 7 Thus, "to say that consciousness is consciousness of something, is to say that it must be produced as revelation-revealed of a being which is not it and which is given as existant
already at the time it reveals it." 8 Sartre concludes that "there is an
ontological proof valid for the whole domain of consciousness." 9
The "revealing" of Being returns us to our earlier criticism in the
section on phenomenological method in which we stated that the
concept of proof or demonstration in Sartre resolves itself into an

• EN, 152-153.
• Ibid., 28-29.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., 30.
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order of "revealing" of the status of ontological affairs. It is now possible to see that the ontological proof is not a proof in the traditional
scholastic sense but an ontologically "revealed" condition of Being.
What has Sartre gained and lost by this substitution of ontological
proof for H usserlian method? According to his own views, he has
gained that transcendance of Being which, he claims, "haunted"
Husserl's philosophizing; unfortunately, he has gained it (granting,
at present and for the sake of the argument, its validity) at the cost of
replacing any rationally comprehensible form of proof with a psychological, nearly-mystical, and ontic sort of demonstrability. This form
of demonstration is quasi-phenomenological in so far as it stems from
the Husserlian theory of intentionality, but it is non-phenomenological
in so far as it takes advantage of the "natural attitude" as its principle
of verification.
This Sartean method is consistently used only in the opening pages
of EN. After Sartre, admittedly, fails to accomplish an ontological
proof for the existence of the Other, he uses the phenomenological
method sporadically and inconsistently. Throughout the sections on
the concrete relations between selves, he leaves all forms or degrees of
phenomenology and gives us a psychologistic account of sadism,
masochism, sexuality, etc. In existential psychoanalysis he abandons
phenomenological philosophizing. Only in the last third of EN, when
he returns to the problem of human freedom, does he seek to reestablish his phenomenological lines; but by this time his analyses are
largely based on what has gone before, and this prior content, to a
great degree, reduces his analysis to existential psychoanalysis. Now,
for Sartre, existential psychoanalysis is valid because it rests upon previously established ontological foundations, but since those supposed
ontological foundations are shot through with psychologism, as well as
with genuine intutitions and keen insights-none of which being the
instruments Sartre purports to be using-the arguments based upon
these foundations cannot be validated, not even on Sartre's own
grounds.
Summarizing our criticism of Sartre's method, we may therefore
say that, through the abandonment of true Husserlian phenomenology,
Sartre invalidates his inquiry and the resultant ontology, because of
the lack of a clear and consistent method. Sartre is drawn from ontological to psychological analysis and thus fails to present a clear
theory of proof. Without such a theory of proof Sartre's ontology is
left wide open to the attacks of positivism: the general charge being
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that Sartrean terminology is meaningless and Sartre's problem a
"pseudo· problem." The nerve of the positivist attack lies in the claim
that the propositions of ontology-as of metaphysics-are nonsensical
and that, accordingly, the time has come to purge contemporary
philosophizing of such meaningless and useless hindrances to clear
thinking.
Ayer gives a concise statement of the positivistic rejection of meta·
physics when he writes:
"We may ... define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which
purports to express a genuine proposition, but does, in fact,
express neither a tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And
as tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of
significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all
metaphysical assertions are nonsensicaL" 10
With metaphysics eliminated, the concept of philosophy which remains
IS described as follows:
"The propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic
in character-that is, they do not describe the behavior of
physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or
the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly, we may
say that philosophy is a department of logic." 11
In a recent work on analytic philosophy, Arthur Pap tells us that
"a metaphysical statement is not just 'at the time unverified but unverifiable in principle." 12 Also, "according to positivist usage . . . a
me,taphysical statement is one which it is logically impossible to
verify." 13 Examples of metaphysical statements for positivist writers
are: "There was a time when matter was created" and "There is a
cause which itself is uncaused, that is, a first mover." 14 It is obvious
to any reader of EN that the complex, often obscure, figurative, and
elusive language of Sartre yields statements which are much worse
instances of what the positivists term "nonsense." It is enough to call
to mind such a key statement as Sartre's characterization of the pourAyer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, 41.
Ibid., 57.
1. Pap, A., Elements of Analytic Philosophy, 9.
,. Ibid., 10.
u Ibid., 12.
10
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soi (as that which is what it IS not and is not what it is) in order to
realize that positivists would term the great majority of sentences in
EN nonsensical. And this, in fact, is the case in Ayer's review of EN.
He berates "the attempt to endow Nothing with an activity, the fruit
of which is found in such statements as Heidegger's 'das Nichts nichtet'
or Sartre's 'Ie Neant est neantise' "15 "Whatever may be the effective
value of these statements," Ayer writes, "I cannot but think that they
are literally nonsensical." 16 His conclusion is: "What is called existentialist philosophy has become very largely an exercise in the art
of misusing the verb 'to be'." 17
How can Sartre meet such criticism? Can EN be justified as
philosophy after the onslaught of positivism? In defense of Sartre one
might attempt the following replies to the general positivistic criticism.
First, the analysis of Being is prior to any epistemological considerations. Whereas the positivist wishes to set up criteria for verifiability
of propositions, the ontologist is interested in analyzing the primal
given from which all analyses ultimately derive. The epistemologist
assumes the Being of his area of investigation in the sense that any
attempt to define Being via logical constructs removes the investigation one step from the "originary givens" of our experience and so departs from pure Being.
Second, Sartre might claim that his "phenomenological" method
offers the possibility of verifying the propositions concerning Being
and Nothingness which he formulates. In some sense, this method does
center about the formulation of arguments on the basis of individual
and direct insights into and inspections of the given. The idea that
truths regarding the given will be revealed to the phenomenologist is
then a basic departure from the main line of contemporary philosophic
analysis. This departure is what makes Sartre's, at least in part, a
"radical" ontology. Since the positivist rules out by definition verification through "revelation," he can never hope to comprehend
Sartre's method or results.
Third, the difficulty which the positivist has in understanding
Sartre's work is one partially of philosophic orientation, temperament,
and sympathy. Although in the course of this work we have not
,. Ayer, A. J., "Novelist-philosophers, V, Jean-Paul Sartre," Horizon, July, Vol.
XII, No. 67, 1945, 16.
1. I bid., 19.
17

Ibid., 25.
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stressed the "irrational" aspect of Sartre's philosophy, it must be recalled that existential philosophy has such a quality.18 We understand the irrationalism of EN when we realize that the pour-soi is
Nothingness and that, as Nothingness, it cannot support itself with the
traditional categories of thought. Sartre, therefore, forsakes all theories
which hold for an essence of man, and brings forth instead his categories of anguish and nihilation. Sartre's countercharge against the
positivists might be that they are a part of the tradition of philosophy
which clings to the rationalist categories and which holds for an
essence of man-a hU,man nature. The implicit presupposition of
thinkers like Ayer is that the world is of such a nature that logical
analysis may reveal its structure. But Sartre might argue that without
ontological analysis such a position is unwarranted.
Fourth, the considerations stated above regarding the radical categoriology of existentialism lead to an important difference between
Sartrean and positivistic analysis. The existentialist claims that he is
exploring areas of human reality which are closed to positivistic approaches. It is certainly clear that, apart from the validity of Sartre's
work, he has attempted to analyze the concepts of human freedom,
choice, and so on. Positivists have excluded such concepts from their
work for various reasons: that they are the proper object of study for
different disciplines- psychology or social theory; that empirical verification of propositions concerning human freedom (in the way that
Sartre deals with the problem) is impossible in principle. Sartre,
however, might answer these arguments by asserting that the ontological investigation of man's "situation" cannot be the work of special
disciplines, because they all begin by presupposing the very object of
ontological inquiry: the Being of man. Further, existentialism is reacting against the system of traditional and fixed categories of the
special sciences. Man's existential fear, dread, suffering, aloneness,
and anguish are incomprehensible when viewed as psychological or
psychiatric disturbances to be cured by proper clinical therapy. Similarly, the existential category of responsibility of the pour-soi is meaningless if it is understood in terms of the "responsibility" of the business executive, the civic "responsibility" of the citizen, or the religious
"responsibility" of the Christian. The positivists, on the other hand,
deny validity to the existential area of inquiry by fiat: they assert that

18

See Introduction.
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all areas not the objects of positivistic inquiry are necessarily referred
to the special sciences.
Fifth, Sartre may claim that his ontology is in the tradition of
"perennial philosophy." This statement is more than an argument
ad vericundum. Jaspers writes of the spirit of perennial philosophy:
"Today as at all times we must do the work of the philosophical
craft: develop the categories and methods that constitute the
structure of our basic knowledge, orient ourselves in the cosmos
of the sciences, assimilate the history of philosophy, practice
speculative thinking in metaphysics, and apply the elucidating
methods of existential philosophy.
The aim of philosophy is at all times to achieve the independence of man as an individual. This he gains by establishing a relation to authentic being. He gains independence of
everything that happens in the world by the depth of his attachment to transcendance.· What Lao Tse found in the Tao,
Socrates in the divine mission and in knowledge, Jeremiah in
Yahweh who revealed himself to him, what Boethius, Bruno,
Spinoza knew: that was what made them independent." 19
Perennial philosophy has as its quest what Plato called "the healing
of our unwisdom." But, more precisely, the meaning of perennial
philosophy centers about a rich appreciation of the great questions
and answers of the history of philosophy, and is a passionate concern
with the problems raised by the dominant figures of philosophic inquiry. We must be careful to state here that agreement with the core
of perennial philosophy does not compel the contemporary thinker to
accept any special philosophic position nor to hold that every utterance ever made by an important philosopher is in some degree true.
Rather, perennial philosophy is desirous of keeping intact the dialectic
of history of philosophy so that what has been gained in insight over
the past centuries will not be either overlooked or purposely ignored
in the rush of certain contemporary thinkers to ostracize from philosophy everything which dates earlier than the work of Frege. It is
agreed that the idea of perennial philosophy is a "loose" and undemanding one, but its importance is to be observed, ironically, more
in those who revolt against it with a great show of indignation than
in those who accept it as a worthy guide and a meaningful directive.

10

Jaspers, K., The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, 166.
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Sartre's place in perennial philosophy is assured in the sense that
he raises again the great metaphysical question of Being. Thus, he is
in that line of philosophizing which begins with Aristotle and contains
in its ranks the names of Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Descartes, Kant,
Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. The "unwisdom" of many of the positivists lies in their rejecting, by ex cathedra pronouncement, this history of problems related to theory of Being, basing their action on the
assertion that the problem of Being is unresolvable. The advice of
perennial philosophy is that "unresolvable" problems are no less the
province of philosophic study than are "resolvable" ones, and that the
worth of philosophy lies as much in questions that are raised as in the
solutions to those questions, as much in clarifying the "unresolvable"
as in solving the resolvable. "Science and philosophy," Santayana
writes, "cast a net of words into the sea of being, happy in the end if
they draw anything out besides the net itself, with some holes in it."
Last, in responding with Sartre to the accusations of positivism, we
must be careful to admit some of the similarities between these seemingly completely contradictory and disparate positions. The basic
similarity we shall stress is one of historical genesis. Both positions are
seriously concerned with the Cartesian-Husserlian problem of the proper starting point in philosophizing. Both positions are in some sense
thrown back upon the cogito as the only certain point of orientation.
Both positions are in approximate agreement in the usage of methodological solipsism as the key to correct philosophical procedure. Sartre
might claim that £r~m this point on the dissimilarities multiply because ontology analyzes the primordial level of the human reality and
positivism goes 'forward' to the analysis of language, formal methods,
and the complexus of problems associated with these. Whereas Sartre
desires a phenomenological explication of the subject-pole of experience, positivism turns to an analysis of the object-pole by use of
hypothetico-deductive methods. These comparisons must not be misconstrued to imply that Sartrean existentialism and modern positivism
are basically alike or that they may be synthesized: such an assertion
would be completely false. We have attempted only to point out, in
the vast welter of obvious differences between the two positions, a
basic similarity which derives from the historico-genetic aspects of both
existentialism and positivism.
It must be remembered that, for the main part, the above replies
to positivistic criticisms of Sartre are attempts to formulate those
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answers which Sartre himself might give to his critics. However, we
are not in agreement with all of these answers and do not think that
they fully exonerate Sartre's inadequacies and weaknesses. Our basic
criticism throughout this work has been that Sartre's failure to
make use of true Husserlain phenomenology deprives his work of the
method necessary to a successful ontological .investigation. We have
gone so far as to assert that this methodological failure basically
invalidates Sartre's ontology. We have not attempted to answer the
question which has been raised by the positivists: Is ontology a valid
area of philosophic inquiry?, for an answer to this question, were it to
be done adequately, would require a separate study. But in order to
give some indication of what our answer might be, we may once again
turn to HusserI's phenomenology and may try to see what possibilities
it contains intrinsically which might qualify it as the proper instrument
for ontological inquiry. Let us first see what HusserI himself has contributed to the general question of the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics.
At first glance it might appear that HusserI's phenomenology is
incommensurable with metaphysics. Since HusserI's phenomenological
program is to develop a method which will make philosophy a
"rigorous science," it seems that the dark tangles and confusions of
metaphysics would be the first things to be eliminated from this program. HusserI says:
"Profundity is the symptom of a chaos which true science must
strive to resolve into a cosmos, i.e., into a simple, unequivocal,
pellucid order. True science, insofar as it has become definable
doctrine, knows no profundity. Every science, or part of a
science, which has attained finality, is a coherent system of
reasoning operations each of which is immediately intelligible;
thus, not profound at all. Profundity is the concern of wisdom;
that of methodical theory is conceptual clarity and distinctness.
To reshape and transform the dark gropings of profundity into
unequivocal, rational propositions: that is the essential act in
methodically constituting a new science." 20
However, our problem is the interpretation of HusserI's philosophy
and its internal relationships with metaphysics. The quotation just
•• Hussed, E., "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,"; quoted and translated in
"Phenomenology and Metaphysics," by Landgrebe, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. X, No.2 (December, 1949), 197.
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given sets the stage for the inquiry and does not give us any sort of final
answer. We must remember that phenomenological method is a
propaedeutic to all disciplines and branches of philosophy, and that,
therefore, it bears some distinct relationship to metaphysics. The first
indication ef what this relationship might be is given by Farber when
he writes:
"The characteristic concepts of metaphysics, such as being,
reality, object, etc., are clarified in a preliminary way by being
referred back to the rudimentary level of experience from which
they first derive their sense." 21
The "rudimentary level" is the level of pure consciousness divorced
from the "natural attitude." It is here that the first distinction vital to
comprehending the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics
must be found: phenomenology is concerned with a priori grounds of
Being as they may be grasped in the intuitions of the pure ego. Phenomenology is not concerned with metaphysics as the a priori analysis
of Being in general; i.e., with an investigation of the structures of Being apart from their foundation in the content of consciousness as

intuited elements.
"Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical only with respect to the
tradition. It attempts the construction of a priori sciences on
the basis of concrete intuition-such sciences as pure grammar,
p'lre logic, pure law, the eidetic science of the world intutitively
apprehended, etc., and the elaboration of a general ontology of
the objective world which embraces everything. This is metaphysics, says Husserl, if it is true that the ultimate knowledge
of being may be called metaphysics. Rejecting the traditional
metaphysics because of its speculative excesses, he sets up his
own 'apodictic' theory. Eidetic descriptions of constitutive experiences take the place of physical reality." 22
Thus, while metaphysics is admissible in so far as its foundations
are phenomenologically grounded in the intuitions of consciousness,
the traditional speculative metaphysics is rejected and "the problem
of an a priori ontology of the real world, which is intended "to make

n Farber, M., "Phenomenology," op. cit., 363 •
•• Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 533.
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clear its universal structure as conforming to intuitively given essential
laws, is not truly philosophical in Husserl's sense." 23
Let us look more carefully into Husserl's rejection of speculative
metaphysics. The "quest for Being" which characterizes traditional
metaphysics is really a quest for the origin of Being. It was the contribution of Kant to show that "the origin of the whole of Being cannot be anything actually to be met with ... as a part of the existing
universe." 24 The reaction of idealism to this insight was the attempt to
locate the Absolute in human subjectivity. "But the relation of the
absolute, Mind, as subjectivity, to mind as human consciousness, was
never fully clarified and this lack of clarity brought about the shipwreck of idealism." 25 It is at this point that phenomenology takes up
the problem of Being and offers a solution by redefining the idealist
principle of the dependence of experience upon the subjectivity into
the phenomenological principle of the dependence of the structure of
experience upon the meaning-endowing acts of consciousness.
"The world, the totality of all Being, into whose 'origin' metaphysics inquires, is not a sum or collection of objects known and
fixed from the outset, but that articulated into objects as it
presents itself to us, it is but the result or function of the performances (Leistungen) of subjectivity, in which it constitutes
itself as a world. Already Kant's 'categories,' no less than the
Leibnizian idea of the vis apperceptiva of the monad, had been
the first stirrings of the discovery of this functional dependence
of the world on subjectivity." 26
Speculative metaphysics gives way to phenomenological metaphysics, and the abstractness of speculative thought gives way to the
concreteness of phenomenological intuition. In this radical sense,
"metaphysics is an answer to the question of Being, of its meaning and
origin, of the origin of the universe, and the absolute Being-not by
puzzling out a dimly suspected behind-the-world, beyond all possible
knowledge, but by analyzing 'performances' and functions of consciousness." 27

'3 Farber, M., The Foundation of Phenomenology, 532 .
•• Landgrebe, op. cit., 202 .
•• Ibid .
•• Ibid., 203.
•• Ibid., 204.
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We are thus on the true terrain of Russerlian phenomenology,
which offers to us the distinctive method for the analysis of consciousness. To pursue our problem any further would require a detailed
study of phenomenology and RusserI's life-work, a task which is beyond
the scope of this study. Our sole purpose in raising the question of
the relationship between metaphysics and phenomenology was to show
in a general way how RusserI's phenomenological method might be
used in an ontological investigation. Since we brought up the problem
of the relationship between metaphysics and phenomenology in regard
to the positivistic attack against ontology, it is valuable to note that
whatever the accomplishments and validity of the positivistic criticism
of metaphysics, the positivists have not investigated the possibility of
a true phenomenological ontology, and their criticisms of speculative
metaphysics, therefore, have not been shown to be valid also against
the RusserIian approach.
Our study of Sartre's EN leads us to conclude that the problem of
Being which he investigates is a genuine philosophical problem but
that his solution of this problem is fundamentally inadequate because
of his failure to develop and make use of an appropriate phenomenological method. While we cannot accept Sartre's main conclusions, we
must commend his efforts in raising once again vitally important
philosophic issues which much of contemporary philosophy has tended
to ignore or defame. Sartre's work is intimately connected with "perennial philosophy," and the questions he raises concerning man's Being,
freedom, anguish, and responsibility are crucial problems which philosophy must attempt to clarify and answer. Sartre's shortcomings
have thus prepared the way for an advance beyond quasi-phenomenological ontology. Whether or not this advance, making use of RusserI's
method, will succeed, we leave an open question. Sartre's greatest
achievement is to have returned us to the nexus of philosophic problems concerned with the ultimate isomorphism between human subjectivity and human reality. We are returned, then, to the profound
core of Kant's Copernican revolution and to the question: Can phenomenological ontology complete or advance beyond the Copernican
revolution?

APPENDIX

Appendix
All quotations from L'P-tre et Ie Neant have been translated from
the original French by the author of this work. To date, there
has been no translation of L'P-tre et Ie N eant into English. All other
quotations from foreign languages have been translated from the
original source by the author of this work with the exception of
a few instances which are clearly noted in the footnotes involved.
The following French quotations are the originals from which the
main quotations in this work have been taken. Each quotation is
identified by the number of the page in this work on which the translation appears, and the footnote on that page which gives the reference
to the original work.
Page 14, footnote 22 (Varet, G., L'Ontologie de Sartre, 17)
"L'echec de la critique kantienne commence avec l'idee que la
theorie de la connaissance peut se faire de falion independante,
sans une ontologie."
Page 14, footnote 23 (Varet, G., L'Ontologie de Sartre, 15)
"Dans l'idee critique, toute question sur l'etre appelle l'examen
des conditions pour Ie connaitre ... Ainsi, chez Heidegger et chez
Sartre, toute question philosophique a pour propriete-c'est
l'essence meme d'une question philosophique-de renvoyer aux
possibles de cette question. Dans ce sens precis, tout existentialiste
conscient, phenomenologue ou non, Sartre en particulier, est largement tributaire de la 'Revolution' Kantienne, qui est bien une des
acquisitions fondamentales de la philosophie moderne: ce doit etre
desormais Ie caract ere distinctif de toute philosophie que d'inclure
dans sa propre probIematique l'entreprise philosophique dans son
ensemble, et partant Ie philosophie lui-meme."
Page 32, footnote 10 (EN, 299)
"la verite est verite du Tout. Et il se place du point de la verite,
c'est-a.-dire du Tout pour envisager Ie probleme de l'autre. Ainsi, •
lorsque Ie monisme hegelien considere la relation des consciences,
il ne se place en aucune conscience particuliere. Bien que Ie Tout
soit a. realiser, il est deja comme la verite de tout ce qui est vrai;
aussi, lorsque Hegel ecrit que toute conscience etant identique avec
117
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elle-meme est autre que l'autre, il s'est etabli dans Ie tout, en dehors
des consciences et les considere du point de vue de l'Absolu."
Page 33, footnote 11 (EN,299)
"l'optimisme de Hegel aboutit a un echec: entre l'objet-autrui et
moi-sujet, il n'y a aucune commune mesure, pas plus qU'entre la
conscience (de) soi et la conscience de l'autre. Je ne puis pas me
connaitre en autrui si autrui est d'abord objet pour moi et je ne
peux pas non plus saisir autrui dans son etre vrai, c'est-a-dire dans
sa subjectivite. Aucune connaissance universelle ne peut etre tiree
de la relation des consciences. C'est ce que nous appellerons leur
separation ontologique."
Page 39, footnote 51 (EN,389-390)
"Nous avons renonce a nous doter d'abord d'un corps pour etudier
ensuite la fac;on dont nous saisissons ou modifions Ie monde a
travers lui. Mais, au contra ire, nous avons donne pour fondement
au devoilement du corps comme tel, notre relation originelle au
monde, c'est-a-dire notre surgissement meme au milieu de l'etre.
Loin que Ie corps soit pour nous premier et qu'il nous devoile les
choses, ce sont les choses-ustensiles qui, dans leur apparition originelle, nous indiquent notre corps."
Page 41, footnote 60 (EN, 413)
"ces froncements de sourcils, cette rougeur ... qui semblent ...
menac;ants n' expriment pas la col ere, ils sont la colere. Mais il
faut bien l'entendre: en soi-meme un poing serre n'est rien et ne
signifie rien. Mais aussi ne percevons-nous jamais un poing serre:
nous percevons un homme qui, dans une certaine situation, serre
Ie poing. Cet acte signifiant considere en liaison avec Ie passe et
les possibles, compris a partir de la totalite synthetique 'corps en
situation,' est la co1ere."
Page 41, footnote 61 (EN,418)
"Le corps pour autrui est l'objet magique par excellence. Ainsi,
Ie corps d'autrui est-il toujours 'corps-plus-que-corps,' parce qu'autrui m'est donne sans intermediaire et totalement dans Ie depassement perpetuel de sa facticite."
Page 42, footnote 62 (EN, 418-419)
"J'existe mon corps: telle est sa premiere dimension d'etre. Mon
corps est utilise et connu par autrui: telle est sa seconde dimension.

APPENDIX

119

Mais en tant que je suis pour autrui, autrui se devoile a moi comme
Ie sujet pour lequel je suis objet. II s'agit meme la, nous l'avons
vu, de ma relation fondamentale avec autrui. J'existe donc pour
moi comme connu par autrui-en particulier dans ma facticite
meme. J'existe pour moi comme connu par autrui a titre de corps.
Telle est la troisieme dimension ontologique de mon corps."
Page 49, footnote 9 (EN, 515)
"ttre, pour Ie pour-soi, c'est neantiser l'en-soi qu'il est. Dans ces
conditions, la liberte ne saurait etre rien autre que cette neantisation. C'est par elle que Ie pour-soi echappe a son etre comme a son
essence, c'est par elle qu'il est toujours autre chose que ce qu'on
peut dire de lui, car ... [Ie pour-soi] est deja par dela Ie nom qu'on
lui donne, la propriete qu'on lui reconnait. Dire que Ie pour-soi a
a etre ce qu'il est, dire qu'il est ce qu'il n'est pas en n'etant pas ce
qu'il est, dire qu'en lui l'existence precede et conditionne l'essence
ou ... que pour lui 'Wesen ist was gewesen ist,' c'est dire une
seule et meme chose, a savoir que l'homme est libre."
Page 50, footnote 14 (EN, 569)
"A desir egal d'escalade, Ie rocher sera aise a gravir pour tel ascensionniste athlCtique, difficile pour tel autre, novice, mal entraine et au corps malingre. Mais Ie corps ne se revele a son tour
comme bien ou mal entraine que par rapport a un choix libre.
C'est parce que je suis Ia et que j'ai fait de moi ce que je suis que
Ie rocher developpe par rapport a mon corps un coefficient d'adversite. Pour l'avocat demeure a la ville et qui plaide, Ie corps
dissimule sous sa robe d'avocat, Ie rocher n'est ni difficile ni aise a
gravir: il est fondu dans la totalite 'monde' sans en emerger aucunement."
Page 51, footnote 16 (EN, 577-578)
"Examinons de plus pres ce paradoxe: la liberte etant choix est
changement. Elle se definit par la fin qU'elle pro-jette, c'est-a-dire
par Ie futur qU'elle a a etre. Mais, precisement parce que Ie futur
est l' etat-qui n' est-pas-encore de ce qui est, il ne peut se concevoir
que dans une etroite liaison a ce qui est. Et ce ne saurait etre ce
qui est qui eclaire ce qui n'est pas encore: car ce qui est manque
et, par suite, ne peut etre connu comme tel qu'a partir de ce dont
il manque."
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Page 55, footnote 8 (EN, 694)
"cansidererions-nous l'etude de M. Bachelard sur l'eau, qui fourmille d'aper~us ingenieux et profonds, comme un ensemble de
suggestions, comme une collection precieuse de materiaux qui defraient etre utilises, a present, par une psychanalyse consciente de
ses principes."
Page 55, footnote 11 (EN, 700)
"Le visqueux est docile. Seulement, au moment meme ou je crois
Ie posseder, voila que, par un curieux renversement, c'est lui qui
me possede. C'est la qU'apparait son caractere essentiel: sa mollesse
fait ventouse. L'objet que je tiens dans ma main, s'il est solide, je
peux Ie lacher quand il me plait; son inertie symbolise pour moi
mon entiere puissance: je Ie fonde, mais il ne me fonde point ...
voici que Ie visqueux renverse les termes: Ie Pour-soi est soudain
compromis. J'ecarte les mains, je veux lacher Ie visqueux et il adhere a moi, il me pompe, il m'aspire;" son mode d'etre n'est ni
l'inertie reassurante du solide, ni un dynamisme camme celui de
l'eau qui s'epuise a me fuir: c'est une activite molle, baveuse et
feminine d'aspiration, il vit obscurement sous mes doigts et je
sense comme un vertige, il m'attire ... comme Ie fond d'un precipice pourrait m'attirer. II y a comme une fascination tactile du
visqueux. Je ne suis plus Ie maitre d'arreter Ie processus d'appropriation."
Page 58, footnote 2 (EN,639)
"l'homme, etant candamne a etre libre, porte Ie poids du monde
tout entier sur ses epaules: il est responsable du monde et de luimeme en tant que maniere d'etre ... la responsabilite du pour-soi
est accablante, puisqu'il est celui par qui il se fait qu'il y ait un
monde; et, puisqu'il est aussi celui qui se fait etre, quelle que soit
donc la situation ou il se trouve, Ie pour-soi doit assumer entierement cette situation ... avec la conscience orgueilleuse d'en etre
l'auteur ... la situation est mienne ... parce qU'elle est l'image de
mon libre choix de moi-meme et tout ce qu'elle me presente est
mien en ce que cela me represente et me symbolise."
Page 58, footnote 4 (EN, 579)
"la signification du passe est etroitement dependante de mon projet present. Cela ne signifie nullement que je puis faire varier au
gre de mes caprices Ie sens de mes actes anterieurs; mais, bien au
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contraire, que Ie projet fondamental que je suis decide absolument
de Ia signification que peut avoir pour moi et pour Ies autres, Ie
passe que j'ai a etre. Moi-seul en efIet peut decider a chaque moment de Ia portee du passe: non pas en discutant, en deliberant et
en appreciant en chaque cas l'importance de tel ou tel evenement
anterieur, mais en me pro-jetant vers mes buts, je sauve Ie passe avec
moi et je decide par l'action de sa signification. Cette crise mystique
de rna quinzieme annee, qui decidera si elle 'a ete' pur accident de
puberte ou au contraire premier signe d'une conversion future?
Moi, selon que je deciderai-a vingt ans, a trente ans-de me convertir. Le projet de conversion confere d'un seul coup a une crise
d'adolescence Ia valeur d'une premonition que je n'avais pas prise
au serieux."
Page 59, footnote 9 (EN, 680-681)
"dans Ia mesure ou je m'apparais comme creant Ies objets par Ie
seul rapport d'appropriation, ces objets sont moi. Le stylo et la
pipe, Ie vetement, Ie bureau, Ia maison, c'est moi. La totalite de
mes possessions reflechit Ia totalite de mon etre. Je suis ce que
j'ai. C'est moi que je touche sur cette tasse, sur ce bibelot. Cette
montagne que je gravis, c'est moi dans Ia mesure ou je Ia vaincs;
et Iorsque je suis a son sommet, que j'ai 'acquis,' au prix de memes
efforts, ce large point de vue sur Ia vallee et sur Ies cimes environnates, je suis Ie point de vue; Ie panorama, c'est moi dilate
jusqu'a l'horizon, car il n'existe que par moi, que pour moi."
Page 72, footnote 28 (EN, 28)
"C'est en vain qu'on tentera un tour de passe-passe, en fondant Ia
realite de l'objet sur Ia plenitude subjective impressionnelle et son
objectivite sur Ie non-etre: jamais l'objectif ne sortira du subjectif,
ni Ie transcendant de l'immanence, ni l'etre du non-etre. Mais,
dira-t-on, Husser! definit precisement Ia conscience comme une
transcendance. En efIet: c'est Ia ce qu'il pose; et c'est sa decouverte
essentielle. Mais ... il est totalement infideIe a son principe."
Page 72, footnote 29 (EN, 28)
"La conscience est conscience de quelque chose: cela signifie que
Ia transcendance est structure constitutive de Ia conscience; c'esta-dire que Ia conscience nail portee sur un etre qui n'est pas elle.
C'est ce que nous appelons Ia preuve ontologique."
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Page 72, footnote 30 (EN, 28-29)
"Dire que la conscience est conscience de quelque chose cela signifie qu'il n'y a pas d'etre pour la conscience en dehors de cette
obligation precise d'etre intuition reveIante de quelque chose,
c'est-a-dire d'un etre transcendant _ . _ Or, une intuition revelante
implique un reveIe_ La subjectivite absolue ne peut se constituer
qu'en face d'un reveIe, l'immanence ne peut se definir que dans la
saisie d'un transcendant."
Page 83, footnote 20 (EN, 109)
"On se met de mauvaise foi comme on s'endort et on est de mauvaise foi comme on reve_ Vne fois ce mode d'etre realise, il est
aussi difficile d'en sortir que de se reveiller: c'est que la mauvaise
foi est un type d' etre dans Ie monde, comme la veille ou Ie reve,
qui tend par lui-meme a se perpetuer_"
Page 84, footnote 22 (EN, Ill)
"Si la mauvaise foi est possible, c'est qu'elle est la menace immediate et permanente de tout projet de l'etre humain, c'est que
la conscience red!le en son etre un risque permanent de mauvaise
foi_ Et l'origine de ce risque, c'est que la conscience, a la fois et
dans son etre, est ce qu'elle n'est pas et n'est pas ce qu'elle est."
Pages 87-88, footnote 24 (EN, 7 11-7 12)
"Ie Pour-soi et l'En-soi sont reunis par une liaison synthetique
qui n'est autre que Ie Pour-soi lui-meme_ Le Pour-soi, en eifet,
n'est pas autre chose que la pure neantisation de l'En-soi; il est
comme un trou d'etre au sein de l't:tre ___ Le Pour-soi n'a d'autre
realite que d'etre la neantisation de l'etre_ Sa seule qualification
lui vient de ce qu'il est neantisation de l'En-soi individuel et
singulier et non d'un etre en generaL Le Pour-soi n'cest pas Ie
neant en general mais une privation singuW!re; il se constitue en
privation de eet etre-ei_"
Page 88, footnote 25 (EN, 712)
"Nous n'avons done pas lieu de nous interroger sur la maniere dont
Ie pour-soi peut s'unir a l'en-soi puisque Ie pour-soi n'est aucunement une substance autonome_"
Pages 88-89, footnote 26 (EN, 715-716)
"l'en-soi et Ie pour-soi ne sont pas juxtaposes_ Bien au contraire, Ie
pour-soi sans l'en-soi est que1que chose comme un abstrait: il ne
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saurait pas plus exister qU'une couleur sans forme ou qu'un son
sans hauteur et sans timbre; une conscience qui ne serait conscience
de rien serait un rien absolu."
Page 89, footnote 27 (EN, 716)
"si la conscience est liee a l'en-soi par une relation interne, cela ne
signifie-t-il pas qu'elle s'articule avec lui pour constituer une
totalite et n'est-ce pas a cette totalite que revient la denomination
d' etre ou de realite? Sans doute, Ie pour-soi est neantisation, mais,
a titre de neantisation, il est; et il est en unite a priori avec l'ensoi."
Page 89, footnote 28 (EN, 716)
"si nous devions considerer l' etre total comme constitue par l' organisation synthetique de l'en-soi et du pour-soi, n'allons-nous pas
retrouver Ia difficulte que nous voulions eviter? Ce hiatus que
nous decelions dans Ie concept d'etre, n'allons-nous pas Ie rencontrer a present dans l'existant Iui-meme?"
Page 90, footnote 31 (EN, 716-717)
"Si nous voulions concevoir une organisation synthetique telle que
Ie pour-soi soit inseparable de l'en-soi et que, reciproquement,
l'en-soi soit indissolublement liee au pour-soi, il faudrait Ia concevoir de telle sorte que l'en-soi rec;;oive son existence de Ia neantisation qui en fait prendre conscience. Qu'est-ce a dire sinon que
la totalite indissoluble d'en-soi et de pour-soi n'est concevable que
sous Ia forme de l'etre 'cause de soi.' "
Page 90, footnote 32 (EN, 717)
"Ie reel est un effort avorte pour atteindre a la dignite de cause-desoi. Tout se passe comme si Ie monde, I'homme et I'homme-dansle-monde n'arrivaient a realiser qu'un Dieu manque. Tout se
passe donc comme si l' en-soi et Ie pour-soi se presentaient en etat
de desintegration par rapport a une synthese ideale. Non que
l'integration ait jamais eu lieu, mais precisement au contraire
parce qu'elle est toujours indiquee et toujours impossible. C'est Ie
perpetuel echec qui explique a la fois l'indissolubilite de l'en-soi
et du pour-soi et leur relative independance."
Page 96, footnote 5 (EN, 680-681)
"La totalite de mes possessions reflechit la totalite de mon etre. Je
suis ce que j'ai. C'est moi que je touche sur cette tasse, sur ce
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bibelot. Cette montagne que je gravis, c'est moi dans la mesure OU
je la vaincs; et lorsque je suis a son sommet, que rai 'acquis,' au
prix de memes efforts, ce large point de vue sur la vallee et sur les
cimes environnantes, je suis Ie point de vue; Ie panorama, c'est moi
dilate jusqu'a 1'horizon, car il n'existe que par moi, que pour moi."
Pages 96-97, footnote 6 (EN, 681)
"La possession est un rapport magique; je suis ces objets que je
possede, mais dehors, face a moi; je les cree comme independants
de moi; ce que je possede, c'est moi hors de moi, hors de toute subjectivite, comme un en-soi qui m'echappe a chaque instant et dont
je perpetue a chaque instant la creation."
Page 104, footnote 6 (EN, 152-153)
"Husser! a ete, tout au long de sa carriere philosophique, hante
par 1'idee de la transcendance et du depassement. Mais les instruments philosophiques dont il disposait, en particulier sa conception idealiste de l' existence, lui otaient les moyens de rendre
compte de cette transcendance: son intentionnalite n'en est que la
caricature. La conscience husserlienne ne peut en realite se
transcender ni vers Ie monde, ni vers 1'avenir, ni vers Ie passe."
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